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This study examines the governance of social protection in Egypt. In light of rising poverty 
rates and economic and political instability, the government of Egypt has started shifting part 
of its focus towards reforming the social protection system, especially after the revolution in 
2013. Because economic reforms have not translated in household income growth and since 
the currency devaluation have worsened socio-economic conditions, it is crucial and timely to 
examine the social protection arena in Egypt, focusing predominantly on the conditions and 
challenges of the governance of the system. This study adopts a framework that identifies three 
operational entry points of governance— Rules, Roles and Controls— as well as two spheres 
of analysis— program and sector levels. Twelve in-depth interviews with policy-makers and 
experts in relevant governmental, international and non-governmental bodies are used. The 
analysis focuses on the level of the social protection system as a whole and the program level, 
by examinig the contributory social insurance system as well as the non-contributory cash 
transfer programs, Takaful and Karama. Although Egypt has reformed the legislative 
framework of the social protection system, this analysis finds that the system still faces a 
number of shortcomings. Social protection in Egypt is confronted with the challenge of 
inadequate inter-ministerial coordination which hampers the establishment of a 
comprehensive, coherent and sustainable system that achieves social justice. The programs 
show a disconnect between design and implementation. Indeed, the two programs have 
designed and developed an adequate institutional infrastructure and monitoring and evaluation 
capacity. However, they face diverse implementation challenges. The recommendations of this 
analysis center around the establishment of an institutional home for social protection, the 
establishment of a common vision, the development of the necessary institutional and 
administrative capacity, a rigorous monitoring and evaluation toolkit, undergoing regular 
governance examinations, among others.   
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1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
The Arab Spring has highlighted the need for a new era of social justice in the Middle East 
and still. Social Protection (SP) issues were set aside after the revolution and more attention 
was given to political turn-overs, power arrangements as well as religious-secular conflicts 
(Gamal, et al., 2014). Nine years after the revolution, the concept of social justice is regaining 
its importance in the Arab region and governments are starting to recognize the importance of 
shifting a part of their focus to the development of adequate SP systems, an endeavor that was 
initiated right before the revolution in many countries but was halted due to the rebellions and 
later the eruption of conflict in many countries (Jawad, Jones, & Messkoub, 2019a).  
A growing youth population, rising levels of food insecurity, political and economic 
instability as well as poverty and spatial inequality are some of the obstacles facing Egypt and 
its commitment towards SP (Selwaness & Messkoub, 2019). Egypt is a lower middle-income 
country (World Bank, 2017) which faces persistent socio-economic challenges. Poverty rates 
grew from 26.3% in 2012 (WFP, 2013) to 32.5% in 2017-2018 (World Bank, 2019), whilst 
food insecurity rates rose from 14% in 2009 up to 17.2% in 2011 (World Bank, 2019). 
According to the 2014-2015 Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Expenditure 
Survey (HIECS), one in every four Egyptians is poor and almost one in every two citizens is 
poor or near poor (ERF, CAPMAS, 2014, as cited in: Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). 
Moreover, a very large percentage of the country’s middle class is vulnerable to shocks and 
risks and can therefore, fall easily below the poverty line (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). For 
this reason, the country has been undertaking several economic reforms that have so far 
improved the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  from 4.2% in 2016 to 5.3% in 2018 (WFP, 
2019). Nevertheless, this has not translated in household income growth. Indeed, poverty keeps 
rising while income of the bottom 40% keeps declining (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). This 
highlights the importance of developing an effective and efficient social protection system. 
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The Egyptian government, aware of the importance of putting in place a SP system that 
cushions the effects of the current political and economic reforms on the middle class as well 
as those living in poverty, has pledged to expand social safety nets (SSN) and their coverage 
for the most vulnerable (Government of Egypt, 2015). Using savings gathered from the energy 
subsidy reforms gradually adopted since 2014 as well as the reforms that were made to the 
whole subsidy system (Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform, 2019), 
the country aims to transform the design, delivery and scope of the current SP programs. This 
is why, the government has increased spending on social security and social assistance 
programs while it reduced spending on the subsidy system (Ministry of Planning, Monitoring 
and Administrative Reform, 2018). The evolution of social policies is therefore important and 
requires an in-depth analysis of developments in the country (Ameta & El Shafie, 2015). 
1.1. Statement of the problem 
Although there is no universally accepted definition of social protection, all definitions 
highlight the fact that social protection grants an effective response to poverty and vulnerability 
in the Global South (Barrientos & Hulme, 2008; Arjona, Ladaique, & Pearson, 2003; Holmes 
& Slater, 2007). Social protection measures provide a response to risk, deprivation, poverty 
and vulnerability which is accepted by the polity and the society (Conway, De Haan, & Norton, 
2000).  
As previously mentioned, Egypt is currently at a potential turning point in its efforts to 
reform the social protection system (Selwaness & Messkoub, 2019). In addition to the rise in 
poverty, the structural adjustment programs as well as the political instability, the government 
of Egypt has recognized the deficiencies in the existing SP system and has committed to 
improve targeting and delivery systems as well as reform the legacy programs that were neither 
efficient nor effective (World Bank, 2015). With regards to SSN, the government is slowly 
moving away from universal subsidies to more targeted programs (Selwaness & Messkoub, 
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2019). In 2014, the government introduced reforms to the food subsidy system (FSS) which 
aimed at enhancing the supply chain, providing the beneficiaries with a number of subsidized 
commodities to diversify their consumption, among others (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). 
Moreover, the government has set aside 10-15% of the savings from the structural subsidy 
reforms to launch Takaful and Karama, the country’s first targeted cash transfer program 
(World Bank, 2015, p. 4). Finally, new social insurance and health insurance laws have been 
passed in the last two years to transform the systems. The new social insurance law tries to 
mitigate many of the challenges of the old system, whereas the health insurance law provide 
universal health insurance (Selwaness & Messkoub, 2019).  
Design and capacity limitations are some of the major challenges facing most developing 
countries in the extension of social protection programs (Barrientos & Hulme, 2009). 
Developing countries face a number of challenges at all levels of the policy cycle, starting with 
the design of the program, to the service delivery, institutional capacity as well as evaluation 
mechanisms (Barrientos & Hulme, 2009). In this regard, Egypt is not different. Despite its 
efforts in designing a program that fits international standards, Takaful and Karama, the 
program still faces a variety of challenges in terms of its targeting, service delivery as well as 
evaluation (Breisinger, et al., 2018b). Moreover, the country’s social protection system is 
fragmented and is therefore, uncapable of achieving social justice and reducing poverty 
(Selwaness & Messkoub, 2019). Similar to other Arab countries, the Egyptian SP system is 
incorporating innovative programs into the existing political and institutional frameworks and 
hence, fails to have a transformative impact (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2007; Jawad, 
Jones, & Messkoub, 2019a).  
Most studies on SP in Egypt either focus on specific programs (e.g. Selwaness I. , 2012; 
Ido, 2018; Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018; Loewe & Westemeier, 2018) are outdated or do not 
delve deep into the SP system as a whole. This is why they often neglect many of the enduring 
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challenges in the SP system. Moreover, Egypt is at a potential turning point where a number 
of reform efforts are being implemented. For this reason, it is crucial to open the “Black Box” 
of the SP system (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012) and analyze the governance of 
the social protection system and the programs being implemented in Egypt.  
Although Governance is a term which is conceptually ambiguous and vague (Pierre & 
Peters, 2020) and has been defined differently by different strands in the literature, for the 
purpose of this study, governance in SP is defined as a set of incentives and accountability 
relationships which improve the delivery of services, their quality, efficiency and outcomes 
(Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012, p. 5). An examination of the governance of a SP 
system in a country focuses on the “system” (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). as 
well as the program level. Not only design and implementation features are assessed, but also 
the regulatory framework, coordination among the relevant stakeholders as well as the 
accountability relationships governing the system and the programs are in the cornerstone of a 
governance analysis. Hence, effective governance aims to enhance the design, implementation 
and outcomes of SP programs (Campos & Pradhan, 2007). It aims to create an integrated social 
protection system which is comprehensive, transformative and achieves social justice. Since 
design, delivery and coordination obstacles are some of the challenges currently facing the 
Egyptian SP system, an in-depth assessment of the governance of SP in the country is both 
timely and necessary.  
1.2. Research Objectives  
This thesis aims to provide an analytical framework that identifies the governance 
conditions and challenges that are currently facing the Egyptian SP system. If the country does 
not reform the underlying constraints which have precluded it from developing an effective SP 
system in the past, reform efforts can go in vain. Established programs can also demise, similar 
to Mexico’s Prospera cash transfer program, which was abolished in 2019, 21 years after it 
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was launched and - at the time - represented an iconic and innovative conditional cash transfer 
program (Kidd, 2019). Thus, this study aims to examine the facilitators of SP which have been 
established to improve the SP system as well as challenges the system and the programs are 
still encountered with. This way, reform efforts can be guided by an evidence-based and in-
depth examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the current system.  
As such, the study does not engage with the conceptual debates on general SP issues, such 
as whether to target programs or not, whether to provide conditional or unconditional transfers, 
whether to provide in-kind or cash grants, among others. Although these are debates that are 
also essential within the context of the design of the SP system in the country, they are out of 
the scope of this paper. Instead, this study examines the challenge most countries face: 
fragmentation of services; and the poor governance of SP systems with limited institutional 
and administrative capacities (UNDP & UNCDF, 2013). This thesis seeks to offer an in-depth 
understanding of the challenges and conditions in the governance of SP in Egypt. It also maps 
the development in the field after the revolution, an endeavor which has not been undertaken 
by many scholars. While the impact of Covid-19 on the social protection system in Egypt might 
be significant, this study was conducted before the outbreak of the pandemic and thus, its effect 
on the social protection system in Egypt are not included in this thesis.  
In order to do so, the conceptual framework Rules, Roles and Controls developed by the 
World Bank to enhance the governance of SP systems is employed (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, 
& Ringold, 2012). The framework defines governance in terms of accountability relationships 
and incentives and provides three operational entry points for governance; (1) the rules of the 
game which establish the regulatory and legal context of SP systems and programs, (2) roles 
and responsibilities which identify the institutional relationships as well as the incentive 
structures as well as (3) the controls and accountability relationships which aim to reduce error, 
fraud and corruption, improve transparency, monitoring and evaluation, among others. The 
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governance of SP is examined at three spheres; (1) macro-level or policy-/legal framework, (2) 
meso- or sector-level which focuses on coordination efforts as well as the (3) micro-or 
program-level which delves into an assessment of the design and implementation of SP 
programs. This conceptual framework is unique insofar as it can be applied to both contributory 
and non-contributory schemes, as it provides operational parameters to measure the different 
entry points and as it does not merely focus on the program level but most importantly the 
policy and coordination issues related to the SP system in a country.  
By conducting in-depth interviews with twelve policy-makers, experts and consultants in 
the SP system in Egypt, and using the previously identified parameters, this study assesses the 
governance of SP in Egypt. The interviewees represent governmental agencies such as the 
Ministry of Social Solidarity, the National Organization for Social Insurance, the Ministry of 
Supply and Internal Trade as well as a number of international organizations. Data provided 
by the interviewees are triangulated with a content analysis of scholarly work on contributory 
and non-contributory schemes in the country. Both the meso- and the micro-levels of 
governance are examined.  
At the program level, the focus lies on the social insurance system as well as the Takaful 
and Karama program for a number of reasons. First, not only was I able to gain access to data 
and documents on these programs, but I had the opportunity to interview policy-makers and 
consultants working on both programs. Moreover, the two programs have been operating for a 
number of years and hence, an evaluation can be rendered. On the contrary, the new universal 
health insurance scheme has not been fully implemented yet and therefore, a judgment of the 
program is still premature. Assessing the old health insurance scheme would be outdated since 
a new one is already in play. In terms of SSN, the inclusion of the Food Subsidy system would 
have been plausible and imperative, however, the area of food subsidies is complex and could 
have drastically widened the scope of this study. Moreover, data on food subsidies are scarce 
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and I was not able to interview many experts in the field. Nevertheless, food subsidies require 
an in-depth analysis on their own especially since they have been the most important but least 
efficient and effective SSN for decades (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). With regards to active 
labor market policies and programs, on the one hand, this field is evolving but there is a lack 
of coordination between the players in this field (Barsoum, et al., 2019). Indeed, the 
government is not playing an active role in steering labor interventions and hence, an 
assessment of the governance of these interventions would not have been representative. On 
the contrary, the government is directly involved in steering the social insurance system as well 
as its first targeted cash transfer programs Takaful and Karama.  
Although the examination of the two programs does not claim total representativeness of 
all other programs in the country, however, many of the findings can be generalized to other 
social protection programs in Egypt. Especially because the study examines a contributory as 
well as a non-contributory program, which differ in their nature, the common characteristics of 
the two programs can often be generalized to other programs in the country.  
The study finds that the main challenge facing the social protection system is the lack of 
coordination across social protection programs. SP programs are mostly fragmented, do not 
have a common vision and thus, mandates can often overlap. Not only does the inadequate 
coordination prevent the system from achieving social justice, but it can impede service 
delivery. Another finding relates to the existence of a disconnect between design and 
implementation of the programs. While the legislative and regulatory framework seems to be 
designed according to international best practices in most programs, implementation 
challenges are more apparent and require an in-depth investigation of the governance, at the 
micro-level. Additionally, more rigorous assessments need to be undertaken in order to 
evaluate programs based on their outputs. Developing the necessary human and institutional 
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capacity is also one of the main necessities. Indeed, the lack of performance incentives often 
impedes effective service delivery.  
1.3. Research Questions  
As previously mentioned, this study aims to examine the governance of the social 
protection system in Egypt. Especially with regards to the country’s ongoing efforts to reform 
SP, it is crucial to place these efforts within the framework of good governance and to elaborate 
on the challenges and facilitators of the system. The contributory and non-contributory social 
protection systems are in the focus of this work. Instead of solely focusing on governance 
challenges, this study also highlights the existing conditions in order to build on the system’s 
strengths. This thesis tries to answer the following research questions using qualitative research 
methods.  
Main Question: In light of the increase in the percentage of poverty and the ongoing reform 
efforts of the social protection system in Egypt, what is the status of the governance of the 
social protection system in Egypt and the challenges facing it?  
First Sub-Question: What are the prerequisites needed to enhance the governance of 
Egypt’s social protection system?  
Second Sub-Question: What are the main challenges facing the governance of the 
Egyptian social protection system, as a whole?  
Third Sub-Question: What are the main governance challenges facing the country’s 
contributory and non-contributory schemes, taking the social insurance system as well as 
Takaful and Karama as case studies?  
1.4. Structure of the thesis  
This study is sub-divided into seven chapters which focus on the following aspects:  
Chapter One introduces this thesis’ research topic, as well as the problem which is being 
addressed in this work. The research objectives are also examined in this chapter in addition to 
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the scope of the study. This introductory chapter also provides insights into the methodology 
used as well as the findings of the study. It also incorporates the main questions this work aims 
to address.  
Chapter Two provides a background about the social protection system. It starts by 
providing this study’s conceptualization and understanding of social protection as well as the 
typology and classification which is used here. It then attempts to map the different social 
protection schemes and programs in the country, focusing predominantly on changes that 
occurred after the January 21st Revolution in Egypt. This chapter is sub-divided into 
contributory and non-contributory schemes followed by an examination of active labor market 
interventions in the country.  
Chapter Three presents a review of the literature that is relevant to this paper. First, the 
concept of governance is in the highlight. This section shows that governance is an ambiguous 
concept which can be used in various domains. Tracing the development of governance and its 
relation to social protection starts with the relationship between governance and social policy. 
Indeed, the first scholarly works on the relationship focused on social policy. Contemporary 
studies concentrate on the governance of social protection. Before providing an in-depth 
examination of the governance of social protection, governance is placed within the discourse 
on social protection. At the end, the review emphasizes the studies focusing on social protection 
in the Middle East and Egypt and especially the governance of social protection in the region.  
Chapter four elaborates the conceptual framework used to analyze the governance of 
social protection in Egypt. It provides a visualization of the framework and highlights the 
parameters that are most relevant to this study.  
Chapter five describes the research methodology that is used in this study. The rationale 
for the use of qualitative research methods is elaborated and the data collection methods are 
described. This chapter also elaborates on the sample selection, the study framework, how the 
 16 
data were analyzed, which ethical dimensions were taken into considerations as well as the 
study limitations.  
Chapter Six presents the collected data and analyzes them. It is sub-divided according to 
the conceptual framework into the meso- or systems-level which tackles the sector of social 
protection and the coordination among the actors in it as well as the micro- or program-level. 
At the program level, this chapter focuses on a governance assessment of the social insurance 
system followed by an examination of Takaful and Karama program.  
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis by providing the main findings of the analysis and 
offering a number of recommendations based on the identified strengths and weaknesses of the 
social protection system in Egypt.  
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2. CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND ABOUT SOCIAL 
PROTECTION IN EGYPT  
This chapter provides an outline of the social protection system in Egypt. It focuses 
predominantly on changes that were initiated after the January 21st revolution in Egypt. In order 
to start a discussion on social protection, it is crucial to first elaborate on this study’s 
conceptualization and definition of social protection. Afterwards, using the World Bank (2012) 
typology of social protection programs, the background section is sub-divided into contributory 
and non-contributory schemes as well as labor market interventions. The two most important 
contributory schemes in the country are the social insurance and the health insurance systems. 
With regards to non-contributory schemes, the food and fuel subsidies as well as the cash 
transfer programs - whether the Solidarity pension or Takaful and Karama - are in the 
cornerstone of this section. In Egypt, there are not many passive labor market interventions, 
this is why, the field of active labor market policies and programs is analyzed. Although the 
analysis section only focuses on Takaful and Karama and the social insurance scheme, this 
chapter aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the social protection arena and therefore, 
tries to describe and incorporate the most important schemes. Not all programs are included in 
this chapter, however, as elaborated above, the focus lies on the most important interventions 
that were identified based on the literature and scholarly work in the field.  
2.1. Defining Social Protection 
Social protection is a key contributor to social inclusion and the goal of leaving no one 
behind. It is a key contributor to all of the 2030 sustainable development goals, particularly 
goal one, which aims at eliminating poverty in all its forms everywhere (UN ESCWA, 2015).  
It is important to start by having some clarity about what is meant by social protection and 
how it is understood. There is no universally accepted definition of social protection mostly 
because countries’ social protection measures vary across the developed and developing world 
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(Yemtsov, Honorati, Evans, Sajaia, & Lokshin, 2017). The working definition that is used in 
this paper is adopted from the World Bank’s book Measuring the Effectiveness of Social 
Protection (2012). The World Bank defines social protection as these policies that assist 
individuals and societies in managing risks and vulnerabilities and that protect individuals from 
poverty. These policies enhance resilience, equity and opportunity (World Bank, 2012). Social 
protection schemes are sub-divided into contributory schemes, non-contributory schemes as 
well as labor market interventions.  
A. Contributory or Social Security schemes are central to income security. They refer 
to health insurance, social insurance and pension schemes that are funded by workers’ 
contributions, which can either be voluntary or compulsory. The main aim of 
contributory schemes is to leverage income in order to cushion workers from the impact 
of shocks such as unemployment, inability to work due to health issues or maternity, 
and retirement. Workers contribute regularly throughout their work life to a fund in 
order to claim benefits. There are two main types of contributory schemes: benefit-
defined schemes where individuals contribute to a collective fund and have specified 
benefits at the time of receiving pensions; and contribution-defined schemes where 
contributions are made to individual accounts and benefits are defined based on the 
contributions made. Health insurance programs are also an imperative part of the social 
security system. 
B. Non-Contributory or Social Assistance schemes are social safety nets that aim to 
reduce poverty and vulnerability. Such social welfare programs assist individuals and 
households to adapt to chronic poverty and reductions in income which would lead to 
them sinking into poverty. Unconditional and conditional cash transfers as well as in-
kind transfers are some of the social assistance programs where recipients are generally 
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not obliged to make any advance payments to receive benefits. These non-contributory 
schemes involve other informal forms of transfers and support. 
C. Labor market programs and regulations help the unemployed and the under-
employed. These measures include passive and active approaches. Passive labor market 
policies (PLMPs) incorporate contributory and non-contributory unemployment 
assistance. Such interventions are often a part of the social security or social assistance 
system of the country. This is why, PLMPs will not be discussed in depth in the context 
of labor market regulations.  
Active Labor Market policies (ALMPs) are interventions that seek to improve the 
prospects for gainful employment among their participants (OECD, 2008). Youth-
focused ALMPs are often paired with the key objective of facilitating the school-to-
work transition process, by increasing the employability of new entrants to the labor 
market or by increasing labor demand (Angel-Urdinola & Leon-Solano, 2013). ALMPs 
are often regarded to have an inside-outsider role on employment (Rovny, 2014). 
Indeed, outsiders are those who are disadvantaged in the labor market such as the 
unemployed, low-skilled, immigrants, among others (Rovny, 2014.). ALMPs are 
generally divided into four main categories (Kluve, et al., 2016). These are (1) training 
programs, possible formats include: in-classroom, on-the-job, life skills, second-chance 
programs, non-formal apprenticeship, financial literacy, and mentoring; (2) 
entrepreneurship promotion programs, in the form of financial and non-financial 
assistance; (3) employment services, counselling, search assistance or job placement; 
and (4) services in the context of subsidized employment and public works projects. 
Table 1 shows the objectives and types of programs that fall under each of the above-
mentioned categories. When mapping the social protection arena in Egypt, this thesis focuses 
on these types of programs which are important for the contemporary social protection system 
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in Egypt. The most important contributory schemes in Egypt are the social insurance and health 
insurance schemes, while the most important non-contributory schemes are the food subsidy 
system, the old solidarity pension as well as the targeted cash transfer programs Takaful and 
Karama. Finally, ALMPs are the most relevant labor market interventions in Egypt.  
Table 1: Social Protection and Labor Market Interventions  
Social protection and labor 
programs 
Objectives Types of programs 
Social safety nets/ social 
assistance (noncontributory) 
Reduce poverty and inequality  • Unconditional cash transfers 
• Conditional cash transfers 
• Social pensions 
• Food and in-kind transfers 
• School feeding programs 
• Public works 
• Fee waivers and targeted subsidies 
• Other interventions (social services) 
Social insurance 
(contributory) 
Ensure adequate living standards in 
the face of shocks and life changes 
• Contributory old-age, survivor, and 
disability pensions 
• Sick leave 
• Maternity/paternity benefits 
• Health insurance coverage 
• Other types of insurance 
Labor market programs 
(contributory and 
noncontributory)  
Improve chances of employment and 
earnings; smooth income during 
unemployment 
• Active labor market programs (training, 
employment intermediation services, wage 
subsidies) 
• Passive labor market programs 
(unemployment insurance, early retirement 
incentive) 
Source: Author’s compilation based on World Bank (2018) 
2.2. Contributory Schemes  
The most important contributory schemes in Egypt are the social and health insurance 
schemes which are currently undergoing legal and regulatory reform efforts (Government of 
Egypt, 2015). This section highlights the reform efforts in both schemes as well as the 
challenges facing both schemes.  
2.2.1. Social Insurance  
This section describes reform efforts and challenges of the social insurance system (SIS) 
in Egypt. The old and the new social insurance frameworks are contrasted. The current legal 
framework, Law 148/2019 was officially launched on the first of January 2020, however, since 
it introduces drastic changes to the system, many of its provisions are still being implemented 
gradually. Thus, understanding the old legal scheme remains essential as many of the system’s 
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challenges are caused by the complexity of the old social insurance legal and regulatory 
framework.  
Law 148 for 2019 is currently the main legislative framework governing social 
insurance in the country. It unifies the different laws that were governing the SIS prior to its 
passing1, creates a unified contribution rate and amends several of the flaws of the old legal 
framework. According to law 148/2019, the National Organization for Social Insurance 
(NOSI) should become the main body responsible for social insurance in Egypt and thus, 
should become independent from the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MoSS). Indeed, a full-time, 
independent and qualified managing director should soon be hired to manage NOSI.  
Before law 148/2019 was passed, the contributory social insurance scheme in Egypt dated 
back to the laws developed in the 1970s (Social Security Administration, 2017). Although 
public and private employers are required to provide the contracted employees with access to 
social security, a large proportion of workers are not covered, especially in the private sector. 
These include temporary workers, self-employed and casual workers, artisans, domestic 
servants and small-scale farmers. The situation particularly affects new entrants to the labor 
market from the working youth (Barsoum, 2016). Egypt’s social insurance schemes caters to 
disability, maternity, old age, sickness and unemployment2 (Ameta & El Shafie, 2015, p. 7). 
In June of 2010, Law 135/2010 was passed. It aimed at unifying the social insurance laws 
and resolving several of its core obstacles. Yet, due to the discontinuity and political transitions 
that occurred in early 2011, the law was annulled by the Presidential Decree No.79 in 2013. 
 
1 Before law 148/2019 was passed, four main laws were governing the social insurance system; Law 79 for 
1975, Law 108 for 1976, Law 50 for 1978, Law 112 for 1980. A more elaborative account on the old social 
insurance system can be found in the following studies; Ido (2018); Loewe & Westmeier (2018); Selwaness & 
Roushdy (2014); Selwaness (2012); Sieverding & Selwaness (2012).   
2 Unemployment benefits are rarely provided to the beneficiaries due to a technical flaw in the system. According 
to the Ministry of Manpower and Migration, unemployment benefits are only given to insured persons who are 
dismissed involuntarily from their jobs. The majority of the private sector obliges employees to sign a resignation 
letter (Form 6) whilst signing the contract. This way, these companies evade many of their insurance liabilities 
and the dismissed workers do not receive their unemployment benefits (Selwaness & Messkoub, 2019) 
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Most recent statistics depict that around 17 million citizens contribute to the different 
social insurance schemes (ILO, 2019). Roughly 28.7% of the working age population and 
53.6% of the labor force takes part in the system (ILO, 2019). Social insurance coverage among 
male participants dropped from 44.9% in 2006 to 39.8% in 2012, while female participation in 
the labor force increased and hence, their participation in social insurance increased from 
43.2% to 54.5% in the same years (Selwaness & Messkoub, 2019). Nevertheless, the relatively 
low social insurance coverage can be attributed to several factors, among which the decline in 
public sector hiring that started in the late 1990s as a part of vast structural adjustment programs 
and economic reforms initiated at the time (Loewe & Westemeier, 2018; Assaad, 2009).  
The Egyptian SIS faces various challenges and shortcomings. These can be 
summarized as follows: 
A. There are wide gaps in coverage especially among youth. This is mainly due to the fact that 
the system was expanded for public sector employees in the 1970s and 1980s. At the time, 
a large number of citizens were being employed in the government and hence, SIS coverage 
was high. However, due to the decline in public sector hiring (Assaad, 2009) and the 
expansion of informal employment (Gatti, Bodor, Angel-Urdinola, & Silva, 2014), there 
was a significant decline of SIS among the younger groups (Sieverding & Selwaness, 
2012). Moreover, due to the particularly low labor force participation among women, SIS 
coverage remains low (Assaad & Krafft, 2015; Barsoum, 2018). In particular, 18.7% of 
Egyptian women aged 15 to 24 were part of the labor force in 2017 (ILO, 2017). Moreover, 
the high cost of participation and the inadequate enforcement of law within the SIS have 
exacerbated the issue of low coverage (Roushdy & Selwaness, 2019). Finally, the lack of 
awareness about the SIS, especially among the poor or near-poor, which represent the 
largest portion of workers (Selwaness & Messkoub, 2019) is another main cause for the 
coverage gap (Loewe, 2014; Sieverding, 2016).  
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B. The current scheme intensifies socio-economic disparities as it covers the more privileged 
groups in the labor market, the formal sector, whilst neglecting the most vulnerable, farmers 
and casual workers (Loewe, 2014). Less than 20% of the casual workers in Egypt had 
access to the SIS in the last decades (Roushdy & Selwaness, 2019). This exacerbates both 
the urban-rural divide in the country as well as socio-economic inequalities. Indeed, 
according to the World Bank (2007), 80% of pension-spending in Egypt goes to the non-
poor (Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012).  
C. Another challenge facing the SIS is the evasion from social insurance contributions. A high 
percentage of the private sector either evades fully from SIS contributions of their 
employees or partially by under-reporting employees’ salaries. Indeed, around 40% of the 
Egyptian private sector under-reports its social insurance contributions (UNDP, 2005). One 
of the main reasons why the system disincentives enrolment are the high contribution rates 
(Loewe, 2014; Maait & Demarco, 2012; Roushdy & Selwaness, 2015). Indeed, the 
Egyptian SIS is regarded as one of the most expensive in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region (Maait & Demarco, 2012). Prior to the ratification of law 148 for 2019, 
the contribution rates were 41% of the payroll, of which 26% are covered by the employer, 
14% by the employee and 1% by the Treasury. Thus, both employers and employees have 
an incentive to under-report their earnings. Another reason why under-reporting is 
relatively high is the fact that pensions are calculated based on the monthly earnings of the 
last years in service (Roushdy & Selwaness, 2019). As they come closer to the pensionable 
age, contributors start fully reporting their salaries.  
D. The system also puts a ceiling on pensionable wage. This way, low-wage workers should 
pay their social insurance contributions on their total salary while high-wage workers 
whose revenues are above the pensionable wage ceiling do not report their total earnings 
(Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012). This way, not only does the system worsen socio-
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economic gaps and inequalities, the SIS is deprived of contributions that could have been 
collected from high-wage workers.  
E. Finally, the social insurance system’s inadequate law enforcement and monitoring capacity 
worsens all of the above-mentioned challenges and shortcomings of the system (Sieverding 
& Selwaness, 2012; Roushdy & Selwaness, 2015).  
As noted previously, law 148 for 2019 is currently the only law regulating social 
insurance benefits. The most important changes that were included in the law and 
consequently, in the new system are briefly highlighted here. This section is based on a report 
published by NOSI about the most important tenets of the new law (NOSI, 2019).  
The main challenges that depicted a dire need for a new legal framework governing social 
insurance are, firstly, an anticipated actuarial budgetary deficit that would have occurred in 
2037 (NOSI, 2019). The above-mentioned challenges and shortcomings of the old system 
including the low coverage rate and the evasion of social insurance contributions in addition to 
the increase in the percentage of early retirements and the low pension benefits were some of 
the main triggers to start working on a reformed legal framework.  
In order to mitigate these challenges and upgrade the SIS, law 148/2019 was passed on the 
first of January 2020. It unifies all social insurance laws which should reduce the complexity 
of navigating the system. Furthermore, it lowers and unifies social insurance contribution rates 
but increases the minimum and maximum insurable salary. Law 148/2019 works with a unified 
global salary instead of fixed and variable salaries. It also includes the automatic adjustment 
of pensionable wage by 15% on an annual basis for the first seven years of its implementation. 
Afterwards, the rate would be adjusted based on the inflation rate. According to the new law, 
within the next couple of years the two social insurance funds managed by NOSI, Government 
Social Insurance Fund (GSIF) and Public and Private Business Sector Fund (PSIF) should be 
merged. Also, within one year from the implementation of the new law an independent 
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managing director should be appointed to head NOSI. This way, it would become independent 
from MoSS. Social insurance coverage for casual workers is also enhanced in the new system, 
thus, contributing to the inclusion of the informal economy and increasing the coverage of the 
system. Finally, the new law also foresees a voluntary social insurance scheme that is based on 
defined contributions and which would be invested in the country’s new sovereign wealth fund.  
2.2.2. Health Insurance  
Before the Arab Spring, from 1965 to 1997, several laws extending health insurance to 
large portions of the population were being developed in Egypt (ILO, 2009b). Law 32/1975 
extended health coverage to public servants whilst Law 79/1975 provided it to private sector 
employees. Successive laws broadened the coverage to include widows of pensioners, children, 
among others (ILO, 2009b, p. 4). Egypt’s health care system included different and fragmented 
types of service providers and funders including tax-funded and social health insurance 
schemes. The tax-funded as well as the insurance-based systems both manage their own 
hospitals and health care facilities that provide primary, secondary and tertiary care. Moreover, 
the Ministry of Health and Population (MOHP), the Health Insurance Organization (HIO), the 
Ministry of Education as well as the Curative Care Organizations all run their own facilities 
(ILO, 2009b). The social health insurance system is mainly managed by HIO and a number of 
government hospitals and healthcare providers that grant services for the uninsured at 
subsidized rates (Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012). The HIO has its own network of healthcare 
providers but it also works with private doctors and facilities to provide additional services for 
those covered by the health insurance system (Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012).  
This system faces many challenges and shortcomings. In terms of the coverage of the 
system, roughly 30% of the labor force was covered by the HIO in 2008 (Maeda & ElSaharty, 
2008), among which less than 5% were private sector workers. This discrepancy can be largely 
attributed to the fact that private sector companies are not obligated to enroll their employees 
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in the health insurance scheme. Moreover, the poor quality of medical services and the 
exclusion of several services from the health insurance scheme has increased the pay out-of-
pocket share of those insured under the system (Maeda & ElSaharty, 2008). In addition to many 
financial constraints and limitations that resulted from the legislative framework of the health 
insurance system and that have resulted in the unsustainability of the system, health insurance 
benefits the rich more than the most vulnerable populations. Indeed, 80% of the subsidized 
health care services are provided to the two highest income quintiles, according to MOHP 
(Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012). Other forms of inequality exist between the coverage of the 
urban and the poor, men and women as well as the formal and the informal sector (Sieverding 
& Selwaness, 2012). One of the main causes of these shortcomings is that many institutions 
and laws regulate the same coverage scheme. This leads to inefficiency, lack of coordination, 
in addition to several other obstacles and challenges.  
The Government of Egypt has committed to reform the health insurance system 
(Government of Egypt, 2015). The government’s efforts culminated in the passing of Law 2 
for 2018 adopted in January 2018. It covers all citizens including all ages, all parts of the 
country, private employees, seasonal workers as well as women and children on a mandatory 
basis (NATLEX, 2018). Additionally, the law provides coverage against disease and health 
injuries. It also guarantees free healthcare services to those unable to meet the required 
contribution fees. Not only does the new law extend health insurance coverage geographically, 
demographically and by the level of service, it regulates all aspects of health insurance. In 
addition, it increases the revenues of health insurance and incentivizes quality and efficiency. 
Finally, the law focuses on the delivery of high quality services and guarantees the 
sustainability of funding (NATLEX, 2018). In June 2020, the World Bank has approved the 
provision of US$ 400 million to support the development of the universal health insurance 
scheme (World Bank, 2020). The pilot phase of the law is being launched in Port Said where 
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approximately 506,000 citizens were registered in the first couple of months. Universal Health 
insurance is set to be rolled out gradually until 2030 (Egypt Today, 2019). No assessments can 
be rendered on the new law yet due to the lack of data about the pilot phase in Port Said that 
has only started in July of 2019.  
2.3. Non-Contributory Schemes  
Non-contributory social protection programs - also referred to as social safety nets or social 
assistance schemes - are interventions which do not necessitate direct contributions from the 
beneficiaries as a requirement to the entitlement to benefits (Behrendt & Hagemejer, 2018). 
Such programs help individuals adapt to chronic poverty, destitution, deprivation and 
vulnerability, thus, targeting the poor and vulnerable (World Bank, 2018a). As noted above, 
non-contributory schemes include conditional and unconditional cash transfers, in-kind 
transfers, non-contributory social pensions, food and in-kind transfers, school feeding and 
public works programs, fee waivers, among others (World Bank, 2018a).  
In Egypt, the most important social safety nets are the subsidies as well as cash 
transfers. The focus of this section lies on the food and fuel subsidies since they are among the 
most important commodity subsidies and SSN in the country as well as the solidarity pension 
and Takaful and Karama cash transfer programs. Changes which were initiated after the Arab 
Spring are highlighted here.  
2.3.1. Food and Fuel Subsidies  
Subsidies play an important role in Egypt’s social, economic and political landscape. 
Spending on subsidies, grants and social benefits amounted to an annual average of 9.7% of 
the GDP for fiscal years 2011/12 to 2015/16 (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). The most 
important category of subsidies in Egypt includes commodity subsidies which reached an 
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average of 7.9% of the GDP in the same period3 (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). Commodity 
subsidies can be divided into six categories; (1) Food Subsidies (Tamween) (2) Farmers’ 
Subsidies (3) Fuel Subsidies (4) Electricity Subsidies (5) Subsidies for medicine and children’s 
milk (6) Transfers to public water companies.  
Egypt’s non-contributory social assistance scheme has long focused on fuel and food 
subsidies. These policies have been often described as both expensive and regressive since 
80% of their benefits are reaped by the non-poor (Devereux S. , 2016, p. 14). Step-by-step 
liberalization of energy prices is currently being implemented and a portion of the savings from 
these fuel subsidies is invested in reform, transformation and development plans of SSN, 
healthcare and education (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018).  
Food subsidies remain, however, the cornerstone of Egypt’s SSN, especially since the 
country is constantly faced with the double-burden of malnutrition4 - in spite of the prevalence 
of the subsidy system since the early 1900s (Ecker, Al-Riffai, Breisinger, & El-Batrawy, 2016). 
The Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade (MOSIT) is in charge of regulating the FSS in 
Egypt. It is estimated that roughly 80 million Egyptians are registered in the system (Emam, 
2019). Spending on the FSS is the second-largest among Egypt’s SSN, preceded by fuel 
subsidies (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). Finally, the FSS has always played the role of 
mitigating price shocks and cushioning the population from falling into poverty and deprivation 
(Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). The removal of food subsidies - without an immediate 
substitution - could lead to roughly a 10% increase in the national level poverty (WFP, 2013). 
Upper Egypt, the region with the highest poverty rate in Egypt would be affected severely 
(WFP, 2013).  
 
3 Subsidy spending in Egypt can be divided into four categories (a) commodity subsidies (b) subsidies and grants 
for social services (c) subsidies and grants for lagging regions and (d) subsidies and grants for economic activities 
(Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018).  
4 The double-burden of malnutrition resembles the co-existence of undernutrition and obesity or diet-related 
noncommunicable diseases (Ecker, Al-Riffai, Breisinger, & El-Batrawy, 2016).  
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In line with the new social contract and the demands for social justice and inclusive 
growth after the country’s 2011 and 2013 revolutions, MOSIT started introducing a series of 
structural reforms aimed at enhancing targeting, efficiency, delivery, coverage or benefit level 
of the FSS (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). A smartcard-based system where citizens are 
allowed to buy a number of loaves per day replaced the old scheme in which the government 
provided the flour for the bakeries at a subsidized price. In 2015, approximately 88.6% of all 
families made use of food subsidies through the smart-card system (Machado, Bilo, Veras 
Soares, & Guerreiro Osorio, 2018, p. 134). This is why, in 2017, the eligibility criteria were 
narrowed down to households earning below a certain income threshold. Additionally, only 
four family members are now allowed to be registered under one smart-card, however, this 
does not apply to already listed households (Machado, Bilo, Veras Soares, & Guerreiro Osorio, 
2018, p. 131). 
The contemporary system Tamween incorporates two principal elements; Baladi Bread 
(BB) and Ration Cards (RC). Starting from mid-2014, subsidized commodity quotas were 
replaced with monthly cash allowance that provide ration cards’ beneficiaries with a variety of 
commodities to choose among. Several other reforms that incentivize beneficiaries to use RC 
instead of consume BB have been undertaken, as well (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). Thus, 
Egypt has changed its food subsidy system from the provision of in-kind subsidized goods to 
an open voucher-style system. Moreover, the system is technologically developed so as to 
allow for the personalization of the subsidized food commodities (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 
2018, p. 108). One of the major shortcomings in the system that still persists is the universality 
of food subsidies. Up until now, targeting mechanisms for the food subsidy system have not 
been fully developed.  
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The most important tenets of the reformed FSS are the following5.  
A. The BB subsidy shifted from an input-based subsidy to an output-oriented one. Instead of 
subsidizing the wheat flour distributed to bakeries, in the new system bakeries buy wheat 
flour at the market price and sell the loaves at the agreed-upon price (5 piastres). MOSIT 
now subsidizes the difference between the subsidized price and the real cost of the loaves. 
This change has helped in reducing leakage as well as the prevalence of a black market for 
wheat.   
B. The FSS system is now an automated smart system. The BB and RC systems are linked 
and bakeries have to have POS readers. This way, financial transactions between MOSIT 
and the bakeries as well as the bakeries and the beneficiaries are now automated.  
C. The new system also caps the number of bread loaves a family can purchase daily, enhances 
the quality of the bread and incentivizes families to alter their food choices by rewarding 
beneficiaries who do not purchase the maximum amount of BB. This way, the system 
promotes a more diverse diet which might have positive nutritional effects. 
D. The new FSS has encouraged commercial activities and market competition by allowing 
groceries which sell subsidized commodities to sell other goods in addition to the RC 
produce.  
In spite of the upgrade of the system, FSS still encounters a number of challenges. First, 
the FSS still faces distortions in the market. Also, there have often been reports of shortages of 
basic commodities such as Rice and Oil. Many beneficiaries also complain about the value of 
the benefits. Indeed, after initiating the change to the RC point-based system, the relative value 
of the food subsidy has declined as opposed to earlier systems. Moreover, the system does not 
provide enough incentive to replace BB with other commodities. Indeed, beneficiaries are 
 
5 This section is predominantly based on Abdalla & Al-Shawarby (2018) since it is one of the most 
comprehensive and recent accounts on the issue of subsidies. Their account includes a more detailed review of 
the FSS.  
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compensated with 10 piasters on their RC for every loaf of bread they save. This amount does 
not render beneficiaries many other options to purchase. Finally, the biggest challenge facing 
the sustainability of the FSS is the targeting. The FSS covered nearly 88.6% of the Egyptian 
population in 2015, among which are 77.7% of the richest decile and 90% of the second to 
fourth richest deciles (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018).  
2.3.2. Cash Transfers  
Social assistance had been managed in the form of monthly non-contributory pensions 
since the Anwar El-Sadat government. At the time, it was named Sadat pensions and afterwards 
it was changed to Mubarak pensions and finally, the scheme was called Solidarity Pension or 
Ma’ash Al-Daman. This scheme targets casual workers as well as those not covered under the 
SIS. Although it is named pension, this scheme is considered as one of the principal SSN 
together with other social assistance programs. This program has received criticism for its 
limited coverage, the low pension benefits as well as its bias in administration (Sieverding & 
Selwaness, 2012). The system reaches less than 10% of the poorest quintile (World Bank, 
2015). Despite the heavy criticism, before and after the revolution, the pension was raised 
several times in an ad hoc manner by most governments due to social pressures (Ido, 2018). 
This exacerbated the issue of the financial sustainability of this pension scheme.  
With regards to the provision of cash transfers, before the January 25th Revolution, 
MoSS initiated a geographical targeting program aimed at reaching the 1000 poorest villages 
in Egypt and providing them with conditional cash transfers (Ido, 2018). The conditions for 
the obtainment of the monetary transfers were minimum school attendance, constant visits to 
healthcare facilities and clinics as well as other nutritional issues. For a very long period of 
time, only 2% of the SP budget was targeted at non-contributory schemes (Devereux S. , 2016, 
p. 44), however, reforms are being undertaken in this area.  
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After the revolution and responding to the call for Social Justice MoSS launched the 
Takaful and Karama Program (TKP) – Dignity and Solidarity. Takaful is an income support 
program for under-privileged households with children (0-18 years). Conditional on school 
enrollment and attendance, health screenings, among others, eligible families receive monthly 
cash transfers (World Bank, 2015). The amount of Takaful monetary transfer is dependent on 
the number of children as well as their school level. It is notable that 89% of the recipients of 
this program are women (Breisinger, et al., 2018b). Karama is a social inclusion scheme that 
provides SP and decent living standards to elderly people, persons with disabilities and more 
recently, orphaned children. Karama grants a fixed cash amount per individual. Both programs 
use proxy-means-testing (PMT) formula to target the most vulnerable households. In 
December 2016, the programs reached almost 5.5 million citizens (Ministry of Social 
Solidarity, 2016) and the spending on the two programs amounted to LE 1.7 billion in 2015 to 
2016 (Ministry of Finance, 2017).  
As opposed to Karama, Takaful is regarded as more of a developmental SP scheme that 
aims at the enhancement of human capacity (Ido, 2018). Takaful is a conditional cash transfer 
program. Although conditionality has not been implemented yet, it aims to enhance the 
beneficiaries’ education and health indicators as well as their quality of life (World Bank, 
2018b). Additionally, Karama grants individuals with cash transfers whilst Takaful endorses a 
feminist design that targets female heads of households (World Bank, 2018b).  
Both programs are supported by the World Bank’s Strengthen Social Safety Net Project 
from 2015 up until 2019 (World Bank, 2015). Indeed, setting up the program, designing and 
maintaining its infrastructure, among other needs were financed by the World Bank’s loan of 
LE 400 billion. After assessing the progress of TKP, the loan was renewed in 2020 in the 
amount of LE 400 billion that should last for four more years (World Bank, 2015). At the 
starting phase of the program in 2015, a portion of the loan was dedicated to the cash transfers. 
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Afterwards, the program was included in the government’s budget and currently, the cash 
transfers are being provided by government’s resources. The budget allocated to TKP increased 
by 250% from 2015 to 2017-2018 (MoSS, 2019). Within this period, not only was the program 
rolled out on a national scale, but the impact assessment conducted by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) revealed that the program produced positive impact on the 
beneficiaries (Breisinger, et al., 2018a; Breisinger, et al., 2018b;ElDidi, et al., 2018).  
The most dire challenge facing SSN in Egypt has always been the targeting efficiency, as 
shown from the assessment of the FSS as well as the Solidarity pension. To mitigate this 
challenge, the MoSS together with the World Bank developed a multilayer targeting formula 
to enhance the targeting of Takaful and Karama cash transfers; first through geographical 
targeting with the help of poverty maps, then a household targeting formula based on a PMT 
and finally, using categorical criteria such as children, the elderly and persons with disability 
(World Bank, 2015). Kurdi et al. (2018) provide a more detailed description of the targeting 
procedures. Criteria for the indicators of poverty were based on the HIECS conducted by the 
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) for the year 2012 to 2013 
(ERF, CAPMAS, 2014). The poverty map focuses to a large extent on the least developed 
geographic regions - predominately the Southern parts of the country which were previously 
neglected (Government of Egypt, 2015). This is why, the government’s outreach efforts and 
awareness campaigns towards the program were mostly targeted at the Southern poorest areas 
of the country (Breisinger, et al., 2018a).  
Accepted beneficiaries receive cash transfers that are calculated depending on the 
number of children, their age groups, the number of elderly or people living with disabilities, 
etc. TKP benefits increase depending on the government’s budget allocation.  




Table 2: Calculation of TKP benefits  
Takaful Karama 
Monthly Payment Mother with Children Monthly Payment Elderly + Living with 
Disability 
EGP 325 = US$ 20 Base  EGP 350 = US$ 22.06 1 
EGP 6 = US$ 0.38 Primary school child EGP 700 =  US$ 44.11  2 
EGP 80 = US$ 5.4 Preparatory (middle) school child EGP 1,050 = US$ 66.17 3 
EGP 100 = US$ 6.30 High school child   
Other parameters Capped at 3 children (highest 
education level) 
Other parameters Capped at 3 eligible 
members in one household 
Paid to female in household  Paid to each individual 
separately  
Source: Adopted from: World Bank (2015)6 
From an institutional point of view, the Central Social Protection Department at MoSS is in 
charge of the overall management of TKP while the Central Unit for Social Pension is 
responsible for the daily handling of the program (World Bank, 2015). A Project Task Force 
(PTF) under the Central Unit for Social Pension has also been assigned to lead the 
implementation of the program at the central level as well as the coordination with relevant 
partners (World Bank, 2015). The PTF incorporates staff members and consultants in charge 
of Management Information Systems (MIS), procurement, communications, research, 
coordination, M&E, among others. The program’s infrastructure was designed with the help of 
a number of international organizations, the most important of which is the World Bank which 
helps ensure the program’s infrastructure matches international standards. MoSS is in charge 
of the registration, enrollment, payment Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), as well as the 
grievance redress mechanism (GRM) of TKP through its offices at the governorate, district and 
village levels (World Bank, 2015).  
Capitalizing on the database of Takaful and Karama, MoSS is providing the program’s 
beneficiaries with other related and integrated packages of SP services (World Bank, 2015). 
These include a project for the eradication of illiteracy among Takaful women, La Ommeya 
 
6 Dollar Equivalence calculated by researcher. Calculation is based on the following exchange rate (August 
2020): US$ 1 = LE 15.86.  
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(MoSS, 2019a); a decent living housing program, Sakan Karim (MoSS, 2019b); a program 
which aims at limiting the demographic growth of Takaful beneficiaries, Etnen Kefaya (MoSS, 
2019c); among others (World Bank, 2018b).  
2.4. Active Labor Market Programs  
In Egypt, the Ministry of Manpower and Migration (MoMM) is the primary public 
employment agency. MoMM is in charge of labor policies, enhancing employability and 
managing the demands of the labor market (ILO, 2017). MoMM runs 300 public offices that 
are dispersed around the country (Barsoum, 2017). Since the initiation of the Economic Reform 
Structural and Adjustment Program in 1991 which launched privatization projects and limited 
employment opportunities in the public sector, several governments as well as donor-funded 
projects in the field of youth employment and school-to-work transition have been 
implemented in Egypt. This directive aimed at the mitigation of the impact of the above-
mentioned policy shift. Nonetheless, the government is still regarded as the employer of first 
choice for a large portion of Egyptians (Barsoum, 2017).  
ALMPs in Egypt integrate skill development programs - focusing primarily on 
technical and vocational training - with entrepreneurship promotion as well as financial 
services and access to credit. Only 2% of ALMPs in Egypt target subsidized employment 
(Barsoum, 2017).  
One of the most important steps towards the development of ALMPs in Egypt was the 
establishment of the Social Fund for Development in 1991. The Social Fund was established 
as a semi-autonomous agency that targets the establishment of employment opportunities, the 
development of the capacities of different communities as well as the encouragement of small- 
and medium-sized enterprises (Ameta & El Shafie, 2015). The program is an important tool in 
the fight against unemployment, the alleviation of poverty and the enhancement of living 
standard as well as social and economic development (Abou-Ali, El-Azony, El-Laithy, 
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Haughton, & Khandker, 2009). The Fund was established as a joint initiative between the 
Egyptian Government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as well as the 
World Bank. In 2015, the Social Fund for Development funded a total of 15,211 small 
enterprises in sectors such as trade, industry, service, agriculture, among others (UNDP, 2016). 
In April 2017, a decree from the Egyptian Prime Minister established the Micro- Small- and 
Medium Enterprise Development Agency to replace the Social Fund for Development (GIZ, 
2017). 
It is worth noting that comprehensive ALMPs combining skill development with 
employment services and entrepreneurship promotion have only been established after the 
January 25th Revolution (ILO, 2017). In the context of Social Fund for Development, the 
Emergency Labor Intensive Investment Project as well as the Emergency Employment 
Investment project were launched with the support of the World Bank, UNDP and the 
European Union in 2012. Both projects grant temporary employment opportunities to 
unemployed unskilled or semi-skilled workers through labor-intensive projects (Social Fund 
for Development, 2013). These two programs target the mitigation of the economic downturn 
that occurred after the Arab Spring (ILO, 2017). At the macro-economic level, national 
standards for the provision of skill training were developed in partnership with the relevant 
industries, the Social Fund for Development – and later the Industrial Training Council – the 
World Bank as well as other international organizations. At the program level, the national 
program for training for employment was implemented by the, World Bank as well as the 
Industrial Training Council (ILO, 2017). In Egypt, civil society organizations play an important 
role in the development of ALMPs. The line between state and non-state providers is blurred, 
especially given that the Social Fund for Development used to work with hundreds of NGOs 
in the provision of ALMPs (Barsoum, 2017).  
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The Ministry of Social Solidarity has designed an ALMP to complement Takaful and 
Karama; Forsa Program - Opportunity - which is still at an early phase of its development 
(MoSS, 2019d). Forsa is the employment and livelihood support component of TKP (World 
Bank, 2015). TKP graduates should seek training and employment opportunities through Forsa 
(El-Shabrawy, 2019). Forsa targets TKP beneficiaries who are of age to participate in the labor 
force, those rejected by the PMT formula of TKP and people with disabilities who are capable 
of working, among others (El-Shabrawy, 2019) . The following are the services provided to 
Forsa beneficiaries; (1) behavioral and cultural awareness sessions focusing predominantly on 
financial literacy (2) mentoring especially with regards to entrepreneurship and the 
management of micro-enterprises in collaboration with the ILO (3) Job-specific and demand-
driven skill-training in cooperation with the USAID (4) Financing micro-enterprises (5) linking 
beneficiaries to a database of employers and employment opportunities, among others (El-
Shabrawy, 2019).  
Egypt’s ALMPs face several challenges related to the country’s welfare regime structure 
(Barsoum, 2017). Not only are inefficient and unsustainable models of public employment still 
bolstered, but the government does not spend sufficient funds on skill development. Moreover, 
the activities in this field are fragmented due to the multiplicity of players that leads to a lack 
of coordination as well as donor-dependence (Barsoum, et al., 2019). Indeed, very often no 
clear outputs or monitoring and evaluation reports are available for these programs. Finally, 
despite the political support for entrepreneurship programs in the region, the number of 
beneficiaries, especially start-ups, is small, as compared to other activities (Semlali & Angel-
Urdinola, 2013). Thus, Egypt focuses on financial services – as is clear from the Social Fund 
for Development - whilst few programs incorporate mentoring, coaching or business 
incubation (Semlali & Angel-Urdinola, 2013).  
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3. CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
While most social protection and social policy discourses have centered around evaluation 
studies, design and implementation questions, regional divergences and similarities, limited 
attention has been given to institutional arrangements and governance of SP. This literature 
review examines the concept of governance and its relation to Social Policy and Social 
Protection. It also places governance within the works on SP. Finally, policy, design and 
implementation conditions and challenges of SP systems in the MENA region and in Egypt are 
examined.  
3.1. Governance as a Concept  
Over the years, the concept of governance has become an overarching approach which 
covers a number of phenomena in political sciences, economics, management, public 
administration as well as public policy (Pierre & Peters, 2000). From a state-centered 
perspective, governance is sometimes seen from the lens of public management (Hood, 1991; 
Du Gay, 1996; Hill & Lynn Jr, 2004; Lynn Jr, Heinrich, & Hill, 2000; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 
2017). It also often deals with the coordination of different actors through policy networks 
(Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Rhodes, 2017; Börzel, 1997) as well as the coordination of a variety 
of sectors in the economy (Campbell, Hollingsworth, & Lindberg, 1991; Hollingsworth, 
Schmitter, & Streeck, 1994). Governance has also come to denote the collaboration and 
coordination of efforts between the public and private sector in public service delivery (Ansell 
& Gash, 2008; Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2012). In the private sector, corporate governance is a 
term which incorporates a variety of structures, rules, procedures and mechanisms that steer 
and control corporations and their relationship with stakeholders (Almqvist, Grossi, van 
Helden, & Reichard, 2013; Tricker & Tricker, 2015). Finally, international organizations such 
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have coined the term good governance 
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as a development reform objective especially in the Global South (Leftwich, 1994; Santiso, 
2001; Woods, 2000; Mkandawire, 2007).  
Not only does the concept of Governance resonate in many academic domains and is 
understood in different lenses, but Pierre and Peters (2020) differentiate between Governance 
as a structure, Governance as a process and Governance as an analytic framework. In 
structural terms, governance regulates the relationships between the different political and 
economic institutions inside as well as outside the state (Pierre and Peters, 2020, p. 4). 
Governance can organize relationships in a hierarchical way. Structures can also revolve 
around the market given the importance of economic actors and institutions. One of the most 
common perceptions on the structural definition of governance is the understanding of 
Governance as networks (Pierre and Peters, 2020, p.11; Börzel & Risse, 2010; Marcussen & 
Torfing, 2006). Network governance deals with the relationship between networks in the policy 
arena as well as collaborations among actors and stakeholders in a given area “ranging from 
local government or neighbourhood to networks of states, or actors with joint stakes in a 
particular issue” (Pierre & Peters, 2020, p. 11). Governance as a process focuses both on 
outomces as well as institutional arrangements (Pierre & Peters, 2020, p. 12). Thus, governance 
is not only concerned with structures but most importantly, relationships between them. In this 
regard, governance is dynamic with regards to both its configuration as well as objectives 
(Pierre & Peters, 2020, p.13). For the state this means that proper governance requires the state 
to coordinate and steer its efforts. Finally, governance can be regarded as a theory or analytic 
framework rather than a phenomenon.  
Although there is no single definition of governance, this work takes a more operational 
perspective on governance. The focus is on the application of adequate governance mechanism 
rather than the theory of governance. Hence, this thesis’ working definition of governance is 
one which highlights the importance of both governance as a structure - i.e. institutional 
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capacity - but also governance as a process which is dynamic. Governance includes the steering 
of subjects and practices in a way which helps reach social and politico-economic goals 
(Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2003).  
This work also emphasizes the importance of accountability to governance (Bassett, 
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). While a large portion of the corporate governance literature 
highlights the significance of accountability (Solomon & Solomon, 2004; Brennan & Solomon, 
2008; Keasey, Thompson, & Wright, 2005; Solomon J. , 2007), accountability relationships 
are crucial for the governance of the public sector, as well (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 
2012). In this regard, accountability can be defined as a set of “principal-agent relationships 
between policymakers, providers and citizens” (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). 
This thesis’ conceptualization and working definition of governance is elaborated in Chapter 
four.  
3.2. Understanding Social Protection  
The terms Social Policy and Social Protection cannot be used interchangeably. Social 
Policy is a field of policy and academic inquiry that is predominately based on the early 2000s 
Western European welfare state literature (Jawad, Jones, & Messkoub, 2019b). It is a feature 
of postwar democracies which provides overarching theoretical and empirical setting to the 
current study of SP (Jawad, Jones, & Messkoub, 2019b). SP is a newer but related concept that 
can be considered the more nuanced arm of social policy which includes more targeted SSN as 
well as social insurance schemes, which were, however, often neglected in the Global South 
(Jawad, Jones, & Messkoub, 2019b). Thus, SP can be considered the emerging paradigm for 
social policy in developing countries that contributes to the reduction of vulnerability and 
poverty in the Global South (Barrientos & Hulme, 2008). Because SP is not merely a policy 
framework but includes different approaches to economic and social development, the 
governance of SP can be more easily operationalized than that of social policy (Barrientos & 
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Hulme, 2008). Additionally, SP is the more contemporary phenomenon (Jawad, Jones, & 
Messkoub, 2019b). For this reason, this work focuses on the governance of SP in Egypt.  
Before analyzing the governance of social protection, it is crucial to map out the discourse 
on social protection that has been evolving for more than a decade. The term Social Protection 
has been defined differently by academics, donor agencies, governments and NGOs. Although 
there is no consensus on a single perception of SP, it is agreed-upon that SP is concerned with 
populations that are vulnerable and at risk, such as children, women, elderly, disabled, 
displaced, unemployed, sick, among others (Scott, 2012). Especially in developing countries, 
social protection puts an emphasis on poverty and poverty reduction strategies that reduce 
vulnerability and stimulate economic growth (Arjona, Ladaique, & Pearson, 2003; Barrientos 
& Hulme, 2009; Barrientos & Hulme, 2008; Barrientos & DeJong, 2006; Norton, Conway, & 
Foster, 2002).  
The International Labor Office (ILO) takes a rights-based approach on social protection 
and extends it beyond SSN (ILO, 2014). Indeed, SP is a human right based on shared principles 
of social justice and corresponds to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ call for 
appropriate living standards, access to health and education, food, housing and social security 
(ILO, 2019). This is why, every country should develop a Social Protection Floor (SPF) and 
establish a coherent SP system. SPFs are nationally-defined guarantees which provide 
protection against illness, health, poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion (Ortiz, Schmitt, & 
De, 2016). These guarantees should make sure that citizens have access to health care and 
income security over the life cycle (ILO, 2019).  
The World Bank’s discourse on SP, on the other hand, focuses on risk management. The 
Social Risk Management Framework developed by the World Bank is grounded on the notion 
that the poor are most exposed to various types of risks and have the least instruments to deal 
with such risks (Holzmann, Sherburne-Benz, & Tesliuc, 2003). Thus, the poor should have 
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more access to Social Risk Management instruments (Holzmann, Sherburne-Benz, & Tesliuc, 
2003). The main elements of Social Risk Management include risk reduction, risk mitigation 
and risk coping. Finally, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) approach emphasizes 
the importance of multi-dimensional poverty and its impact on children’s poverty and 
deprivation. Their approach towards social protection is fixated around child poverty and 
providing children with inclusive and integrated SP systems that are equitable (UNICEF, 
2012). A more elaborative account of different international organizations’ and donor agencies’ 
conceptualizations of SP is provided by Cook & Kabeer (2009).  
It is evident that there are significant variations in the approaches towards SP as well as the 
objectives and design of SP interventions (Cook & Kabeer, 2009). While the World Bank’s 
Social Risk Management framework has dominated international policy discourse for a long 
period of time, among others due to the Bank’s influence, other scholarly accounts of SP have 
been influential, as well (Cook & Kabeer, 2009). Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2007) 
conceptual framework on Social protection for transformation focuses on the link between 
social protection and the reduction of vulnerabilities. It is one of the most elaborative and 
widely acknowledged conceptualizations of SP. Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux argue that 
social protection is broader than mere SSN and that it has to incorporate protective, 
preventative, promotive and transformative measures. Provision instruments describe social 
assistance programs as well as social services targeted at needy populations. Preventive 
measures aim to prevent deprivation and focuses on the eradication of poverty. Such 
instruments include social insurance and security programs that are targeted at economically 
vulnerable groups. Prevention tries to avert households from negative coping strategies 
(Carpenter, Slater, & Mallett, 2012). Promotive interventions focus on the improvement of real 
income and capacities by developing programs that enhance the livelihood, assets and 
productivity of individuals. Such programs include, for instance, ALMPs and microcredit. 
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Finally, transformative measures focus on social justice and inclusivity (Sabates-Wheeler & 
Devereux, 2007).  
Aside from the conceptualizations of SP, the discourse on SP includes studies that map out 
the evolution of the field (Cook & Kabeer, 2009; Norton, Conway, & Foster, 2002; Barrientos 
& Hulme, 2009; Scott, 2012; European Commission, 2015). These trace the evolution of SP 
from short-term protective SSN that reduce the impacts of shocks and insurance interventions 
linked to formal employment to long-term preventive and promotive SP schemes which 
support equitable growth, address the structural causes of poverty and attempt to help people 
climb out of poverty.  
Another strand in the literature focuses on regional developments and the impact of 
political economy on SP. Machado, Bilo, Veras Soares, & Guerreiro Osorio (2018) and 
Devereux (2015) provide a descriptive account of the development and status quo of SP 
programs in the Middle East and North Africa. On the other hand, Karshenas & Moghadam 
(2009) examine the evolution of social policy in the region before the revolution while the 
political economy of SP in the Middle East and North Africa received even more attention after 
the 2011 revolution calling for social justice (Loewe, 2013; Loewe & Jawad, 2018; Karshenas, 
Moghadam, & Alami, 2014; Silva, Levin, & Morgandi, 2013). Studies on the Latin American 
experience trace stronger and deeper structural developments that have started almost two 
decades ago (Barrientos A. , 2019). Since the beginning of the 1990s, newly democratized 
Latin American countries embarked on a mission to secure social rights (Levitsky & Roberts, 
2012) and with the help of international organizations and donor agencies, they started 
developing large-scale social assistance programs targeting low-income and informal 
employment groups (Molyneux, 2007; Barrientos & Hinojosa-Valencia, 2009; Barrientos & 
Santibáñez, 2009; Ferreira & Robalino, 2010). More contemporary accounts of the Latin 
American experience assess the shock-responsiveness of SP in the region (Beazley, 2017) as 
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well as ways to move beyond SSN (Cruz-Martínez, 2019; Barrientos A., 2019; Papadopoulos 
& Leyer, 2016). The Sub-Saharan and South Asian experiences with SP are also crucial in the 
discourse on SP (Devereux & Cipryk, 2009; Kohler, Cali, & Stirbu, 2009).  
Aside from the conceptualization and regional accounts on SP, a large portion of the 
literature analyzes the effectiveness and efficiency of different types of SP (Howell, 2001; 
Palacios & Sluchynsky, 2006; Betcherman, Olivas, & Dar, 2004) as well as the design and 
implementation challenges and lessons learnt (Barrientos A., 2007; von Gliszczynski, 2015; 
Slater & Farrington, 2009; Devereux, 2010). With regards to the types of SP, a wealth of 
literature assesses the impact and programming options of cash transfers; conditonal and 
unconditional, targeted and universal, etc. (Slater, Farrington, Holmes, & Harvey, 2008; 
Hanlon, Barrientos, & Hulme, 2010; Hanlon, 2004; Fiszbien & Schady, 2009; Holmes & 
Slater, 2007). This is mainly because cash transfers are regarded as a feasible and viable 
measure in both developmental and humanitarian contexts (Scott, 2012).  
3.3. Governance and Social Protection  
This section maps out the literature on the governance of social protection. As noted 
previously, while social protection has gained momentum in contemporary studies, the 
discourse on social policy preceded SP. This is why, this section begins with an analysis of the 
relationship between governance and social policy, followed by an examination of works 
assessing the governance of social protection systems. Afterwards, the review zooms into the 
governance of social protection programs; cash transfers and contributory schemes.  
3.3.1. Governance and Social Policy 
The utility of governance as a frame of analysis to the study of social policy was firstly 
examined by Mary Daly (2003). She traces back the different definitions and 
conceptualizations of governance and shows that the concept is not foreign to social policy. 
Her definition of governance includes the analysis of relationships among local, regional and 
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national levels, the role of the state and its relation to civil society as well as the formulation, 
orientation and implementation of policies (Daly, 2003, p. 115). The analysis sheds light on 
the question whether governance extends beyond management and can lend itself to an analysis 
and understanding of social policy. In order to answer the question, she develops an analytic 
framework for governance and social policy and applies it to analyze the New Labor Law in 
the United Kingdom. The conceptual framework identifies four dimensions of governance; 
Public Sphere, Policy-Making, Policy Implementation and Societal Incorporation as well as 
the operationalizeable referents that help analyze these dimensions. Although the conceptual 
framework is holistic and involves most parameters that need to be assessed when studying 
social policies, it is not easily operationalizable, as opposed to the framework used in this study 
(Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). Daly (2003) reaches the conclusion that 
governance extends far beyond management and similar academic disciplies, however, further 
research is needed in order to further embed and integrate governance into the study of social 
policy. Her assessment is unique insofar as it is the inauguration of the linkage between the 
two domains. This paper also represents one of the few theoretically grounded studies linking 
governance to social policy. The conceptual framework used in this thesis will be briefly 
introduced in the next section and elaborated in Chapter four of the thesis.  
3.4. Governance of Social Protection Systems 
The World Bank has done extensive research on the governance of social protection as it 
has developed a holisitic approach to analyze the governance of SP. The World Bank’s 
Giannozzi & Khan (2011) find that the expansion of already inadequate SSN, requires an 
assessment of the current governance schemes of SSN in East Asia. They develop a conceptual 
framework which examines the governance of non-contributory SSN and apply it on the 
assessment of East Asia.  
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Building on this framework, Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold (2012) develop the 
conceptual framework Rules, Roles and Controls used in this thesis. Instead of merely focusing 
on the governance of SSN, this framework examines the governance of contributory and non-
contributory schemes as well as active labor market policies. This conceptual framework will 
be elaborated in depth in the next chapter. It is centered around the importance of accountability 
to good governance and identifies operational entry points for the governance of SP; (1) Rules 
of the Game, (2) Roles and Responsibilities, (3) Controls and Accountability Mechanisms. 
Most importantly, it does not only tackle governance from the program level, but it identifies 
the three levels at which governance is crucial; (1) Macro-level, (2) Meso-level, (3) Micro-or 
Program-level. In parallel, another framework is developed at the World Bank which does not 
directly discuss the governance of SP but is closely linked to it. Robalino, Rawlings, & Walker 
(2012) provide a framework for designing and applying SP and labor systems in developing 
countries.  
Similar to Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold (2012), the paper is concerned with social 
protection systems, i.e. a country’s set of different SP programs which are often disintegrated 
and fragmented. Robalino, Rawlings, & Walker (2012) analyze some of the prerequisties of a 
well-designed SP system, among which is effective risk management, improved financial 
sustainablity, equitable redistribution of resources, economies of scale in administration as well 
as better incentives. Many of these pre-requisites are incorporated into this study’s conceptual 
framework. Robalino, Rawlings, & Walker (2012) assess these design and implementation 
features on the SP systems of Brazil, Chile, India, Niger, Romania and Vietnam andconclude 
that three levels are crucial to the design of efficient SP and labor systems— (1) policy level, 
(2) program level as well as the (3) administrative level. These three levels are similar to the 
categorization provided by Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold (2012).  
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Although not many, some scholars in different organizations and countries have worked on 
the governance enablers and challenges of social protection. Rohregger (2010) analyzes the 
conditions which are essential in establishing efficient and effective SP programs. Among the 
enablers are political consensus, adequate administrative structures, sustainable financing and 
economic growth as well as international conditioning. Rohregger identifies governance 
challenges that are entry points for the assessment of SP programs, among which are 
administrative structures, legal and political framework, lack of data and monitoring and 
evaluation, sustainable conditions, among others. Similar to Daly (2003), this study requires a 
more nuanced assessment of the parameters to be measured at the program and the policy level 
in order to examine the above-mentioned enablers and challenges. Similarly, the European 
Commission’s report on Social Protection Systems (European Commission, 2015) examines 
issues related to the design and implementation of social protection systems. Designing 
adequate SP systems require the existence of an institutional home, a costing assessment, 
proper targeting means, among others. Implementation systems need to pay attention to the 
payment and registration systems as well as the development of proper measures for 
monitoring and evaluation.  
Bozio & Dormont (2016) focus on the level most significant to the French SP system; the 
financial feasibility of social protection programs. While it includes other design features, the 
study aims to make the spending on SP more efficient and provides a number of reform 
recommendations, that are, however, specific to the case at hand. Some of the 
recommendations are reiterated in other works, such as the coordination of efforts between 
contributory and non-contributory social protection programs and the reorganization of the 
architecture and infrastructure of specific programs, especially from the administrative stance. 
Thus, although the paper does not provide a generic set of enablers, the recommendations set 
forth revolve around policy and administrative capabilities as well as fiscal sustainability.  
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A number of studies highlight the role of the international community in the delivery of 
effective social protection programs at the national level. Deacon (2013) takes governance into 
the global scene and analyzes the impact of international organizations, especially United 
Nations agencies on the governance of social protection at the country level. Since the focus is 
on SP, the ILO and the World Bank are predominantly in the highlight of this paper. Indeed, 
the role of the ILO and its Social Protection Floor as well as other International Governmental 
Institutions in the extension and governance of social protection is one which is studied 
extensively (Deacon, 2016; Çavus, 2016; Shriwise, Kentikelenis, & Stuckler, 2019). These 
works focus not only on the governance of social protection, but also the global discourse over 
social policy. 
3.4.1. Governance of Cash Transfer Programs 
The nature of contributory programs is different from non-contributory and active labor 
market programs. This is why, the largest portion of studies, whether reports or journal articles, 
assesses the governance of one type of social protection programs. Hence, most studies 
concerned with the governance of SP focus predominantly on the micro- or program-level of 
governance.  
Non-contributory SP schemes and especially cash transfer programs have been in focus of 
the literature on social protection for decades (Bastagli, et al., 2016). Whether to target or to 
provide universal transfers, whether to conditon cash transfers or not, among others are some 
of the issues surrounding non-contributory schemes which are studied extensively in the 
literature (von Gliszczynski, 2015; Hulme, Hanlon, & Barrientos, 2012; Hanlon, 2004; 
Barrientos & Hulme, 2009). This, however, is not in the center of this study. Instead, the focus 
is on the governance, implementation challenges and facilitators as well as delivery of non-
contributory and contributory schemes. 
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UNDP & UNCDF (2013) focus on the governance of social assistance programs including 
unconditional and conditional cash transfers, in-kind transfers, among others. The report finds 
that non-contributory programs in most countries, especially in the Global South, are 
fragmented and characterized by improvished governance as well as a lack of institutional 
capacity. After mapping the existing institutional and governance details related to the 
implementation of social assistance programs in countries from Asia and the Pacific, it 
examines the efficiency and effectiveness of local government in delivering social assistance 
programs. The report also develops a conceptual framework for the assessment of local level 
governance of social assistance programs.  
While UNDP & UNCDF (2013) highlight the role of decentralization and local governance 
in the implementation and service delivery of all types of social assistance programs, Slater, 
Farrington, Holmes, & Harvey (2008) advance a framework for the assessment of cash transfer 
programs. It focuses on three spheres; (1) institutions, politics and governance, (2) capacity 
and implementation, (3) local economic and social impacts. While this framework includes 
many of the dimensions of governance put forth by all previously elaborated studies, this work 
also emphasizes the importance of local governance and impact as well as the interplay 
between the different spheres. Although this framework is meant to be implemented on cash 
transfers it can easily serve in the assessment of other types of SP service delivery. The 
framework requires an in-depth anlaysis of the referents or the ways such spheres can be 
measured at the program level.  
In contrast to this study, Bastagli, et al. (2016) review the evidence on the impacts of cash 
transfers at the individual and household level by analyzing the literature of 15 years spanning 
from the year 2000 to 2015. In order to do so, they advance a framework to assess the enablers 
and constraints of cash transfer programs at three levels; (1) household-level, (2) local-level 
and (3) country-level. As opposed to the conceptual framework used in this work (Bassett, 
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Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012), Bastagli, et al. (2016) incorporate the crucial level of the 
household in order to also determine the impacts on the household, which is the most important 
level of impact. Outcomes and impacts of cash transfers are measured at three levels; (1) 
individual, (2) household (3) intra-household. In this thesis, the household level could not be 
incorporated given the lack of direct access to household data. The way to mitigate this issue 
with regards to Takaful and Karama program in Egypt was to incorporate IFPRI’s impact 
assessment which included more than 8000 households in the analysis.  
3.4.2. Governance of Contributory Schemes 
Even though contributory schemes, such as social and health insurance have been existent 
far longer than cash transfers, they still face numerous challenges related to compliance, error, 
fraud and corruption as well as corporate governance and financial sustainability (Bassett, 
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). The International Social Security Association (ISSA) has 
developed guidelines on good governance of social security organizations. “[…] [Good] 
governance is aimed at delivering what is mandated and ensuring that what is delivered is 
responsive to the evolving needs of the individual and society.” (ISSA, 2013, p. 1). Similar to 
Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold (2012), the guidelines highlight the importance of 
transparency and accountability mechanisms as well as strategic long-term planning, actuarial 
soundness, investment in human resources and internet communication technology 
infrastructure, the prevention of error, fraud and corruption, among others.  
Using the recommendations and data of ISSA (2013), Enoff & McKinnon (2011) focus on 
the micro-level of the governance of social insurance schemes. Their emphasis lies on the 
improvement of program delivery especially with regards to compliance and contribution 
collection. Using survey evidence of different social security organizations, Enoff & 
McKinnon (2011) propose a set of techniques to improve contribution collection and the 
enforcement of compliance.  
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The concept of governance is applied differently to study social security policy in the 
United Kingdom in Carmel & Papadopoulos (2003). This study defines governance in more 
political and macro-level terms. “Governance is […] a form of political regulation of social 
subjects […] initiated, organised and partially controlled by an actor or actors vested with […] 
political authority […]. Governance involves the ‘steering’ of the subjects’ behavioural 
practices towards particular social and politico-economic goals via a set of institutions and 
processes that aim to maintain or change the status quo.” (Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2003, p. 
2). Using this perception of governance, this paper analyzes policy developments in social 
security policy in the United Kingdom from two areas of concern. The first, is the area 
commonly referred to as the policy level of governance, i.e. the government’s policy goals as 
well as the principles they are based on. The second area of concern is the more operational 
side of governance focusing on the management of policy as well as program delivery.  
After mapping out a number of studies analyzing the governance of social protection, it is 
crucial to highlight that many of these accounts develop operational conceptual framework for 
the assessment of governance. This is because governance of SP tackles the prerequisites and 
challenges of the policy and program level implementation of SP and is therefore more applied 
than it is theoretical. This also explains why a number of the mapped studies are reports 
conducted by scholars in international institutions. Another crucial finding is that whether a 
framework is developed for contributory, non-contributory schemes or both, most analyses 
pointed at the same governance entry points; coordination instead of fragmentation, political 
willingness and support, financial sustainability, administrative and institutional capacity, 
among others. While some works delve deeper into the program level, others focus on the 
macro-level of governance. The most viable frameworks and accounts are those which 
emphasize the different spheres of governance, are holistic and can be applied to different types 
of programs and are easily operational, i.e. provide operational parameters.  
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3.5. Literature on Governance of Social Protection in the Middle East  
While the governance of SP in the Middle East and particularly in Egypt has not been studied 
in the literature extensively, there are a number of studies which analyze the design and 
implementation facilitators and challenges of SP in the region. United Nations Economic and 
Social Commission for Western Asia’s (UN ESCWA) report on Social Protection Reform in 
Arab Countries (UN ESCWA, 2019) acknowledges the shortcomings SP systems have 
suffered from in the Arab Region. While contributory schemes are faced with challenges of 
low coverage, high fragmentation and financial unsustainability, non-contributory SP schemes 
have relied for a long period of time on universal subsidies (UN ESCWA, 2019, p. 10). Most 
SP systems in the region lack coherence and coordination at the policy level which undermines 
effectiveness and efficiency. UN ESCWA (2019) examines the reforms being implemented in 
the region from a systems perspective and thus, conducts a meso-level analysis of SP (Bassett, 
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). The fourth chapter of the report analyzes governance 
aspects of SP systems in the region. It provides conditions for adequate program and system 
governance that ensure coordination and collaboration between relevant parties in the delivery 
of SP. Such recommendations include the establishment of national dialogue processes, 
creation of fiscal space as well as the inclusion of stakeholders at the local level. The chapter 
concludes with best practices from Morocco and Mauritania.  
The Arab Region’s SP systems share a number of common well-documented 
characetristics and challenges (Barsoum & Kassem, 2019). Coverage of SP programs and 
income support transfers is often inadequate insofar as it covers approximately 30% of those 
living in the poorest quinitiles (Silva, Levin, & Morgandi, 2013). Contributory schemes face 
serious coverage challenges since the largest share of the workforce in the region is not covered 
by the formal social insurance systems (Jawad, Jones, & Messkoub, 2019; Silva, Levin, & 
Morgandi, 2013). Not only does this exacerbate the urban-rural divide as well as inequality, 
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but it worsens the conditions for the missing middle class (UN ESCWA, 2019). In addition, 
universal or quasi-universal energy and food subsidy schemes have been key in the region’s 
welfare mix (Barsoum & Kassem, 2019). Most of these countries have been undergoing efforts 
to reform their subsidy systems, in particular Jordan, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia (Jawad, 
2014; Silva, Levin, & Morgandi, 2013). A number of Arab countries have also implemented 
cash transfer programs to mitigate the negative impacts of the gradual removal of subsidies 
(UN ESCWA, 2019). Coverage challenges aside, SP systems in the region lack an overarching 
and comprehensive long-term strategy, are usually disintegrated and fragmented and are 
confronted with challenges of coordination among all relevant actors in the field (Devereux, 
2016).  
Regarding program design and implementation, the region’s SP programs face challenges 
related to targeting, especially in terms of the inherited and deeply flawed subsidy system 
(Devereux S., 2016; Jawad, 2015). SP programs also face serious challenges regarding the 
institutional capacities, financial adequacy, management information systems and the 
development of rigorous monitoring and evaluation systems. In spite of the multiplicity of 
studies analyzing the political economy of social policy in the region as well as the challenges 
and characteristics of social protection programs in MENA countries, very few studies provide 
a systematic examination of the evolution of social policy changes and social developments in 
the region (Jawad, Jones, & Messkoub, 2019a).  
Studies on the Egyptian SP system analyze the design and implementation challenges 
related to the different types of SP schemes. A number of scholars highlight the challenges 
related to the contributory scheme and propose possible reforms to the social insurance and 
pension schemes in the country (Helmy, 2008; Selwaness & Roushdy, 2014; Selwaness I. , 
2012; Loewe & Westemeier, 2018; Loewe, 2004). The focus remained, however, for a number 
of years on the inefficiencies of the food and energy subsidy system as it was the most 
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important SSN in the country (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018; Ecker, Al-Riffai, Breisinger, & 
El-Batrawy, 2016; Lofgren & El-Said, 2001; Abdel-baki, 2011; Ramadan & Thomas, 2011). 
Recently, a number of studies started mapping the social protection system in Egypt as a whole 
with its gaps, challenges and opportunities (Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012), especially in light 
of the reforms that have started after the revolution in 2013 (Selwaness & Messkoub, 2019; 
Helmy, Richter, Siddig, & Ghoneim, 2018; Jawad, et al., 2018; El Baradei, 2019). Aside from 
Takaful and Karama, since it is a recently launched program, most programs in Egypt have 
been studied in depth in the country.  
Nevertheless, a significant gap remains; there have been no attempts to analyze neither the 
governance nor the challenges and opportunities on all different levels, the program and the 
policy spheres. This is also important because most programs in the country - and in the region 
- face very similar challenges. Moreover, implementation details have rarely been discussed. 
Indeed, even in terms of the well-studied social insurance system, no accounts have been found 
which examine the implementation and service delivery challenges, for instance those related 
to the institutional and human resource capacities. Finally, linking theory to practice often 
provides insights into recommendations and perspectives which have not been considered 
before. Many of the studies assessing the countries SP system do not link theory to practice. 
This is why, this thesis’ application of the governance framework helps in the formulation of 
evidence-based and comprehensive recommendations.  
This thesis provides a practical and operational account on the governance of SP in Egypt. 
By analyzing the governance of SP in Egypt, not only is a country’s experience reviewed. But 
the assessment of governance challenges and prerequisites links between theoretical notions 
about how effective SP is designed and implemented as well as the practical hurdles faced both 
at the country and program-levels.  
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The governance of social policy and social protection is a niche which has not been studied 
extensively especially by academics, mostly since it requires an in-depth analysis of programs 
and policies in different countries, which are often not easily accessible by scholars. 
Additionally, the governance of SP links between theoretical conceptualizations, regional 
examinations, design and implementation features as well as program evaluations and thus, 
touches upon many of the different accounts on SP.  
There are a number of studies analyzing program-level challenges in the delivery of SP in 
Egypt. Nevertheless, no studies have been found that incorporate both the “systems”-level of 
governance as well as an in-depth examination of the governance of contributory and non-
contributory schemes. Furthermore, most studies assess different programs and do not examine 
common features, facilitators and challenges. Most of the studies on the Egyptian social 
protection system do not assess on the system as a whole. Hence, by providing a holistic and 
comprehensive governance examination of SP in Egypt, this study is the first of its kind in 
Egypt and the MENA region. Such an assessment is timely in light of the country’s efforts to 
reform the SP system.  
To sum up, this study fills a gap in the literature on social protection in the Middle East and 
Egypt by analyzing the governance of the social protection system as well as the different 
programs inside the system. Thus, it not only examines the big picture but it also assesses 
design and implementation features and thus, zooms in on the different programs. This way, 
reform efforts in the region can be guided by evidence-based comprehensive analyses.  
   
 56 
4. CHAPTER FOUR: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
As it has been clear from the literature review, the governance of social protection is an 
under-researched area, especially when it is analyzed in the context of a country, in this case, 
Egypt. As social protection moves to the center of academic research on the social dimension 
of development, a body of evidence is produced. Evaluation studies assessing the impacts of 
social protection programs on the reduction of poverty and vulnerability, design and 
implementation issues at the program level such as targeting, conditionality, financial issues as 
well as the impact of social protection on health, education, labor, among others, are areas of 
research which have been explored in depth by a number of scholars, international 
organizations and donor institutions (UNDP & UNCDF, 2013). Nevertheless, issues of 
governance and institutional arrangements of social protection have received little attention. 
With the scaling up of many programs across the developing world, issues related to the 
governance of social protection become more pronounced (UNDP & UNCDF, 2013). In order 
to efficiently and effectively deliver social protection programs at the national level as well as 
achieve social justice, it is relevant to examine the governance of SP.  
Another reason why governance is in the focus of this study is the increased recognition 
and evidence of the importance of good governance in the enhancement of service delivery 
and the improvement of the outcomes of social protection programs (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, 
& Ringold, 2012). Governance is a holistic analytic approach which not only aims to reduce 
corruption, but provides incentives for policy-makers and program providers, improves the 
accountability relationship with citizens, among others (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 
2012). Most importantly, it aims to look inside the “black box” or “missing middle” (Bassett, 
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012) of SP service delivery and hence, improve legitimacy. Thus, 
governance can be viewed as a crucial building block for enhanced implementation and 
outcomes and therefore, an integral part of the social protection system. Instead of merely 
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examining programs, governance allows for an investigation of the “system” (Bassett, 
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012) and hence, the interactions among programs, actors, 
regulations, institutions, stakeholders and mechanisms.  
Still, governance assessments face a number of constraints. First, as previously mentioned, 
there is a certain ambiguity around the definition of governance. Not only this, but scholars are 
unable to come up with a single definition of the governance of social protection because of 
the diversity of programs making up the sector (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). 
The conceptual framework used in this study tries to overcome this challenge by examining 
overarching concepts which do not differ across the various types of programs in the field. 
Additionally, an in-depth examination of governance requires a profound understanding of the 
political economy as well as country-specific details about the design and implementation of 
SP programs. Such data are often difficult to gain access to.  
As previously explained, there are various definitions of governance with multiple entry 
points. The working definition of governance used in this thesis is derived from Bassett, 
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold (2012). Governance in SP incorporates a set of incentives and 
accountability relationships which impacts service provision, accountability behaviours, 
service quality, efficiency and outcomes (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012, p. 5). 
Effective governance enhances implementation and influences outcomes by improving the 
coordination of SP programs, framing accountability relationships, promoting transparency 
and participation and enhancing service delivery (Campos & Pradhan, 2007). Thus, improved 
governance could lead to better development outcomes (Overseas Development Institute, 
2006; Campos & Pradhan, 2007).  
The conceptual framework used in this study Rules, Roles and Controls developed by the 
World Bank (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012) operationalizes the working definition 
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elaborated above. It provides a set of conditions for effective governance. Accordingly, efforts 
to strengthen governance are categorized into three main domains7.  
A. Rules of the Game: The rules of the game are a prerequisite for functioning accountability 
relationships between policy-makers, program providers as well as citizens. This translates 
into a clarity of the legal framework governing the SP system as well as a clarity of the 
legal, regulatory and operational guidelines at the program level. These guidelines and rules 
differ from contributory to non-contributory schemes. While contributory schemes need to 
manage compliance, publicize program rules and ensure the consistency of the rules, non-
contributory schemes have to develop and publicize clear and transparent program rules, 
that are communicated to the citizens and are consistent both in application as well as 
content. In terms of non-contributory schemes, these rules need to be clear at all levels of 
service delivery; from the determination of eligibility, entry and exit of the programs, the 
determination of benefit levels, among others.  
B. Roles and Responsibilities: It is crucial for SP systems to determine the roles and 
responsibilities of the actors involved both at the system as well as at the program level. In 
this regard, it is crucial to clearly identify the principals and agents in the accountability 
relationships, to clearly determine the roles and responsibilities across different levels of 
government and institutions, to clarify institutional relationships and job descriptions for 
providers and to ensure adequate performance incentives. Contributory and non-
contributory schemes differ here, as well.  
At the level of contributory schemes, it is imperative to define institutional roles and to 
establish an effective performance management system. Non-contributory schemes 
highlight the importance of accountability relationships. Upon conducting the data analysis 
of this study, a number of additional parameters were found to be relevant for the delivery 
 
7 This section is derived from Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold (2012).  
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of non-contributory programs. First, it is important to be entrepreneurial and to consider 
outsourcing as a form of effective division of roles. Moreover, the separation of functions 
between payment and service delivery can help enhance the governance of the program. 
Finally, the capacities and individuals working on the design and delivery of the programs 
are imperative for its success. This is why, a rigorous and impactful capacity development 
program can aid in the clarity and effectiveness of the roles and responsibilities.  
C. Controls and Accountability Mechanisms: In order to enforce accountability, it is 
important to include a number of oversight mechanisms and implementation procedures to 
ensure “the right benefit gets to the rights person at the right time” (Bassett, Giannozzi, 
Pop, & Ringold, 2012, p. 7). Contributory schemes highlight the importance of proper 
corporate governance. Moreover, transferring payments electronically reduces error, fraud 
and corruption. It is also essential to ensure the existence of effective, time-based and 
systematic checks as well as to ensure that sanctions are in place to penalize fraud and 
corruption.  
Non-Contributory schemes involve supply-side as well as demand-side controls and 
accountability mechanisms. Supply-side mechanisms include the existence of verification 
measures, audits and monitoring and evaluation tools. Cross-checking the data provided by 
the citizens to other databases is also helpful in detecting fraudulent and corrupt behavior. 
Developing feedback loops such as a grievance redress mechanism can also help enhance 
the governance and accountability of the system. I have added the parameter Management 
Information Systems to the supply-side control measures since digitalization helps reduce 
human error as well as decrease and detect intentional corruption and fraud (Bassett, 
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). Conditionality has also been added as another supply-
side mechanism. As will be clear in the analysis section, conditionality helps reveal errors 
and corrupt behavior on both sides of service delivery; the citizens as well as the service 
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providers. Finally, demand-side control and accountability mechanisms involve citizens in 
the oversight framework. The two relevant demand-side mechanisms in the Egyptian 
context are community monitoring and public hearing. These are the two forms of social 
accountability measures incorporated into Takaful and Karama and are hence, relevant to 
this study.  
Finally, contributory and non-contributory schemes would not be well-governed if they 
were designed in a way which does not ensure sustainability. This is why, the parameter 
sustainability has been added to the conceptual framework. Sustainability in social protection 
systems and programs can take different forms. Political and financial sustainability are crucial 
for all types of programs (György, Peschner, Rosini, & Van Rie, 2019). Financial sustainability 
of contributory schemes involves decisions regarding investment management as well as the 
choice of actuarially sound and sustainable contribution rates.  
The above-mentioned operational entry points, Rules, Roles and Controls, function at 
three different levels or spheres that are inter-related and mutually reinforcing.  
A. The Macro-level analyzes how social protection is placed in the wider institutional 
configuration and within the public sector. This requires the existence of an effective 
framework governing human resources, policies, rule of law as well as an adequate 
enforcement capacity within the executive body. A civil service code often helps ensure 
the SP system is effectively governed at the macro-or policy/legal-level. This level is not 
examined in this study in depth, for many reasons. First, I was not able to gather sufficient 
data on the issue. Examining the macro-level of governance would require a study on its 
own. Even in the study by Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold (2012), when applying the 
conceptual framework, they exclude the macro-level since the micro-and meso-levels are 
more operational.  Additionally, all interviewees assured that the legal or regulatory 
framework is not among the main challenges facing the country. On the other hand, global 
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experiences show that the macro-level of governance is imperative in order to guarantee 
effective accountability mechanisms, reduce corruption and enhance the system’s 
effectiveness and efficiency (El Baradei, 2019b). This is why, the following paragraph will 
provide a brief description of some of the main findings regarding the crucial macro-level 
of governance.  
In Egypt, rule of law, enforcement capacity and accountability are among the biggest 
challenges facing the public sector; the country has spent years without a legislature, the 
parliament is ineffective and thus, corruption in the public sector is high. Indeed, the World 
Justice Project, an organization working on legal policy issues has ranked Egypt 121 out 
of 126 in their perception of how rule of law is applied in the country (El Baradei, 2019b). 
Similarly, according to the worldwide governance indicator, in the period between 2009 up 
until 2017, Egypt has been ranked below the 50th percentile rank in good governance (El 
Baradei, 2019b). Their good governance indicators include accountability, political 
stability, absence of violence, government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption, 
among others (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010). While Egypt’s performance in the 
different parameters fluctuates, the country’s performance on control of corruption remains 
low (World Bank, 2018c). Many of the challenges to be iterated at the meso- and micro-
levels of governance relate to these and other macro-level issues. However, since such 
challenges require an in-depth examination of the Egyptian constitution as well as an 
assessment of the functioning of the public sector under the different governments, it is 
difficult to incorporate this level in this work.  
B. The Meso-Level tackles governance arrangements at the sector level. Accordingly, this 
level focuses on institutional arrangements as well as the coordination of efforts among 
ministries and institutions involved in the delivery of SP programs. Challenges at this level 
include inadequate inter-ministerial coordination, inconsistent policies as well as 
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disintegrated programs. Choices at the sector level determine how the SP system functions, 
as a whole. This level can also be referred to as the sector level.  
C. The Micro- or program-level focuses on the design, administration and implementation 
of programs. This level highlights the importance of responsibilities and accountability 
mechanisms. Governance plays a role at every part of the service delivery chain. Indeed, 
from defining eligibility to enrolling the beneficiaries, providing them with the payments 
and services, monitoring them as well as facilitating an exit from the program, at all these 
stages, micro-level governance ensures effectiveness and efficiency. Challenges at this 
level are numerous since they can arise at every stage of service delivery. This is the most 
basic level of governance that provides the initial building blocks for the rest of the social 
protection system.  
Figure 1 provides a visualization of the conceptual framework, the different levels of 
governance as well as the three operational entry points. The parameters highlighted in red are 
the ones I have incorporated into the framework. This visualization does not incorporate all 
parameters, but those that are relevant for the programs studied in this work. An in-depth 
assessment of all parameters is provided by Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold (2012).  
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Figure 1: The Governance of Social Protection - Conceptual Framework  
Source: Author’s compilation building on Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold (2012) 
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This conceptual framework has been chosen to guide the analysis in this study for many 
reasons. First, among the different governance frameworks examined in the literature review, 
it is the only one that provides a conceptualization of governance that is holistic and can be 
applied across the different types of programs as well as the systems level. Most frameworks 
either focus on contributory or non-contributory schemes and do not find common governance 
parameters between the Two (UNDP & UNCDF, 2013; Enoff & McKinnon, 2011; European 
Commission, 2015). Rules, Roles and Controls is also the only framework which tackles all 
different levels of governance, the macro-, meso- and micro levels. Additionally, the 
conceptual framework is operational. Many frameworks fail to operationalize the relevant 
variables or parameters that are needed in order to measure governance at the system and the 
program level (Daly, 2003; Slater & Farrington, 2009). Other frameworks require the depth of 
data only granted to international organizations and partners working in the field (Bastagli, et 
al., 2016). Finally, after having collected the data, during the coding process it became apparent 
that the three entry points of governance fit well into the emergent themes gathered from the 
collected data. For this reason, I have decided to add a number of parameters and use this 
conceptual framework to guide the analysis of this work.  
On the other hand, the framework faces a number of limitations. Although it provides 
details of every level, entry point and parameter of governance, not every identified parameter 
could be analyzed in this study. This is because many parameters require detailed data and 
information that are not always available. Another delimitation is that the conceptual 
framework is more focused on the program than the macro-level. This is why, an in-depth 
assessment of the macro-level was not possible. Finally, while the framework highlights the 
importance of institutional roles, it neglects the roles of important stakeholders, like for 
instance NGOs. While I aimed to mitigate this challenge and tried to incorporate as many 
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stakeholders as possible in the study, I was not able to land interviews with the significant 
NGOs in Egypt.  
In brief, Rules, Roles and Controls is a conceptual framework which tackles governance 
across different levels and various types of programs. An examination of governance provides 
insights into linkages and relationships that are often overlooked. It opens up the “black box” 
of social protection systems. While it has not been used by a large number of scholars, Bassett, 
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold’s (2012) conceptual framework was not only operational, but it fit 
easily into the data.  
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5. CHAPTER FIVE: METHODOLOGY 
In this section, I elaborate on the choice of research method as well as the data collection 
methods used in this research. The sampling approach is also illustrated. Afterwards, the study 
framework will provide insights as to the researcher’s role in the field and problems that were 
encountered in the field. Finally, ethical considerations as well as the limitations of this study 
are outlined.  
5.1. Research Method  
In order to examine the governance of SP in Egypt, qualitative research methods are 
employed. First, this is the first time such research is conducted in Egypt - and generally 
speaking the area of governance of SP is under-researched. Tapping into such an area of inquiry 
that explores policy and program implications and challenges and whose variables need yet to 
be identified requires the use of qualitative data (Marshall & Rossman, 2014). Key informants, 
policy makers and program beneficiaries8 are crucial for such governance analyses. Moreover, 
the research questions are of exploratory nature and delve into complexities, relationships and 
structures and thus, require a qualitative research design. Finally, the analysis of governance in 
the literature in many domains is usually studied using qualitative methods for the above-
mentioned reasons (Pierre & Peters, 2000; Almqvist, Grossi, van Helden, & Reichard, 2013; 
Santiso, 2001; Mkandawire, 2007).  
It has been uncommon in Egypt to analyze social policy using qualitative research methods. 
Many of the studies in the field make use of quantitative methods especially when examining 
the social security system (Selwaness I. , 2012; Selwaness & Roushdy, 2014; Assaad, 2009; 
Assaad & Krafft, 2015; Maait & Demarco, 2012). Quantative techniques are percieved by 
many academics in the country as well as informants for this thesis as being more reliable. 
Many of the informants with academic and especially economic background advised to use 
 
8 However, for the purpose of this thesis, I was not able to interview program beneficiaries. 
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quantitative methods to take the analysis one step further and assess the impacts of the 
examined programs on multi-dimensional poverty. Not only would this have widened the scope 
of the thesis even further, but upon examination and after attempting to collect the quantitative 
data, a lag was found between the data collected on multi-dimensional poverty as well as for 
instance, the program evaluation of Takaful and Karama. Moreover, most of the needed data 
on programs aside from Takaful and Karama were either not available or could not be made 
available. Most importantly, policy-level data are in no way quantitative and hence, qualitative 
data are more suitable for a governance analysis (Marshall & Rossman, 2014).  
5.2. Data Collection Method  
The data collected and analyzed in this thesis builds predominantly on in-depth and semi-
structured interviews with policy makers as well as experts in the field (Bogner, Littig, & Menz, 
2009). For the purpose of triangulation, I also used content analysis of official documents as 
well as scholarly work to increase the validity and reliability of the data. I conducted a total of 
twelve interviews over the course of almost two months, from mid-December 2019 up until 
mid-February 2020, with policy-makers, experts and consultants working in the different 
branches of social protection and social policy in Egypt.  
Policy makers are individuals in positions of power and influence (Marshall & Rossman, 
2014, p. 155) while experts are individuals who have knowledge, experience and expertise on 
a relevant subject-matter, which might not be necessarily possessed by the expert alone but is 
not accessible to everyone in the field of study (Bogner, Littig, & Menz, 2009, p. 18). It can be 
up to the researcher to determine whether an individual is an expert in a certain field. This 
classification is not arbitrary but should be based on recognition and experience in the field 
(Bogner, Littig, & Menz, 2009). On the other hand, policy makers are influential, prominent 
and well-informed personas in a certain field  (Marshall & Rossman, 2014, p. 155).  
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Conducting interviews with policy makers and experts on social protection in Egypt has 
been identified as one of the most efficient, feasible and effective data collection methods for 
several reasons. First, such elite interviews provide valuable data and information about social 
protection because the positions these individuals hold allow them to be familiar with and to 
have access to data, knowledge, agencies, structures and relationships which are complex and 
can be difficult to obtain (Lancaster, 2017). Moreover, elite interviews are particularly 
significant in policy research (Berry, 2002). Nevertheless, elite interviews pose a number of 
challenges especially when the research involves a contested policy domain that is being played 
out in real time (Lancaster, 2017). Indeed, very often they might provide politically-subjective 
data, might not be willing to disclose information or might be unwilling to participate. This, 
however, was not the experience I faced with most policy makers because I was able to gain 
access to a number of policy-makers who have academic backgrounds and were therefore, 
open, honest and accessible. Still, in order to increase the validity and reliability of the data, I 
conducted interviews with experts and consultants who not only work in the government or for 
the relevant ministries, many of which work in international and non-governmental 
organizations. Not only do experts offer an efficient and effective means of obtaining relevant 
data, they usually have first-hand experience but also an outsider perspective which might often 
make them more objective (Bogner, Littig, & Menz, 2009). All interviewed experts have 
worked on social protection programs with the government within the last two to three years.  
As previously mentioned, in the two months of data collection, I have conducted interviews 
each of which have lasted for one to two hours. Despite their busy schedules, all informants 
blocked at least one hour for the interview and were often very interested in the topic of the 
thesis, especially since it is a very timely issue, according to experts from different international 
organizations as well as MoSS. All interviews were one-on-one meetings conducted in English, 
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audio-taped and materials were transcribed verbatim by myself. All interviews were conducted 
at the offices of the informants in Cairo during working days and hours.  
Interviewees included three experts and senior specialists from different international 
organizations as well as an expert working at an international non-governmental organization 
working on issues of social protection in Egypt. Additionally, I have interviewed a senior 
policy-maker at the MOSIT, a former as well as a current consultant at the MoSS, a consultant 
at the Ministry of Finance, an analyst at the Ministry of Planning and a consultant at NOSI. I 
have also conducted interviews with a senior researcher at the National Center for Sociological 
and Criminological Research as well as an independent senior consultant who worked with 
most of the above-mentioned ministries and organizations. I also had informal interviews with 
a number of staff members at MoSS. Interviewees were classified based on whether they work 
on the social protection system as a whole or whether their work is more relevant to a particular 
SP program - FSS, TKP or the social insurance system.  
Finally, I attended three conferences on social protection in which the former minister of 
Social Solidarity, Ghada Waly, or the current one, Dr. Nevine El-Qabbage, among other policy 
makers and experts were among the key note speakers and discussants. The first was the MOST 
Ministerial Forum hosted by the League of Arab States and UNESCO on the 4th of December, 
2018. I also attended the Annual conference of the Public Policy Hub held on the 30th of 
November, 2019, at the American University in Cairo. Finally, I participated at a workshop 
organized by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the International Labor Office to present the 
results of their report on “Costing a Social Protection Floor in Egypt”. This workshop was held 
on the 5th of December 2019 at the Marriott Hotel in Zamalek, Cairo.  
Given the diversity of the programs that are being analyzed in this study as well as the 
diversity of backgrounds of many of the interviewees, a different set of questions was prepared 
for informants on contributory schemes as opposed to non-contributory schemes. It is also 
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crucial to show an understanding of the interviewee’s background to gain their trust and respect 
in elite interviews (Lancaster, 2017). This is why, it was imperative to tailor some of the 
questions’ to the interviewees’ backgrounds. Nevertheless, there were a lot of recurring 
questions in all interviews. Moreover, all of the interview questions revolved around a common 
theme which is assessing the conditions and challenges in the design, delivery and 
implementation of social protection programs as well as the integration and coordination 
challenges and conditions. This is why, the gathered data were complimentary to each other 
and I was able to find common themes.  
The interviews took the form of topical or guided interviews with semi-structured questions 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2014). In this type of interviews, the researcher probes into a number 
of topics in order to reveal the participant’s perspective and still allows the informant to steer 
a part of the discussion, frame and structure the responses in a direction of their choice 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2014). This is because it is crucial in qualitative research for “the 
participant’s perspective on the phenomenon of interest [to] unfold as the participant views it 
[…] not as the researcher views it.” (Marshall & Rossman, 2014, p. 155). The in-depth type of 
the interviews allowed addressing the issues that are most relevant for the study. Although I 
had conducted plenty of literature review prior to the beginning of the interviews, I did not let 
the conceptual framework guide the interview questions. The choice of the conceptual 
framework occurred after the finalization of the interviews. Still, the understanding of 
governance and social protection were clear before the interviews started. Asking more open-
ended type of questions that are less reliant on conceptual frameworks allows the interviews to 
be less manipulated by the researcher and instead uncover the participants’ views (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2014).  
For purposes of triangulation a desk review was being conducted in parallel to the 
interviewing process. With regards to contributory schemes, a number of scholars have been 
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tracing the development of the social insurance scheme in Egypt for more than a decade; 
Markus Loewe, Irene Selwaness, Maia Sieverding, Rania Roushdy, Omneia Helmy, among 
others. In addition to the official publication of the new social insurance law, these scholarly 
works were reviewed and compared to the primary data as a part of the data collection process. 
Regarding the non-contributory schemes and especially Takaful and Karama, as far as I am 
concerned, there are still no scholarly papers on the program as it was only launched in 2015. 
Still, I have worked with the following studies for the content analysis; the impact evaluations 
conducted by IFPRI (Breisinger, et al., 2018a; Breisinger, et al., 2018b; ElDidi, et al., 2018), 
the World Bank’s Project Appraisal document (World Bank, 2015) as well as a number of 
unpublished reports and evaluations conducted by MoSS. 
5.3. Sampling Approach  
Sampling is the choice of specific data sources from which the data are gathered in order 
to analyze a certain research objective (Gentles, Charles, & Ploeg, 2015). Decisions about the 
sample of the study are made concurrently with the choices of data collection methods 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2014, p. 64). Because “all sampling activities are theoretically 
informed” (Denzin, 1989, p.73, as cited in Marshall & Rossman, 2014), the literature review 
as well as the tentative research questions helped in the sample selection.  
The sampling used in this work is purposeful and theoretically guided. Snowballing 
technique was used in order to reach the different study participants. Based on prior literature 
review and the research question, I identified ministries, organizations and areas of expertise 
that are imperative for the study. Since the study focuses on contributory and non-contributory 
schemes, MoSS and NOSI were the first institutions I hoped to interview experts and policy-
makers from. After attending the two afore-mentioned conferences and workshops, I 
discovered which international organizations are most relevant to the field in Egypt. 
Additionally, since the thesis looks deeply into inter-ministerial coordination, it was crucial to 
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interview experts from the Ministry of Planning as well as the Ministry of Finance. I tried to 
ensure diversity, relevance and expertise in the sample. Many of the informants were reached 
through chain referrals - snowballing. I asked the participants at every single interview who in 
their view would be valuable for the study and there were many names which were recurrent. 
Very often, since most of the interviewees are policy makers and experts, they were able to 
contact relevant informants on the spot and schedule an interview with them. This not only 
helped in widening the scope of the organizations and institutions I initally started with, but it 
helped me in gaining trust and respect in the eyes of the interviewees, which is crucial in elite 
interviewing (Lancaster, 2017). This also helped overcome one of the major obstacles of elite 
interviews, availability and reachability of the informants (Marshall & Rossman, 2014). Many 
of the interviewees gave me insights to significant organizations and individuals whose 
relevance I was not aware of. These very different chains of referrals helped in overcoming the 
challenge of the “limited range of respondents in snowball sampling” (Barsoum, 2018).  
Qualitative research does not claim sample representativeness and so does this thesis 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Instead, the diversity of informants providing in-depth informantion 
about policy choices, conditions and challenges elucidates important patterns. The sample size 
- twelve interviewees - was identified based on theoretical and practical saturation. Indeed, not 
only had I reached a stage where all interviewees would mention informants I had already met 
with, but I had already transcribed all the data and reached a stage of saturation of information.  
5.4. Study Framework  
In this section, I will highlight the researcher’s role in the data collection process as well 
as the challenges that occurred in the field. During the interviews, I presented myself as a 
Master’s student of Public Policy at the American University in Cairo. Not only did the 
referrals and the reputation of the university for ethically sound research help in making the 
interviewees open, critical and honest in their answers and discussions. But also, I researched 
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details about these individuals’ careers prior to the interviews, which helped in gaining trust 
and respect. My role as the researcher was more exploratory, leaving room for the interviewees 
to steer part of the conversation (Marshall & Rossman, 2014). While all interviewees were 
experts and policy makers, they differed in their ages, seniority as well as the positions they 
held. I interviewed a minister, an associate minister as well as a number of senior consultants 
and experts. The type of discussion differed from a minister - who wanted to steer the 
conversation - to a consultant who was ready for a two-sided discussion. Ensuring access to a 
number of social phenomena and events where these policy makers and experts were present 
also helped in gaining their trust prior to the interviews.  
Aside from the fact that each interview had to be prepared for separatly for the above-
mentioned reasons, I faced a difficulty in setting interview dates with top-level government 
officials since I was conducting the data collection during a period of ministerial transition. 
This is why, many of the interviews were re-scheduled several times, often after I had arrived 
to the premises. In the interviews with top-level government officials, very often they were 
sceptical at the beginning so I had to demonstrate an understanding of the area of research as 
well as their careers to gain their trust. Often, I also had to be very subtle when critiquing the 
different programs. On the one hand, both the challenges and conditions are crucial for the 
study. On the other hand, usually the interviewees were the ones in charge of the programs I 
am targeting so reaching analytical and critical data was not always easy. Nevertheless, most 
interviewees, even those in charge of the programs, after gaining my trust, were often open to 
a constructive and critical discussion.  
5.5. Data Analysis  
After transcribing all interviews verbatim and separately, I started conducting the analysis 
of the transcripts traditionally without using a software. Interview data were thematically 
categorized based on emergent analytical themes. Contributory and non-contributory schemes 
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were sub-divided from the beginning of the analysis. I used the open-coding approach by 
segmenting and clustering data into themes and describing them using short sequences of 
words (Marshall & Rossman, 2014). The analysis then followed the inductive reasoning 
analytic approach (Marshall & Rossman, 2014). Instead of imposing hypotheses a priori on 
the data, data collection is a “learning” process (Rossman & Rallis, 2003, as cited in Barsoum, 
2018). Afterwards, the codes and data were triangulated with the desk review of works on 
contributory and non-contributory schemes in Egypt. In parallel, while conducting the 
literature review, I came across the Rules, Roles and Controls conceptual framework (Bassett, 
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012) cross-checked it with the data and the emergent codes and 
noticed how the data fit into the three categories identified by the conceptual framework. 
Coding was then guided by the conceptual framework’s division of the meso- and micro-level 
analysis. I had to add as well as remove parameters from the conceptual framework which are 
less or more relevant to the study on Egypt.  
5.6. Ethical Considerations  
Primary data collection that involves human subjects requires an in-depth assessment of 
ethical considerations. The Institutional Review Board approved this work’s proposal on the 
21st of December 2019 prior to the data collection process. This is why, all possible ethical 
considerations were analyzed and approved before the data collection process started.  
Participation in the study was completely voluntary. Although many of the interviewees 
referred me to other possible study participants, I had to contact all study participants on my 
own and make sure they agreed to conduct the interview while aware of all the givens and 
details. Moreover, I collected informed consent forms from all participants either orally or in a 
written format to guarantee their voluntary participation. I offered to send the interview guides 
prior to the interviews, but often, the interviewees were busy and only needed to be aware of 
the topic of the study. I obtained consent from all interviewees to audiotape the interviews. 
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After transcribing the tapes, all recordings were erased. All interviewees were assured of their 
confidentiality prior to the interviews. Because these are policy makers and experts I should 
not do harm to (Marshall & Rossman, 2014), pseudonyms were employed in the presentation 
of data. However, confidentiality in such interviews is more complex than merely “disguising 
the identities of research participants” (Tilley & Woodthorpe, 2011, p. 198). In this regard, 
confidentiality is not static (Tilley & Woodthorpe, 2011). It is case-specific and poses the 
dilemma of balancing faithful reporting with potentially exposing the participants’ identities 
(Tilley & Woodthorpe, 2011). For this reason, I have not mentioned the names of the 
international organizations whose experts and specialists participated in this study. This is 
because the field of social protection in the country and especially TKP and the social insurance 
system involve a limited number of consultants, experts and policy-makers who have worked 
together and know each other well. To avoid revealing their identities, I removed the names of 
the organizations they represent. This ensures confidentiality even more.  
5.7. Study Limitations  
From a methodological stance, the sample size of this study is one of its main limitations. 
Although the sample size was chosen based on the saturation of data, I believe more insights 
could have been uncovered if I had interviewed even more staff members and policy-makers. 
Many of the ministries’ more junior employees refused to participate in the study. Interviewing 
local-level officials would have been an added value for the study and would have provided 
different type of evidence to cross-check with the elite interviews. Yet, this was not possible 
as I would have needed governmental authorization to interview officials at the local units. 
Because of the timing of the data collection - ministerial transitions, this was not feasible. 
Nevertheless, the diversity of the interviewed officials offset this limitation, to some extent.  
Another limitation with regards to the interviewees is the interview setting. As previously 
mentioned, most interviews were conducted at the offices of the participants and hence, were 
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included on their official calendars. Although most of them were honest, critical and analytical 
to a very large extent, a more informal setting might have reassured them even more.  
With regards to the data collected and the interviewees, another limitation is the scope of 
the data. I was able to interview more officials, representatives and consultants who work on 
TKP than the food subsidy system. This is why, I was not able to conduct a fully-fledged 
analysis on the food subsidy system in spite of interviewing a senior official at MOSIT. I was 
also unable to gain access to national non-governmental organizations who work with MoSS 
and NOSI. Finally, the data gathered on TKP were provided by a larger number of study 
participants than the data on the social insurance system. However, the interviewed expert from 
NOSI has been working in the field for more than a decade and provided an in-depth 
assessment of the system. Additionally, the social insurance system has been extensively 
analyzed in scholarly works which were triangulated with the interviews conducted on the 
social insurance system.  
Finally, while the study can be replicated, replication is not easy especially since the 
identities of the study participants are disguised. Moreover, replication requires the 
establishment of strong networks in the country being examined. Nevertheless, researchers 
who have access to policymakers and experts relevant to social protection can replicate the 
study.   
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6. CHAPTER SIX: DATA ANALYSIS AND KEY FINDINGS  
This chapter presents the findings of the data collected on the governance of social 
protection in Egypt. As previously mentioned, a macro- or policy-level analysis was not 
feasible in this study because of the lack of data on this sphere. Furthermore, this sphere does 
not represent the main challenge facing the country’s social protection system. This is why, 
this chapter starts with an analysis of the meso- or sector-level of social protection. Here, the 
focus lies on the coordination challenges between the ministries, especially in terms of data 
sharing. I also highlight the coordination obstacles MoSS is facing in the design and 
implementation of TKP as well as the issues NOSI is confronted with when designing and 
applying the social insurance system. Afterwards, the analysis is dedicated to the micro- or 
program level. In terms of the contributory system, the analysis focuses on the governance of 
the social insurance system. Takful and Karama are in the center of the governance assessment 
of the non-contributory social protection schemes in Egypt.  
6.1. Meso-or Sector-Level Analysis: Coordination Challenges  
Governance of social protection at the meso-level focuses on the institutional 
arrangements between ministries involved in the SP system as well as agencies who work on 
its service delivery (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). This level determines the 
coherence as well as integration of the SP system. Effective governance of SP at the meso-
level is an important prerequisite for the achievement of social justice. Challenges at this level 
include inadequate inter-ministerial coordination within the SP sector, incongruous policies, 
disintegrated programs, lack of capacity for joint action, lack of shared motivation and the lack 
of principled engagement (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). This sectoral level 
determines the success of the SP system, as a whole. Thus, the lack of coordination among 
implementing partners impedes the efficiency and effectiveness of the SP system a whole 
(European Commission, 2015).  
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At the policy level, a Ministerial Committee for Social Justice was established by Prime 
Minister’s Decision Number 1940 for 2014 in order to coordinate the policies and financial 
resources of social justice programs in Egypt. The committee includes thirteen ministries 
among which is MoSS, MOHP, MoF, Ministry of Education, MOSIT, Ministry of Planning 
and Economic Development, Telecommunications and Information Technology, Labor, 
Higher Education, International Cooperation and Local Development. The committee is 
headed by the Prime Minister. Most interviewees, when asked about the committee, argued 
that its members met a few times but it has not been active for years.  
Another body mandated with the coordination of SP programs is the Economic Justice 
Unit of the Ministry of Finance. The unit should provide technical support especially with 
regards to M&E to the different SP programs as well as help in the coordination of efforts 
(World Bank, 2015). Lack of coordination and coherence between the programs leads to the 
fragmentation of the SP system which in turn leads to its inefficiency and ineffectiveness 
(European Commission, 2015; UN ESCWA, 2019). According to a consultant, both the unit 
and the committee on social justice have been inactive and have not yet taken up the role of 
coordinating and ensuring the coherence of SP programs.  
“Although the Economic Justice Unit follows up on the progress of TKP it has not taken 
up any initiatives to coordinate the efforts of different social protection providers.” 
(Interview, Consultant, February 2020)  
 
Inter-ministerial coordination in Egypt faces a number of challenges. First, all 
interviewees highlighted the fact that neither the ministerial committee on Social Justice nor 
any other coordination efforts will have an impact on social justice unless there is an overall 
strategic vision and a clear institutional structure. SP programs are multi-sectoral and fall 
under the responsibility of a number of governmental and non-governmental entities 
(Devereux, 2016; UNDP & UNCDF, 2013). In most cases, their objectives should be inter-
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related and complementary which should automatically translate into an integrated system 
(Robalino, Rawlings, & Walker, 2012).  
There is no single body in charge of the coordination of social protection efforts in 
Egypt. The establishment or choice of such a body would pave the way for the integration of 
SP programs into a comprehensive and transformative system (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 
2007). According to an expert consultant who has worked with MoSS, NOSI, MOSIT as well 
as MoMM, the MoSS has taken up the role of devising a social protection strategy which 
outlines a common vision of SP in Egypt and divides the roles between the different agents in 
the country. Still, without a common vision, it will be very difficult to steer social protection 
programs towards a common goal.  
The expert consultant on SP highlighted the difficulty of reaching a common vision 
while the MoSS voluntarily coordinates the efforts. Indeed, according to a top-level 
government official at MOSIT, the SP strategy can only be implemented if there is a top-down 
political push towards the implementation of a common vision of SP.  
“In order for the ministries to implement a common vision and to take it seriously, in 
order for the social protection strategy to be designed and implemented by all relevant 
partners, it is crucial for the President or Prime Minister to issue a decree or advise these 
ministries to work together. Otherwise, every ministry will be busy with its own 
mandate and they will not take the time to work together on a comprehensive common 
agenda.” (Interview, Top-level Official at MOSIT, December, 2019).  
 
Because ministries are already busy with their own mandates, service delivery and the 
implementation of programs, inter-ministerial coordination necessitates top-down intervention, 
especially in a country like Egypt. 
Cooperation between ministries often depends on the persona and the personal 
relationships of the ministers, especially in fragmented settings that lack a common vision 
(Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). A number of respondents noted that cooperation 
between the ministries in Egypt depends on the personal and professional relationship between 
the relevant ministers.  
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“Coordination at all levels of social protection can be very difficult as it depends on the 
relationship between the relevant ministers. If they respect and work well with each 
other, it is a trickle-down effect and they encourage the relevant parties to cooperate. 
[…] One of the relevant ministers in the field of social protection refused to attend the 
conference on the launch of TKP so [she/he] would not be obligated to work with MoSS 
on the program.” (Interview, Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020).  
 
In Egypt, as long as inter-ministerial cooperation is not coordinated by a superior body, 
or as long as there is no single authority in charge of the steering of the whole SP system, 
personal relationships will determine the success of the SP system. Even if a common vision 
is achieved, it is crucial to institutionalize this vision within the government (Robalino, 
Rawlings, & Walker, 2012).  
One of the results of the inadequate inter-ministerial coordination in the area of SP is 
the lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities. This can lead to an overlap in the mandates 
of ministries, according to an expert consultant working on SP.  
“Because of the lack of coordination some ministries might take up the mandates of 
other ministries despite being overloaded with their own mandate. Is this sustainable or 
efficient? […] For instance, ALMPs are presumably the mandate of MoMM. Forsa 
program, developed by MoSS is indeed an incredible initiative since it aims to graduate 
TKP beneficiaries onto different job opportunities. However, it is not MoSS’ mandate. 
Although MoSS have the know-how related to program design and implementation - 
especially after having worked on TKP for almost five years, they do not have the 
details related to the needs of the labor market, what skill training is mostly needed in 
which area, etc. (Interview, Expert consultant on Social Protection, February, 2020). 
 
Although MoSS has developed delivery capacity and an adequate infrastructure to 
manage SP programs, taking up the mandate of a different type of program outside of its scope 
might not only overload the ministry but might affect the quality of the program. In addition to 
Forsa (El-Shabrawy, 2019), MoSS is working on designing a comprehensive set of programs; 
linking TKP to La Ommeya - No illiteracy project (MoSS, 2019a), or to Etnen Kefaya - a 
project that aims at limiting the number of children of TKP beneficiaries (MoSS, 2019c). 
Although it is understandable that linking such projects to TKP will strengthen the message 
and the impact of TKP, these complementary projects are not always impactful and effective, 
according to a consultant at MoSS.  
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“Many of these projects are ineffective, weak and inefficient on the ground especially 
since they are not implemented by the ministry mandated and qualified with delivering 
such messages. […] Not only this, but such overlap creates tensions between the 
different ministries since every ministry is in charge of a certain mandate.” (Interview, 
Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020). 
 
Overlaps in the mandates of the ministries exacerbate tensions and disintegration 
between the ministries (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012) as well as impedes the 
effective delivery of the messages. However, it is still plausible that MoSS aims to deliver a 
number of messages especially since the conditionality of Takaful creates a communication 
channel with beneficiaries through which you can build their awareness on contraceptives, 
cultural tolerance, vaccination, antenatal care, the dangers of female genital mutilation and 
school attendance, according to a senior specialist at an international organization.  
Data freedom and coordination is not only crucial in the reduction of error, fraud and 
corruption but it allows for the complementarity of programs. For instance, TKP beneficiaries 
who are not registered in the FSS were automatically redirected to MOSIT in order to register 
them in the system (World Bank, 2015). Almost 32,000 TKP beneficiaries received ration cards 
after the TKP system discovered that they do not receive food subsidies which they should be 
entitled for, according to a senior specialist at an international organization. 
On the other hand, because data collection and processing is not always digital and 
unified, it is sometimes difficult to work with data from other ministries, according to the same 
specialist.  
“For instance, when implementing Takaful’s conditionality, coordination is difficult 
because of the time lag in data collection as well as the fact that MOHP collects data 
manually. The Ministry of Education’s data are digital but aggregated at the local level 
and thus, it takes too long for the data to arrive at the national scale. Now that MoSS 
has signed a protocol with both ministries, it is essential for all partners to find a way 
to efficiently collect, aggregate and report the data needed for the application of 
conditionality sanctions.” (Interview, Senior specialist at an International Organization, 
January, 2020).  
 
Even when ministries are open or obligated to share their data with other bodies, often 
the lack of unified method impedes the efficiency and effectiveness of data collection and 
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analysis. Because all SP programs are multi-sectoral, data coordination is necessary (Devereux, 
2016; UNDP & UNCDF, 2013).  
Coordination challenges are more pronounced in the implementation of conditional 
cash transfers such as Takaful, according to a former consultant at MoSS. For conditionality 
to be applied, a number of actors need to be willing to work together in an efficient manner.  
“Conditional cash transfer programs in particular present significant institutional 
coordination challenges between line ministries due to the need to ensure an adequate 
supply of services across sectors, and to verify co‐responsibilities. Close intersectoral 
coordination is key to ensure that supply‐side services are provided, that management 
information systems to monitor compliance at schools and health clinics are developed, 
cross-referenced, and timely, and that monitoring and oversight at the local levels is 
effective.” (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012, p. 45) 
 
In order for MoSS to sign the protocols that aim at regulating the implementation of 
conditionality with MOHP and the Ministry of Education, TKP Program Task Force were in 
constant dialogue with members of the two ministries as well as El-Azhar as an educational 
institutions. A former MoSS consultant highlighted the difficulties that were faced during the 
process.  
“The problem is that MoSS takes the credit for the success of Takaful. So, the staff 
members from the other ministries were not always very helpful since they have an 
attitude of ‘what is in it for me?’. […] Another challenge is that the whole process is 
not institutionalized. You are talking to individuals. So for instance, the representative 
of the MOHP changed three times throughout the process which takes us several steps 
back.” (Interview, Former consultant MoSS, January, 2020).   
 
This protocol should be implemented now that conditionality is set to be applied in 
2020. The real challenges of inter-ministerial coordination will be apparent during the phase 
of the implementation since multi-sectoral programs need all partners to be alert, to have a 
sense of ownership to the program, to believe in the common objective or goal and to be 
responsive and flexible to the needs of the program (UNDP & UNCDF, 2013). In Egypt, top-
down political support is needed in order to achieve this. 
Social insurance faces similar challenges of inter-ministerial coordination in Egypt. 
One of the biggest challenges is the conflict of interest between the MoF and the Treasury, on 
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the one hand, and NOSI, on the other hand. According to an expert consultant at NOSI, there 
is a serious coordination and trust issue in the SIS between the Treasury - MoF - and NOSI, 
which is an independent body, as noted earlier. In the old SIS, NOSI calculated different 
scenarios for the annual adjustment of social insurance contributions, submitted them to the 
MoF which chose the most appropriate scenario which is compatible with the government’s 
budget. Legally speaking, MoF is obliged to cover any deficit that faces the SIS. 
“MoF argues that these are NOSI’s actuarial experts, and so we cannot trust their 
calculations based on which you will hold the Treasury liable. […] NOSI invests the 
funds and MoF does not supervise. Hence, if NOSI’s performance is bad, why should 
MoF be held accountable?” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020).  
 
While the annual adjustment of social insurance contributions used to be financed by 
MoF, the scenarios and the policies were analyzed by NOSI. If MoF did not agree to the 
increase of the optimistic scenario, pensioners revolted and attacked NOSI claiming that it is 
against pensioners, according to the expert from NOSI. In this case, NOSI was held 
accountable for MoF’s decisions. After MoF approved the budget, it went to the Prime 
Minister’s office then the Parliament. “Coordination at all these levels takes a very long time 
and is very difficult.” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020). The new SIS 
includes the automatic adjustment of social insurance contributions. Accordingly, NOSI would 
be in charge of financing the annual adjustment, and hence a part of this challenge is mitigated.  
Data freedom and sharing can have a positive impact on the SIS, as well. The inclusion 
of casual workers requires serious intergovernmental coordination, according to the expert 
consultant at NOSI. 
“Including the informal economy would require for instance, ministries such as the 
Ministry of Agriculture to provide data on the ownership of agricultural land. The 
Ministry of Interior already does not allow the renewal of drivers’ drivers’ licenses 
unless they register for the SIS as casual workers - if they do not own certain categories 
of cars.” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020) 
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Such data sharing efforts are facilitating the inclusion of a portion of the informal 
economy. As noted previously, the coverage of the SIS in Egypt is inadequate. In order to 
overcome this shortcoming, data sharing and coordination between the ministries is imperative.  
 
In brief, inadequately defined roles and the lack of coordination across implementing 
institutions not only affects programs’ effectiveness but it leads to a duplication and an overlap 
of roles that make accountability unclear (World Bank, 2015). Indeed, this section has shown 
the difficulty of establishing a comprehensive integrated system without the existence of an 
institutional home for social protection, without top-down political support and without the 
existence of a common vision. In Egypt, this has led to an overlap in the mandates of different 
ministries which can create tensions. The design and implementation of Takaful’s 
conditionality also revealed the difficulty of coordinating efforts between different ministries. 
Indeed, solely the process leading up to the signing of the protocol between the line ministries 
spanned more than two years. Finally, the conflict of interest between the Treasury and NOSI 
depicts that the old SIS faced a challenge regarding intergovernmental coordination, as well.  
In order for SP to achieve social justice, it is crucial not only to coordinate the efforts of 
ministries, but also the non-governmental sector. Such coordination requires political will, 
preferably top-down support in a country as centralized as Egypt, a unified vision, the 
establishment of an oversight body in charge of social justice or SP, the unification of data - 
both in terms of collection as well as sharing, as well as the unification of the tools. For 
instance, it is not plausible for MOSIT and MoSS to use different PMT formulas as well as 
different data since both ministries target the same category of the population. Nevertheless, 
according to a senior researcher the National Center for Sociological and Criminological 
Research, the PMT formulas used in both programs are different. “Indeed, neither of the 
ministries is aware of the other ministry’s PMT threshold or the details of the calculation of 
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the PMT formula.” (Interview, Senior Researcher, January, 2020). Only when the above-
mentioned challenges are mitigated and a unification of goals and strategies is achieved, can 
SP achieve the desired goals of equity, inclusivity and the reduction of poverty.  
 
6.2. Micro- or Program-Level Analysis  
The meso- and micro-levels are essential areas of engagement in building coherent and 
strong SP systems (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). The program-level of social 
protection is the most basic form of engagement which establishes the building blocks of an 
effective SP program (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). Challenges at this level are 
diverse as they arise at every stage of SP service delivery, from beneficiary identification to 
monitoring and evaluation (Giannozzi & Khan, 2011). This section analyzes the conditions and 
challenges that are prevalent in the governance of SP programs; the social insurance system as 
well as TKP. Not only were these two programs chosen because of the availability of data and 
expert knowledge on them, but TKP is a novelty while the social insurance system has recently 
been reformed and hence, they can both provide insights into the improved governance of SP 
in Egypt. The two programs are not fully representative of the whole spectrum of SP programs 
in Egypt and its strengths and weaknesses, but they are helpful in gaining an understanding of 
the common challenges and facilitators of contributory and non-contributory schemes in Egypt. 
Thus, an assessment of other programs, like the FSS or the health insurance scheme, would not 
be identical but would reap similar findings.  
6.2.1. Contributory Schemes - Social Insurance System 
As previously noted, the two main contributory schemes in Egypt are the social and health 
insurance schemes. This section analyzes the governance of the social insurance system by 
examining the rules, roles and controls governing SIS in Egypt. The component sustainability 
is also added to the analysis. This part of the analysis examines the old and the new social 
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insurance schemes. While the old one has already been legally reformed, many of the 
implementation and delivery challenges might still prevail in the new SIS. It is also premature 
to judge the application of the new system which started being implemented on the first of 
January, 2020. The analysis of the system relies predominantly on interviews with expert 
consultants at NOSI as well as scholarly work which has been published on the SIS. 
The main challenges facing the SIS were elaborated in the chapter providing a background 
on the social protection system in Egypt. These include a significant gap in coverage among 
youths, females and males, urban and rural citizens as well as casual workers, which aggravated 
socio-economic disparities. Moreover, a large percentage of the workforce evades either fully 
or partially from their social insurance contributions. Finally, many scholars criticized the law 
enforcement and M&E capacity of the SIS (Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012; Roushdy & 
Selwaness, 2015). 
6.2.1.1. Rules of the Game 
Generally, contributory schemes do not face the same challenges related to the targeting 
of non-contributory programs since the beneficiaries of social insurance schemes are 
determined by their contributions to the system (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). 
The main governance challenges related to the rules and the legal framework of the SIS which 
will be tackled in this section are the following; (1) managing compliance, (2) publicizing 
program rules and (3) consistency in the content and application of program rules.  
One of the most important prerequisites of an efficient SIS is the ability to manage 
compliance (ISSA, 2013; Enoff & McKinnon, 2011). This is because the incentives to evade 
or under-report can be very high in many systems (Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2003). An 
effective SIS ensures compliance with legal contributions and wage reporting requirements 
(Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). 
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In Egypt, a large portion of the participants in the SIS under-report their earnings. This 
percentage is particularly higher among private sector workers (Sieverding & Selwaness, 
2012). Indeed, roughly 40.3% of private sector workers under-report their salaries, whilst 
18.6% of public sector workers under-report their wages (Roushdy & Selwaness, 2019). 
According to an expert consultant at NOSI, the “design of the system” encourages under-
reporting as well as the full evasion of SI contributions.  
“Not only have the contribution rates been historically very high, but the presence of 
maximum bounds for pensionable wage and the calculation method of benefits does not 
provide enough incentive for workers to properly report their earnings. Prior to law 
148/2019, pensionable wage used to be linked to the average of a few years’ earnings 
prior to retirement. ‘Why would I spend my life receiving a lower salary while only the 
last few paychecks count towards my pension benefits?’ This is one of the main 
arguments that have led workers and employers to evade the social insurance 
contributions.” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020).  
 
The calculation method of benefits has also led many workers to opt for early 
retirements which endangers the actuarial and fiscal sustainability of the system (Loewe, 2004). 
Moreover, the system’s design acts as a “regressive tax” (Helmy O. , 2008) for low-wage 
workers. Typically, more well-educated and “richer” quintiles of the population are more likely 
to work in bigger establishments and earn higher wages. Since the SIS puts a maximum bound 
on insurable salaries - which stood at approximately LE 5000 and has now changed to around 
LE 7000 - low-wage earners pay a larger percentage of their salaries, and thus, have a bigger 
incentive to under-report (Selwaness I. , 2012).  
According to the expert consultant at NOSI, the new law aims at addressing the above-
mentioned shortcomings and enhancing the compliance to the system. Law 148/2019 calculates 
pensionable salary according to the average of the contributor’s lifetime earnings (NOSI, 
2019). Although the system is still defined-benefits, it encourages participation in the system 
further by adding a voluntary pension scheme that is contributions-defined, and hence 
encourages proper reporting. Another incentive for under-reporting was the relatively low 
increase in pensionable wages that are not automatically adjusted for inflation but are subject 
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to the government’s periodic and often slow increases (Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012). This 
has led to a system that charges high contribution rates while providing relatively low returns 
(Loewe, 2004). The new system foresees the automatic adjustment of the pensionable wage by 
15% on an annual basis for the first seven years and afterwards based on the inflation rate.  
While drafting law 148/2019, NOSI was fully aware of the needs of the workers since 
it holds regular meetings with the Federation of Egyptian Industries. According to the expert 
at NOSI, the federation’s main concern was the reduction of contribution rates. This is why, in 
the new SIS contribution rates were reduced from around 41% to 29.75% (NOSI, 2019). Thus, 
it should be expected that coverage and reporting would be ameliorated. On the other hand, the 
new system still includes a cap on the maximum insurable salary. When asked about it, the 
NOSI expert responded that a maximum insurable salary is necessary in order to maintain the 
private life insurance industry. 
“The removal of the cap, on the one hand, could make the system more equitable, but 
it would kill the life insurance industry and is, therefore, not feasible.” (Interview, 
Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020).  
 
Thus, it is still possible that the new SIS would retain its bias towards higher-wage-
earners and would still act as a “regressive tax” (Helmy O., 2008) for low-wage workers.  
One of the biggest shortcomings of the system is that it widens the urban-rural divide 
and aggravates the difference between social classes (Loewe, 2004; Sieverding & Selwaness, 
2012; Selwaness I., 2012). Social insurance benefits mostly reach advantaged groups in the 
labor market, formal sector workers, whilst falling short of attaining the most vulnerable; 
farmers, casual workers and irregular laborers (Sieverding, 2016). Although the social 
insurance scheme for casual workers and irregular laborers has always been mandatory, many 
are not aware of their rights and obligations. Moreover, the system does not cover them from 
all risks. In the old system, they did not benefit from maternity leave, workplace disability 
compensation as well as sickness coverage (Loewe, 2004). According to the expert consultant 
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at NOSI, the old SIS was considered as more of an income support mechanism than a social 
insurance scheme for casual workers and irregular laborers.  
“In the old SIS contributions were made through the acquisition of a stamp of LE 1 on 
a monthly basis from NOSI office. Pensions were then provided to those who have 
contributed for at least 120 months. These would then receive a monthly pension 
payment of LE 63. Beneficiaries would not pay the monthly contributions, and after 
reaching pensionable age, they would pay LE 120 in the NOSI office and receive LE 
450 in return. This was one of the reasons for the deficit NOSI had calculated for the 
year 2037.” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020). 
 
Although many reforms need to be undertaken in order to increase the awareness of the 
most vulnerable groups, the new SIS designs a new scheme for casual workers and irregular 
laborers (NOSI, 2019). Accordingly, they would be treated as “wage workers” while the 
Treasury is the employer, as reported by the consultant at NOSI. The Treasury would then pay 
12% of the minimum insurable salary whilst the worker would pay 9% thereof (NOSI, 2019). 
“This way, contribution rates would be high and therefore, the benefit level would be high as 
well, which would provide an incentive for casual workers to enroll in the system.” (Interview, 
Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020). Whether this change is sufficient and would lead 
to an increase in the coverage of workers in the informal economy is yet to be determined.  
It is clear, that the old SIS had a difficulty in managing the compliance to the system. 
Nonetheless, the new social insurance law aims to mitigate several of the shortcomings of the 
old one. If this would lead to an enhancement of the compliance is still unclear.  
Another hurdle reported by the expert consultant at NOSI which deters the SIS capacity 
of managing compliance is awareness. One of the biggest challenges facing both the old and 
the new SIS in Egypt is the lack of social insurance awareness.  
“A large portion of the citizens is not aware of the benefits and rights of the pensioners, the 
insured, the survivor. They are not aware that ‘I am entitled to this, secured against that’, 
etc.” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020). 
 
It is crucial to underline the significance of raising awareness about the SIS, the calculation 
method of benefits, among others (Sieverding, 2016). This is specifically essential among new 
 90 
entrants to the labor market as well as youth, especially given the initiation of the new social 
insurance law (Sieverding, 2016). Without proper SIS awareness, the coverage and compliance 
to the system will remain inadequate.  
One of the most important facilitators of the governance of social insurance schemes is the 
publicization of program rules (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). This is especially 
important given the challenge of the lack of social insurance awareness. When asked about the 
possibility of launching awareness campaigns, the NOSI expert highlighted the difficulty and 
lack of feasibility of implementing such campaigns, at least for the “time being”.  
“It is very difficult to spend the organization’s financial resources on awareness. 
Awareness campaigns incur large costs; TV and radio campaigns as well as other media 
campaigns will require NOSI to allocate a large portion of its funds towards the cause. 
This is not feasible, at least not for the time being.” (Interview, Expert consultant at 
NOSI, January, 2020). 
 
The consultant also added that such awareness campaigns necessitate the support of 
international organizations. Since there are no detailed plans yet to raise the awareness of the 
system’s beneficiaries and new entrants, it can be asserted that one of the major issues facing 
the SIS is the transparency and communication of program rules. The new social insurance law 
is published and is available online, yet communication and awareness campaigns should go 
one step further (Enoff & McKinnon, 2011).  
Finally, rules also need to be consistent, both in content as well as application 
(Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). Consistency can improve both the effectiveness 
of SP systems, contribute to better integration, coordination and accountability, as well as 
enhance the legitimacy of interventions (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). Moreover, 
when eligibility and exclusion criteria are consistent with program objectives, not only does 
this lessen inclusion and exclusion mistakes but it reduces error, fraud and corruption, as well, 
a challenge which faces most social protection programs (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 
2012). Although old and new social insurance systems included relatively consistent rules, the 
 91 
old system’s contribution rates and benefit levels were so diverse that it led to complexities 
and a rise in error, fraud and corruption, according to the expert consultant at NOSI.  
“Law 79 for 1975 of the old SIS divided salaries into a basic and a variable salary. The 
calculation of the contribution of each differed, which made it difficult for contributors 
to properly estimate and calculate their contributions. The new social insurance law 
unifies salaries into one single global salary.” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, 
January, 2020). 
 
Moreover, the multiplicity of laws governing different types and schemes of workers 
also complicated the social insurance calculations of the old SIS (Loewe & Westemeier, 2018). 
Not only did this complicate the calculations of the contributions, but it made it more difficult 
for the inspectors to supervise and assess their reporting, and thus, increased the likelihood of 
error, fraud and corruption. This is another reason why the SIS faces a difficulty in managing 
compliance.  
This analysis shows that the old legal framework governing SIS did not include systems 
to manage the compliance to rules, did not publicize them properly and involved relatively 
complex rules that impeded the consistency of application. Nevertheless, the new law 148 for 
2019 tries to establish clear rules of the game. Indeed, to improve compliance to the system, 
the new SIS changes the calculation method of pension benefits to include the average of a 
contributor’s lifetime earnings. Moreover, the social insurance contribution rate was reduced 
to accommodate the needs of the workforce. The SIS was also reformed for casual workers in 
order to incentivize them to enroll in the system. The inconsistency of the old social insurance 
rules and laws was also addressed. Law 148/2019 unifies all social insurance laws, it unifies 
contribution rates and unifies the calculation methods of salaries into one global salary. 
Nevertheless, not all of the shortcomings of the old SIS were addressed by the new scheme. In 
fact, one of the main challenges linked to the publicization of program rules is the lack of social 
insurance awareness which is not addressed by the new SIS. 
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6.2.1.2. Roles and Responsibilities  
As previously mentioned, the governance of SP is not only concerned with rules but 
rather their implementation. Roles and Responsibilities are central elements to the effective 
governance of SP. They ensure the identification and definition of principals and agents in the 
accountability triangle (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012, p. 7). Mechanisms for 
strengthening roles and responsibilities in the design and implementation of contributory 
schemes involve (1) creating clear institutional relationships and (2) establishing an effective 
performance management system.  
It is crucial for the principals and agents to have a clear understanding of their 
institutional relationships in order to make accountability relationships work. According to 
the expert at NOSI, this is one of the most dire challenges that is difficult to address.  
“Many of the employees at the organization are not adequately qualified. Since the job 
descriptions were published in the 1970s and have not been changed ever since, you find 
people who are not qualified for the positions they are holding. […] NOSI staff members 
have to deal with very different social levels while they are not trained to deal with such 
exposure. Especially since the load of work is intense, they start dealing with, for instance, 
big companies in an unsuitable way. And the salaries do not incentivize them to develop 
themselves any further. […] Ever since government hiring has been suspended […], we 
have a shortage of employees. So, employees become over-worked and mandates become 
unclear.” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020). 
 
It is evident that there is no clear conception of the institutional roles and 
responsibilities at NOSI which impedes accountability (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 
2012) and aggravates service delivery. Although there have been efforts by different 
administrations to hire new employees in the needed positions, very often the educational level 
of the targeted employees - for instance doctoral candidates - is not suitable for the posted titles, 
according to the expert. Not only this, but the existing employees who are permanently 
employed do not receive proper training and tutelage and can thus, interfere with reform efforts 
(Assaad & Krafft, 2015).  
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As previously mentioned, law 135/2010 foresaw the change of the system to a 
contributions-defined scheme (Maait & Demarco, 2012). Contributions-defined schemes give 
stronger incentives to the contributors to report their earnings precisely and to enroll in the 
system (Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012). The transition was never carried out due to the 
employees’ resistance to change, as stated by the expert consultant at NOSI.  
“Law 135/2010 foresaw a change in the system from a benefits-defined system to a 
contributions-defined one with individual and solidarity accounts. NOSI employees 
resisted the change. They believed it would be difficult to enact such a fundamental 
change. They did not want to put the effort to learn a totally new system. For this reason, 
this transition was not even included in law 148/2019.” (Interview, Expert consultant 
at NOSI, January, 2020). 
 
Although law 148 for 2019 remains benefits-defined, as previously elaborated, the law 
has added a voluntary contributions-defined scheme which would be invested in the country’s 
new sovereign wealth fund (NOSI, 2019). The expert consultant argued that this would allow 
the employees to gradually learn the new system and thus, get slowly accustomed to it. This 
way, the next time the system is changed, it might be transformed into a defined-contributions 
scheme. Hence, not only are NOSI employees over-worked, often working on different 
mandates which they are often not qualified for, they are not incentivized to work on 
developing themselves. In this regard, performance management systems are crucial.  
Performance management systems (PMS) are essential in order for the staff members 
to put effort into their personal and skill development. Putting in place performance incentives 
can enhance efficiency and effectiveness (Robalino, Rawlings, & Walker, 2012). The expert 
at NOSI stated that as with most public sector organizations, NOSI has not developed neither 
a proper human resource management and development capacity nor an adequate PMS.  
“First of all, up till now, there is no PMS in the public sector. […] Human Resource 
functions are distributed among a number of departments. Even these employees are 
resistant to change. When the organization introduced the proposal of a new salary 
scheme, where the salary would not be fragmented, they rejected the change.” 
(Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020). 
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For this reason, often the employees represent the biggest burden on the social 
insurance system. It is difficult to initiate performance incentives since it is often the perception 
-of senior officials- that “public sector employees work out of altruism rather than incentives” 
(Nevine Qabbage, Minister of Social Solidarity, Annual Conference of the Public Policy Hub, 
December, 2019). The lack of financial or performance incentives makes it even more difficult 
to motivate the employees to develop their capacities. Indeed, a very large percentage of the 
employees in the public sector in Egypt receive monthly salaries that place them below the 
international poverty line (El Baradei, 2019a). This is problematic since “providing basic 
material support for staff to perform their functions” is crucial (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & 
Ringold, 2012, p. 21).  
Finally, another hurdle that faces the contributory SP scheme in Egypt are the constant 
changes of the NOSI leadership, according to the expert at NOSI.  
“NOSI was first a semi-independent agency headed by the Minister of Insurance and 
Social Affairs. Afterwards, its managing director was the Minister of Social Solidarity, 
then the Minister of Finance, then again the Minister of Social Solidarity and finally, 
an independent managing director should be appointed to head the ministry within the 
year.” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020). 
 
This constant change in leadership has led to a difficulty in initiating long-term change 
and clearly identifying the roles and responsibilities of the principals and agents at NOSI.  
Although the legal framework in Egypt has been reformed, it would be difficult to 
implement the changes without the support of the employees at NOSI. This is why, it is 
imperative for NOSI to work on re-organizing the already existing human resources into more 
suitable positions, work on their capacity development, create a PMS system whereby there 
are incentives for those who achieve and work towards the transformation of the system. 
Moreover, the appointment of an independent, a full -time, well-trained and educated managing 
director for NOSI is another crucial step that is yet to be implemented.  
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6.2.1.3. Controls and Accountability Mechanisms  
Controls and Accountability mechanisms bridge the gap between the legal framework 
and its implementation; they bridge the discourse-implementation gap (Bassett, Giannozzi, 
Pop, & Ringold, 2012). The size of this gap is an indicator of the governance of SP at the 
macro-, meso- and micro-levels. “At the program level [controls] help ensure that ‘the right 
beneficiary gets the right benefit at the right time’. [They are the] building blocks of program 
implementation and administration.” (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012, p. 53). The 
most important controls regarding contributory schemes are (1) transferring payments 
electronically which has also been shown to reduce error, fraud and corruption, (2) 
guaranteeing that systematic and random checks take place to reduce error, fraud and 
corruption and (3) making sure that sanctions are in place to hinder irregularities and ensure 
that remedial actions are taken. In order to reduce error, fraud and corruption, the electronic 
transfer of payments can be very beneficial. NOSI disburses pensions either through bank 
transfers, Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), post offices, or through a debit card that has 
been issued by the company E-Finance, as noted by the expert from NOSI. According to the 
information available in the literature (Selwaness & Messkoub, 2019; Sieverding & Selwaness, 
2012) as well as the informants’ accounts, the SIS does not face issues regarding the electronic 
transfer of payments.  
The bigger challenge facing the Egyptian SIS is ensuring time-based, systematic and 
random checks to reduce error, fraud and corruption. Regular as well as random, time-
based and well-designed inspections are crucial in order to avoid the evasion of social insurance 
contributions and enhance the accountability of the system (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & 
Ringold, 2012). Although there are inspectors who try to assure random and systematic checks 
on the reporting and contributions of the different contributors, their number is fairly low and 
they are often inefficient and corrupt, according to the expert at NOSI.  
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“Only 1500 inspectors work with the PSIF across all governorates in Egypt. 800 
inspectors work with GSIF even though the public sector faces less challenges with 
regards to the evasion of social insurance contributions. Moreover, the incentives for 
inspectors to undergo systematic checks are low and the regulatory framework does not 
grant proper means of overseeing the work of the inspectors.” (Interview, Expert 
consultant at NOSI, January, 2020). 
 
Given the large number and the geographic dispersion of the workforce in Egypt, 
inspections are crucial. They would allow the detection of error, fraud and corruption as well 
as mitigate several of the challenges the system is facing. As noted above, not only does the 
system face a challenge with regards to the number of inspectors, but their incentives to 
undergo systematic checks are low. The new social insurance law promulgates the merge of 
PSIF and GSIF (NOSI, 2019). However, their integration would require at least three years, 
according to the expert from NOSI. Once merged the number of inspectors checking on the 
more challenging private sector will grow. However, the new law does not include additional 
checks or incentives for the inspectors. 
Regarding the detection of fraud and under-reporting, it might be helpful to cross-check 
the data NOSI contributors provide about their earnings with those they give to the Tax 
Authority. In 2015, NOSI signed a protocol of cooperation with the Tax Authority. 
Nevertheless, the Tax Authority refused to provide NOSI with the data about the contributors 
due to the “confidentiality of such data since these are client information” (Interview, Expert 
consultant at NOSI, January, 2020). Another problem relates to the availability of an electronic 
database that is up to date.  
“Such authorities [like the Tax Authority] do not have a database in your understanding 
of a database. The responsible employees there simply scan the financial statements of 
the companies and individuals. So, if NOSI is interested in a contributor’s financial 
statement, the most the authority can offer is pull it out of the archives and show it to 
us. However, the databases would not be linked, especially since often the Tax 
Authority does not categorize the data it receives. Moreover, even if there were an 
electronic database, there will always be a time-lag in the update of the database 
between NOSI and Tax Authority which would impede a proper cross-check.” 
(Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020). 
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As previously elaborated, the lack of intergovernmental data sharing and coordination of 
tools and efforts at the meso-level impedes the development of a well-controlled, efficient and 
effective SP system (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). In order to implement proper 
control and accountability mechanisms, cross-checking with other governmental databases is 
crucial. Hence, given that it has not been mentioned as one of NOSI’s priorities to work on this 
deficiency, it will remain difficult to detect fraud. 
Finally, when irregularities are detected in the system it is essential to ensure the existence 
of a system of sanctions to avert the contributor as well as others from defrauding the SIS. It 
is also crucial to reduce the corruption committed by the inspectors themselves. According to 
the expert from NOSI, the new SIS imposes stricter and more aggravated punitive measures on 
those who commit fraud, corruption, among others (NOSI, 2019). Indeed, most of the financial 
penalties were doubled, according to law 148/2019 (NOSI, 2019). 
Many of the necessary conditions of a proper control and accountability mechanism are 
developed in the Egyptian SIS. Since payments are transferred electronically, there are not 
many cases of error, fraud and corruption in this regard. Moreover, the new SIS has aggravated 
the sanctions imposed on contributors who do not abide by the rules and regulations of the SIS 
or who evade their social insurance contributions. Nevertheless, a number of challenges still 
persist; the low number of inspectors and the lack of oversight on inspections as well as the 
difficulty cross-checking the data provided by the contributors with other governmental 
databases, are among the most dire challenges, in this regard.  
6.2.1.4. Sustainability 
The success of SP programs rests upon the existence of political and financial 
sustainability (Bozio & Dormont, 2016; ISSA, 2013; Robalino, Rawlings, & Walker, 2012; 
Carmel & Papadopoulos). The political sustainability of the social insurance scheme, generally, 
does not pose enormous risks as contibutory schemes are often included within the civil service 
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code and embedded in the legal and regulatory framework of the country (ISSA, 2013). 
Additionally, contributors to the SIS are often from the middle class, who are usually vocal 
and politically influential (Kidd, 2019). Therefore, it is doubtful that the government would 
neglect the demands of social insurance contributors.  
Financial sustainability determines the success of a SIS. First, according to the Volountary 
National Review conducted in 2018, the government of Egypt has been increasing the spending 
on social security programs; while the spending on the SIS accounted to 2% of the budget in 
2011/2012, this figure reached 11% in the fiscal period 2017/2018 (Ministry of Planning, 
Monitoring and Administrative Reform, 2018). To develop a financially sound social insurance 
system, it is also crucial to establish an investment strategy which manages investment funds 
in a sustainable and actuarially sound way (Bozio & Dormont, 2016). Thus, investment 
managers have to be properly incentivized to “maximize returns, manage risks and limit 
administrative costs.” (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012).  
The old SIS was built on a fully-funded basis but is now partially-funded with aggregated 
reserves (Maait & Demarco, 2012). These reserves are then invested in governmental debt 
instruments. During the early years of its operation, the Egyptian funds generated surpluses, 
however, over the period from 1975 to 2005 the system generated low or negative real returns 
as a result of ineffective investment policies (Maait & Demarco, 2012). According to the expert 
from NOSI, the old SIS was not financially sustainable. Moreover, the long decision-making 
process whereby changes could be initiated in the system, further aggravated the issue of the 
financial sustainability of the system.  
“The system foresaw that the Treasury would finance any deficits that would occur in the  
budget of NOSI. It was anticipated that a cash deficit would occur in 2037. […] 
Furthermore, in the old system, changes to the contribution rate or the pensionable salary 
had to undergo a very difficult process of decision-making; after the actuarial study is 
conducted at NOSI, the Minister of Social Solidarity would send the proposed changes to 
the Ministry of Finance and the Prime Ministers’ Office, if they agree on the changes, they 
would be discussed in the House of Representatives and finally, a presidential decree with 
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the changes would be published. This made it difficult to respond to the findings of the 
actuarial studies.” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020). 
 
In order to design an actuarially sound and financially sustainable SIS, the new social 
insurance law was only published after a number of actuarial studies were conducting. As noted 
by the expert at NOSI, the law was almost ready in 2017 but NOSI were awaiting the results 
of the actuarial study regarding the sustainable contribution rate. Not only have they come to a 
conclusion regarding the rate at which no deficit would occur, but law 148/2019 includes the 
automatic adjustment of the insurable salary. Thus, decision-making regarding the changes in 
insurable salaries has been facilitated. In addition, a sustainable contribution rate has been 
fixed. No data are available regarding changes in the investment of funds. 
As mentioned previously, the current SIS contains a well-developed legal framework which 
aims to address many of the shortcomings of the old system. Nevertheless, the development of 
the capacities in charge of implementing the new system has not taken the same level of 
attention as the legal framework itself and hence, it might still pose a threat to the governance 
of social insurance schemes. Finally, error, fraud and corruption might still be prevalent in the 
system especially since there is a lack of monitoring and supervision. Not only this, but the 
system itself allows for the occurrence of error, fraud and corruption since many of the 
regulations are outdated and very often such errors are therefore, “unintentional” as stated by 
an expert consultant at NOSI. The new SIS is designed in a way which is financially sustainable 
and therefore, the issue of sustainability seems to be resolved, for the time being. In brief, it is 
imperative to focus on the roles and responsibilities as well as the control and accountability 
mechanisms in order to ensure the proper governance of contributory SP schemes in Egypt.  
6.2.2. Non-Contributory Schemes - Takaful and Karama  
Non-contributory cash and in-kind benefits, also known as social assistance schemes or 
social safety nets, are designed to “help individuals and households cope with chronic poverty, 
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destitution and vulnerability” (World Bank, 2018a, p. 5). The food subsidy system and cash 
transfer programs are the two most important social safety nets in Egypt, as noted previously.  
Due to the lack of data availability and the complexity of the FSS, the analysis focuses on 
the country’s “iconic” (World Bank, 2018b) cash transfer program, Takaful and Karama. 
Indeed, cash transfer programs are gaining importance in the MENA region (Silva, Levin, & 
Morgandi, 2013). While in the past, governments used to respond to political and economic 
instabilities with the scaling up of in-kind transfers and subsidies, the focus shifted to cash 
transfers as subsidies proved their difficulty to be sustained as well as their ineffectiveness 
(Silva, Levin, & Morgandi, 2013). Generally speaking, cash transfer programs have gained 
momentum since the mid-2000s in the Global South (von Gliszczynski, 2015), a phenomenon 
which was often referred to as a “development revolution” (Hanlon, 2004).  
It is worth noting that the Egyptian government is shifting the largest portion of its focus on 
the development of SSN and more importantly, the advancement of TKP. This is not only 
apparent in the increase in budgetary resources of the program by 250% since it was launched 
in 2015 until 2017-2018 (MoSS, 2019), but an economist at the Ministry of Planning and 
Economic Development emphasized the macro-economic significance of the program. The 
problem with the emphasis on cash transfers is that policies remain focused on the poor (von 
Gliszczynski, 2015) and neglect the missing middle class (UN ESCWA, 2019), an issue which 
will be discussed in the section on Sustainability.  
This part of the thesis highlights the main governance conditions and challenges that TKP 
has confronted since its launch in 2015. It is worth noting that cash transfer programs are often 
exclusively delivered by government agencies and include a degree of decentralization in terms 
of the service delivery (Giannozzi & Khan, 2011). Generally speaking, the main governance 
challenges that face most cash transfer programs are how to target the most needy in society 
and how to reduce error, fraud and corruption (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). 
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While this section incorporates data about TKP as a whole, it is essential to note that many of 
the data concern the conditional cash transfer program, Takaful. Since it is the more 
developmental (Ido, 2018) scheme, its design and implementation requires a more nuanced 
governance analysis (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). This section depends on data 
collected from in-depth interviews with policy-makers, experts and consultants in the field and 
a content analysis of IFPRI’s impact evaluations and unpublished documents provided by 
MoSS.  
6.2.2.1. Rules of the Game  
In order to adequately deliver SP services and benefits, a clear, transparent and consistent 
regulatory and legal framework is a prerequisite. Such clear and enforceable rules of the game 
ensure a proper accountability mechanism between all actors involved; policy-makers, service 
providers, program managers as well as the beneficiaries (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 
2012). Rules need to be clear at all levels of the service delivery chain. With regards to the 
delivery of non-contributory SP programs, it is crucial to have clear, transparent and consistent 
rules and procedures at all stages of service delivery; from enrolling the beneficiaries, to 
determining the benefit level, exit criteria, among others (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 
2012). This way, both inclusion and exclusion errors are reduced and uneven interpretation of 
rules and ad hoc decision-making are avoided. This section examines (1) the clarity and 
publicization of eligibility criteria, targeting methods, calculation of benefit levels as well as 
the application of conditionality, (2) the transparency and (3) consistency in their application 
at the program level.  
Clear and Publicized Program Rules  
As previously mentioned, program rules need to be clear for the beneficiaries as well as the 
service providers at all levels of the service delivery chain. Rules also need to be publicized. 
The geographic reach that TKP has achieved after less than five years of its launch speaks for 
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the fact that the application process was relatively clear for the citizens. TKP is currently in 27 
governorates in Egypt. The program disburses cash transfers to roughly 2.5 million households, 
among which are approximately 1.98 million Takaful household recipients (MoSS, 2018). 
According to a senior specialist at an international organization working with MoSS as well as 
a consultant at the ministry, roughly 27 million Egyptians applied for the program which was 
only launched in 2015.  
In spite of the fact that many of the beneficiaries were not aware of the program and its 
eligibility criteria at the beginning, awareness was built, as is clear from the statistics above.  
“In the early years of the program, many of the beneficiaries were not aware of the self-
targeting component of TKP, i.e. that they needed to apply for the program. So, MoSS 
needed to build their awareness on the existence of such a SSN.” (Interview, Senior 
specialist at an International Organization, January, 2020).  
 
Even if many were not aware of the application process at the beginning, as is evident from 
IFPRI’s impact evaluation conducted between 2017-2018, the largest percentage of the 
beneficiaries in the sample believed the program’s required paperwork was clear (ElDidi, et 
al., 2018).  
In terms of the clarity regarding the targeting, acceptance and rejection criteria of the 
program, the same impact evaluation depicts that most of the beneficiaries reported a confusion 
associated with the acceptance and targeting criteria (ElDidi, et al., 2018). As previously 
mentioned, Takaful and Karama used a multilayer targeting formula, first through 
geographical targeting using the PMT and finally, using categorical criteria (World Bank, 
2015). The targeting is designed in a way which aims at significantly reducing error, fraud and 
corruption, according to a former consultant at MoSS as well as a senior specialist at an 
international organization. 
“After the beneficiaries have applied for TKP at the local social unit, to determine their 
eligibility, field visits were conducted by MoSS field workers. These field workers had a 
tablet with the questionnaire and the possible scores. The questionnaire was based on the 
poverty criteria set by HIECS. The questions included details about the size and type of 
housing, electricity and water usage, the location of bathroom, stove type, flooring, roofing, 
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the number of children, among others. The field workers themselves are not aware of the 
weights of the scores they are giving to the different households, which aims at ensuring the 
reduction of error, whether intentional or unintentional.” (Interview, Former consultant at 
MoSS, January, 2020).  
 
From the perspective of service providers, the design of the program ensures the reduction 
of targeting errors, especially since the multi-layer targeting formula depends on a variety of 
different data sources, thus, increasing the reliability and validity of the data (World Bank, 
2015).  
In addition to the field workers, data provided by the beneficiaries were cross-checked 
against other governmental databases at the central level. Although the targeting of the program 
might seem clear and just for the program providers, acceptance and rejection criteria are not 
clear for the majority of the beneficiaries since they are not aware of the details of the PMT 
formula (ElDidi, et al., 2018). Moreover, the eligibility to the program caused a confusion for 
many of the beneficiaries since the PMT threshold was changed several times in order to adjust 
it to the budget of the program whilst targeting the poorest 40% in the country (Kurdi, et al., 
2018). This has also increased the exclusion error of poor households. When the cut-off score 
was updated, the new threshold was applied to households that were registered previously 
(Kurdi, et al., 2018). Nevertheless, it was sometimes difficult to include these households 
previously excluded because of the lower threshold, which caused an increase in the incidence 
of error. The budgetary constraints and the changes of the PMT threshold are some of the 
reasons why the program is currently only reaching 20% of the poorest quintile in Egypt 
(Breisinger, et al., 2018b). 
Despite the changing policies of acceptance and rejection for the beneficiaries and field 
workers, as well as the changes of the PMT threshold, the TKP’s targeting efficiency has met 
the original goal (Breisinger, et al., 2018a). According to IFPRI’s impact assessment, 67% of 
TKP households are in the lowest two quintiles of households with children.  
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Another rule of the game which has to be clear for all parties involved are the criteria for 
setting benefit level of TKP transfers as well as the program’s exclusion criteria. On the one 
hand, the calculation formula of benefit level is clear - as it has been elaborated in the 
background section - although not sufficient for the beneficiaries, as stated by a social policy 
expert at an international organization working closely with MoSS. On the other hand, 
beneficiaries are not aware of the exit criteria. There is a number of possible exclusion as well 
as rejection criteria from the program, among which is the ownership of assets, the receipt of 
other governmental types of support and the receipt of transfers from abroad (Kurdi, et al., 
2018). According to an expert consultant at an International NGO, these criteria are clear for 
the program providers but unclear for the applicants, which is plausible, in the consultant’s 
view. 
“Employees involved in the delivery of TKP benefits at all levels - central and local - are 
aware of these rejection criteria. Although the clarity of program rules makes service 
delivery more efficient and effective, it seems plausible not to inform the beneficiaries 
because a large percentage of the applicants tries to defraud the system and lies on their 
application. Thus, providing them with information as to the program’s exclusion criteria 
would only increase the chances they would lie on their applications.” (Interview, Expert 
consultant at an International NGO, December, 2019).  
 
As will be clear in the following sections, many citizens lie on their applications in diverse 
ways in order to be accepted or to receive higher benefit levels. This is a phenomenon which 
is not unusual for cash transfer programs (Slater R. , Farrington, Holmes, & Harvey, 2008; 
UNDP & UNCDF, 2013; Fiszbien & Schady, 2009). This is why, it seems plausible not to 
inform applicants of the possible rejection criteria, which they might try to disguise.  
One of the biggest shortcomings of the system is the lack of clarity on the application of 
conditionality. It is crucial for beneficiaries to be aware of conditionality, in order for 
conditional cash transfer programs to reap the developmental impact they aspire to achieve 
(Giannozzi & Khan, 2011; Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). Takaful is a cash 
transfer program conditioned on 80% school attendance by children aged six to18 as well as 
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two visits to the health clinics by mothers and children below six years (World Bank, 2015). 
Although the program conducted a service readiness assessment at the beginning of its launch 
(El-Zanaty and Associates, 2016), up until now, conditionality has not been fully implemented 
yet, according to consultants at MoSS. Moreover, only 2.5% of the beneficiaries are aware that 
conditions would be added to the program (Breisinger, et al., 2018b). Not only does this 
contradict with the program’s developmental approach, but it makes it even more difficult to 
implement conditionality, as argued by the consultant at MoSS.  
“You cannot impose conditionality unless you establish the proper regiment, unless you 
succeed in convincing the people of the importance of health and education. Still, how do 
you think does it sound for someone living in the poorest quintile, if you suddenly tell them 
‘we care about you, but we cannot give you the monthly transfers’ especially if you do not 
first mentally prepare them? […] Another problem related to conditionality is that the local 
social units are not fully aware of how it should be implemented yet. Finally, one of the 
main reasons why conditionality is not applied yet is because of the quality of the [health 
and educational] services. When conducting the service readiness assessment, there were so 
many cases in which the health facility was not even open during so-called opening hours. 
Other cases where the facility did not even have a scale -which is needed for antenatal care.” 
(Interview, Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020).  
 
Thus, the implementation of conditionality will face a number challenges. First, the lack of 
awareness on conditionality, will make it difficult for vulnerable and poor households to accept 
the conditions since they are neither accustomed to nor informed of the conditions. Another 
challenge relates to the program providers. As elaborated above and will be explained in depth 
in the following sections, employees at the social unit are not fully aware of the means of 
implementing conditionality. Finally, the supply-side of conditionality poses a number of risks. 
Indeed, as stated by an expert consultant on social protection issues, service delivery at the 
local health and educational unit need to first be enhanced before the ministry can apply 
conditionality. A former consultant at MoSS emphasized the same challenge.  
“Our biggest problem is that we cannot condition transfers without the existence of the 
‘supply’. For instance, we tell the families to send their children to schools but the 
school is far away, or there are no teachers, or the teachers do not like their child so 
they do not include them in the attendance, or many examples like this.” (Interview, 
Expert consultant on Social Protection, February, 2020).  
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Thus, not only does the program face challenges with regards to the clarity of conditionality, 
but it might be argued that there is still a lack of readiness for its implementation from both 
sides of the service delivery.  
On the other hand, the former consultant at MoSS argued that MoSS has put effort into 
building the awareness of the beneficiaries on TKP as well as conditionality in many ways.  
“First, [we tried to build awareness] through a television and radio campaign which 
included advertisements on the program. We also conducted a Guerrilla marketing 
campaign where we organized around 32 public events with singers and games for the 
kids and disbursed eco-friendly bags with TKP details printed on them. We also 
distributed flyers, and printed the details on the Toktoks in relevant areas. […] Then, 
we thought we had to reach even women who are always at home and won’t get to see 
all of these marketing tools. So, we created a system of door-to-door awareness and 
trained 2000 MoSS social workers on the issue of conditionality. In addition to the 2000 
social workers, we worked with 4000 women who are conducting their civil service to 
help with the door-to-door awareness. As far as I am concerned almost one million 
visits were reported up until now.” (Interview, Former consultant at MoSS, January, 
2020). 
 
It is evident that there are different opinions with regards to MoSS’ efforts in publicizing 
program rules as well as conditionality. The MoSS is to a large extent successful in publicizing 
program rules and encouraging applications. Yet, with regards to conditionality, although, the 
marketing and awareness campaigns were conducted, IFPRI report indicates the small portion 
of beneficiaries were aware of its details. This might be attributed to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the tools used. An expert at an International NGO criticized the door-to-door 
awareness highlighting the inability of the social workers to deliver the message. The senior 
specialist at an international organization argued that the social workers had ten to twelve 
messages to deliver to the households with regards to family planning, conditionality, health 
issues, among others. This might have caused confusion and have led to the lack of awareness. 
Another possible reason for the discrepancy between the beneficiaries actual knowledge and 
the conducted awareness campaigns might be the time that is needed in order for the campaigns 
to have an actual impact. In fact, the impact evaluation was conducted between 2017 and 2018 
and by the time, not all the awareness campaigns were conducted, yet. Thus, the impact 
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assessment to be started by the end of the year 2020 can provide more definitive answers in 
this regard, according to an expert at an international organization.  
Transparency of Program Rules  
Along with clarity and publicization of program rules, transparency is crucial (Giannozzi 
& Khan, 2011). A lack of communication and transparency between local social units and TKP 
beneficiaries has been reported by many beneficiaries and has often led to grievances and a 
feeling of unfairness (ElDidi, et al., 2018). Indeed, a large portion of non-beneficiaries 
complained about not being informed of the status of their application despite numerous visits 
to the local MoSS office (ElDidi, et al., 2018). Many of the applicants who were rejected 
complained about the lack of communication with regards to the reasons for rejection. 
Moreover, some beneficiaries argued that the transfers stopped suddenly without prior notice 
and without knowing the reasons after filing complaints (ElDidi, et al., 2018). The lack of 
transparency has led to a culture whereby the people “do not trust and try to defraud the 
government.” (Interview, Expert at an International NGO, December 2019).  
Consistency in the Content and Application of Rules  
Not only does the lack of transparency aggravate the perception and acceptance of the 
program, but the consistency in the content and application of TKP is essential (Bassett, 
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). Although, the PMT formula is like a “ruler” (Interview, 
Senior specialist at an International Organization, January, 2020) applied on all applicants, 
corruption often raises doubts with regards to the consistency of application. Many of the 
beneficiaries in IFPRI’s sample do not perceive the program’s targeting as fair (Breisinger, et 
al., 2018a). A large percentage of those interviewed in the sample highlighted the issue that 
there are many “well-off” (ElDidi, et al., 2018) families who receive Takaful transfers whilst 
there are very poor ones who do not.  
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These issues can occur due to error, fraud and corruption on both sides of TKP service 
delivery (Campos & Pradhan, 2007). Some field assistants do not properly process and assess 
the registration forms (ElDidi, et al., 2018). Others would facilitate paperwork for relatives or 
friends (ElDidi, et al., 2018). Indeed, many beneficiaries complained about the local social 
units in charge of screening and application process (ElDidi, et al., 2018). Many “of the 
documents submitted to the MoSS unit are simply piled on the floor and don’t travel to Cairo” 
(ElDidi, et al., 2018, p.41). This is why, many beneficiaries emphasized their openness to audits 
and random visits - which will be discussed in-depth in the following parts (ElDidi, et al., 
2018). The senior specialist at an International Organization stressed on the existence of many 
oversight mechanisms to reduce such errors in the processing of the application which is made 
possible by automation of the process. Another interviewee argued that automation is not yet 
being effectively and efficiently implemented.  
“Automation is fairly new and is not always easily applied by the field assistants. So, we 
cannot say that the automation of the system has drastically reduced errors.” (Interview, 
Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020).  
 
Even if there was no corruption or favoritism on the side of the service providers, the 
existence of error along with the lack of transparency aggravates the beneficiaries’ lack of trust 
in MoSS employees. This lack of trust leads many beneficiaries to submit false documents, to 
lie on their applications, to hide assets, among others, according to many of the interviewees.  
“It has even become a cultural issue that the beneficiaries want to defraud the government 
in any kind of way.” (Interview, Former consultant at MoSS, January, 2020)  
 
Thus, the existence of error, fraud and corruption on both sides of service delivery precludes 
a fully consistent delivery of TKP benefits. Making the beneficiaries trust the program is one 
of the most important steps in order to reduce intentionally providing wrongful data.  
Another challenge which affects the consistency of the application of cash transfers is the 
confusion between the solidarity pension and TKP, according to a senior specialist at an 
international organization. 
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“Not only is the confusion available among the beneficiaries but also among MoSS 
employees at the social units. This is why, the World Bank is working with MoSS on a 
second phase whereby the old solidarity pension is dissolved, its beneficiaries re-assessed 
and either included or excluded from TKP. Since the old scheme had many flaws, it is 
probable that a significant portion of its beneficiaries would not qualify for TKP which 
would create a fiscal space to increase TKP benefits or its number of beneficiaries. By 
consolidating all cash transfers into one program, TKP, with one targeting formula, you’re 
enhancing the equity and social justice. This way, there is one measurement against which 
everyone is being assessed.” (Interview, Senior specialist at an International Organization, 
January, 2020). 
 
The co-existence of the two schemes exacerbates the challenges related to the consistency 
of the application of TKP. It is therefore, crucial to unify the solidarity pension and TKP as 
more consistent rules would lead to better integration and outcomes of SP programs as well as 
improve the accountability and legitimacy of the system.  
Although not absent of flaws, it is evident that MoSS has created a cash transfer program 
which has relatively clear eligibility criteria and benefit levels. The ministry has established a 
number of regiments to optimize the targeting and build the awareness of the people. 
Nevertheless, the program is currently in its fifth year of implementation and is therefore still 
in a “trial and error phase” (Interview, Former consultant at MoSS, January, 2020) in which it 
is constantly being re-evaluated. Challenges regarding the rules of the program include the 
transparency and communication with the citizenry, the efficiency of service delivery - both at 
the local social units as well as at the education and health facilities - as well as the 
irregularities, favoritism and error, fraud and corruption which can be caused by MoSS 
employees as well as by the beneficiaries themselves. TKP is a novelty and is a state-of-the-art 
program with regards to its implementation in Egypt, according to a senior specialist at an 
international organization. This is why, it is crucial to constantly come up with innovative 
solutions to ever-existing challenges in the country.  
6.2.2.2. Roles and Responsibilities  
In the last section, it became apparent that many of the governance and implementation 
challenges of TKP are related to the capacities and the service providers working on the 
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program. Effective governance requires the existence of clear and well-functioning 
accountability relationships, an institutional incentive structure, coordination among the 
different levels of service providers, separation of functions, among others (Bassett, Giannozzi, 
Pop, & Ringold, 2012). Thus, Roles and Responsibilities across different levels of government 
and institutions involved in SP need to be clearly identified and communicated (Bassett, 
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). In this section I will first analyze the (1) division of tasks 
and responsibilities, (2) TKP and public-private partnerships, (3) separation of functions, (4) 
capacity development of the resources and the (5) program’s performance management system 
and incentive structure. It is crucial to highlight that this section is predominantly based on the 
data collected by the interviewees since there are no scholarly accounts on the issue.  
Division of Responsibilities between MoSS and the local offices 
Decentralization and coordination efforts between the central and local levels are crucial 
when implementing cash transfer programs (UNDP & UNCDF, 2013; Bastagli, et al., 2016). 
Thus, it is essential to have clear division of tasks between the two levels. According to a 
number of interviewees, the division of tasks between the central and local level is relatively 
clear. Not only this but the division is driven by a logic which aims to reduce error, fraud and 
corruption. A senior specialist at an international organization emphasized that the division of 
tasks at TKP aims at reducing corrupt behavior. 
“We do not want the field workers to come and tell us, we believe this person is poor and is 
eligible for TKP. Their role is merely to observe and collect descriptive data. Analysis 
occurs at the central level since the data is submitted on the database of MoSS. […] After 
having collected the data about the households, according to the cut-off point of the PMT, 
the MoSS identifies who is in and who is out. It is like a ruler which is applied on all 
applicants. The system is therefore very objective and harsh. You could be rejected because 
of a decimal point, but that is the beauty and the difficulty of the PMT; this decimal point 
might exclude you from the program although you are still poor or near-poor.” (Interview, 
Senior specialist at an International Organization, January, 2020). 
 
Hence, when it comes to, for instance, determining eligibility; at the local level, the field 
workers collect the necessary data about the households without having prior knowledge as to 
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the PMT threshold or how the data would affect the application. This aims to reduce favoritism. 
This division of roles and responsibilities is also institutionalized as described in the 
background section (World Bank, 2015). Another example concerns the grievance redress 
mechanism - which will be described in one of the following sections. The data on the citizens’ 
grievances are collected at the local level, some of which are resolved at the same level while 
other decisions are taken at the central scale. All of this is elaborated in depth in the World 
Bank’s Project Appraisal document (World Bank, 2015).  
Effective decentralization is relevant in the application of conditionality, as a large portion 
of the tasks is carried out by the local-level authorities (World Bank, 2015). In terms of the 
implementation of conditionality, the responsibilities are distributed between the local 
education and health units and coordinated by the social unit and later MoSS, as described by 
a former consultant at MoSS.  
“The data collection about the attendance of children to school is run digitally by the local 
education offices, while the collection of data about the beneficiaries’ health visits are still 
collected manually and provided to the social units. Then, on a quarterly basis, a report is 
sent to MoSS with details of the different households’ compliance to the conditionality 
standards and the sanctions are then imposed digitally by the MoSS.” (Interview, Former 
consultant at MoSS, January, 2020) 
 
In order for the local education and health units to implement the described system, not only 
was there a protocol signed between the relevant ministries, but a capacity development (CD) 
program was designed and implemented, according to the same consultant.  
“The capacity development program targeted 60,000 employees working at the local 
education, health and social units. It included four chapters; (1) introduction to TKP, (2) 
what is conditionality, (3) how the system of conditionality and reporting will work and (4) 
a training on soft skills and training of trainers. The MoSS first trained 27 trainers across 24 
governorates who in turn were trained to train employees at the local, district and village 
levels.” (Interview, Former consultant at MoSS, January, 2020).  
 
Despite the design and implementation of a capacity building program for the staff members 
at the local level, “the concept of conditionality is a novelty which is also implemented by three 
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different bodies, automation is a novelty, so errors are very much prevalent.” (Interview, 
Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020).   
Although tasks may be divided in a plausible way between the center and the peripheries, 
this does not mean that the system is decentralized. Decentralization requires more of the 
decision-making process to be taken at the local level (UNDP & UNCDF, 2013). One of the 
main hurdles of decentralization efforts is the lack of ownership and accountability towards the 
program from the side of the local officials and especially governors, according to an expert 
consultant at an international NGO. Not only this, but he argued that the authorities at the local 
level are not sufficiently qualified for a program like TKP to be fully decentralized.  
“The governors receive three- to four-day training workshops which are not sufficient. Most 
of them do not want to be held accountable for TKP. Legally speaking, many of the tasks 
are delegated to the governors. Many of them, however, do not want to receive more 
authorities and tasks. But there are also some of them who want to take up the delegated 
responsibilities but can’t because of the lack of adequate training and capacity 
development.” (Interview, Expert consultant at an international NGO, December, 2019).  
 
Decentralization efforts are crucial in the context of the division of tasks between the central 
and local levels (Giannozzi & Khan, 2011). Decentralizing the system can make TKP more 
effective and efficient (Bastagli, et al., 2016). Nevertheless, there are a number of facilitators 
of decentralization which have not been established yet, like for instance, the establishment of 
the necessary legal and regulatory framework, the development of the capacities of the 
authorities at the local level, as well as the inclusion of local civil society organizations (UNDP 
& UNCDF, 2013).  
By and large, although tasks are divided between the local and central levels. In many areas, 
such as the determination of eligibility, the division is clear and does not pose many risks. 
Theoretically, the division is also clear in the implementation of conditionality. Because 
conditionality has not been applied yet, no judgement can be rendered. Furthermore, there are 
a number of prerequisites for effective decentralization which are not evident in the case of 
TKP.   
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TKP and public-private partnerships  
The fact that TKP works with the private sector and fosters public-private partnerships is 
one of its main strengths. According to a senior specialist at an international organization, this 
entrepreneurial approach towards program implementation is what allowed the program to 
have “such an impact in such a short period of time” (Interview, Senior specialist at an 
International Organization, January, 2020). Although the MoSS has a specialist on 
management information systems in TKP’s task force, the automation of TKP services - from 
registration to payment - was conducted by an Egyptian company named E-Finance (World 
Bank, 2015).  
“The government should not do everything. The government should have the flexibility to 
outsource. MoSS exceeded the number of target beneficiaries ahead of schedule because it 
was entrepreneurial. […] For instance, regarding the door-to-door-awareness, MoSS social 
workers were not sufficient in order to roll out the program on a national scale as quickly as 
it did. This is why, they worked with other social workers from other ministries as well as 
the girls conducting their civil service. Very often, these were even more efficient than 
MoSS’ social workers.” (Interview, Senior specialist at an International Organization, 
January, 2020). 
 
The Ministry also worked with Care International in order to pilot and develop its social 
accountability committees (World Bank, 2015). A local consultancy firm conducted the 
program’s service readiness assessment (El-Zanaty and Associates, 2016), IFPRI was in charge 
of the impact assessment, among other consultants that MoSS worked with in order for the 
program to have this reach and impact in just five years (Interview, Expert at an International 
Organization, February, 2020). Hence, it is clear that TKP was rolled out in an efficient manner, 
among other reasons due to MoSS’ ability to outsource relevant portions of the program and 
to separate and divide functions effectively.  
On the other hand, this entrepreneurial approach is criticized by a number of interviewees. 
As with the social insurance system, there are a number of crucial positions which require 
calibers to be hired at MoSS, however, due to the government’s suspension or reduction in 
hiring, these positions are either not filled or the ministry relies on consultants, according to an 
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expert consultant on social protection. She/He emphasized that MoSS and many other 
ministries and governmental agencies are overcoming this challenge by hiring consultants on 
project contracts. According to a consultant at MoSS, the reliance on consultants is not 
sustainable “because the project could break down as soon as the consultant leaves.” 
(Interview, Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020). Additionally, it is difficult to retain such 
calibers since they get offered more competitive positions in the private and non-profit sectors.  
“I was just watching one Parliamentarian argue that the government is, indeed, working 
with ‘A class’ consultants who are well-educated and are efficient and productive. But this 
way, the government is creating a system that is reliant on consultants who do not have the 
time or the energy to transfer skills to the employees at the ministries. In addition, these 
consultants are working with frameworks and tools, the traditional Egyptian public sector 
employee has not learnt to operate with.” (Interview, Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020). 
 
On the other hand, a former consultant at MoSS underlined the fact that the former and 
current ministers of Social Solidarity have always been keen on the transfer of knowledge 
between the consultants and the employees at the MoSS.  
“Not only did we [the consultants] always have to work with them [the employees] even if 
the task did not require more than one staff member working on it, but there were so many 
procedures we could not have ever been able to do without them. Consultants are not aware 
of the governmental procedures with regards to filing paper work as well as the details of 
the legal and regulatory framework. This is why, the ministry’s employees were always 
imperative.” (Interview, Former consultant at MoSS, January, 2020). 
 
Although the government of Egypt is relying to a very large extent on consultants, many 
ministries and especially MoSS care about the development of their human resources and are 
aware of the difficulty of retaining high-caliber consultants. Still, MoSS entrepreneurial 
approach has been complimented by a number of the interviewees for being effective and 
efficient. Whether it is sustainable or not is questionable.  
Separation of Functions between Payment and Processing 
The separation of functions between payment and processing is another one of TKP’s 
advantages which aims to significantly reduce error, fraud and corruption. Once a beneficiary 
registers for TKP, the enrollment to the program is managed electronically through a system 
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designed and managed by E-Finance (World Bank, 2015). TKP payments are administered by 
the local post offices through individual accounts. Beneficiaries can withdraw the transfers 
using TKP smarts-cards -also developed and administered by E-Finance - through ATMs or 
points of sale at the post office or the social units (World Bank, 2015). According to IFPRI’s 
impact assessment, the majority of the sampled beneficiaries believe the delivery of transfer 
payments is smooth (Breisinger, et al., 2018a).  
Capacity Development  
Capacity development is another area with substantial shortcomings. It is true that MoSS 
trained the social workers, field assistants and conditionality officers at all relevant bodies 
(MoSS, 2017). Nevertheless, several challenges related to the implementation and the impact 
of service delivery are apparent, for instance during the registration and processing, the door-
to-door-awareness as well as the implementation of conditionality - as elaborated in the 
previous parts. A consultant at MoSS highlighted that these challenges arise in spite of the 
delivery of capacity development, since the training programs are not outcome-oriented but 
process-oriented.  
“In Egypt, we do not have a problem of the quality of design, we have a problem of the 
quality of delivering the program. You give a capacity development program on M&E 
but do not even introduce it with the definition of M&E. Instead of investing in the 
human capital, we invest in the projects that cross the boxes of the checklists. […] For 
instance, we would like to automate several processes, we buy the software, train 20 
individuals on its usage and then you find out that the software is not being used. So 
what is the unit of measurement? In Egypt, the unit of measurement is process-based 
not results-based. ‘What were the impacts of the program’, is the question we should 
be asking? What are the indicators you are using to measure the impact? […] In order 
for the investment in human capacity to reap results, it takes time. Policy-makers want 
the impact to appear while they are in office in order to be attributed to them. This is 
why, they choose processes over results. […]” (Interview, Consultant at MoSS, 
January, 2020)  
 
Not only does this reflect a challenge with regards to the measurement of CD programs and 
their impacts, but these challenges are also related to the capacities implementing the service 
delivery. The large number of public sector employees and civil servants and their permanent 
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contracts have always been highlighted as some of the main acute challenges of public 
administration in Egypt (Assaad, 2009; Assaad & Krafft, 2015). As it has been clear in the 
context of the SIS, the lack of an incentive structure often makes the employees a burden on 
the system.  
TKP’s Performance Management System and Incentive Structure  
The large number of permanent hires in the public sector, the inadequate division of tasks, 
their incomplete training on important tools and the lack of a performance management system 
are some of the most dire challenges facing MoSS. Similar to the rest of the governmental 
bodies in Egypt, MoSS does not have an efficient PMS, according to an expert at an 
international NGO as well as a consultant at MoSS.  
“The regulations in Egypt favor the employee. Even the Minister cannot fire an employee. 
Also, the system is not merit-based which affects the quality of service delivery. It is all 
about seniority. It is not about excelling and getting promoted. It is about the number of 
years I have served. Employees take trainings just to get promoted. They do not focus on 
what to learn from the capacity building programs, but rather it is a ‘tick’ on their CV. This 
goes for a large portion of the public sector. The legal and regulatory framework is fairly 
adequate but the system is flawed.” (Interview, Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020)  
 
Generally speaking, a large percentage of the public sector employees in Egypt are not 
incentivized to work on their self-development because of the lack of an effective PMS. Yet,  
MoSS has developed a simple incentive mechanism for TKP social workers, according to a 
number of interviewees.  
“By paying the social workers by visit, they were incentivized to conduct the largest number 
of visits.” (Interview, Former consultant at MoSS, January, 2020) 
 
Still, many of the social workers, although efficient, were not effective for many reasons 
among which is the number of different messages they needed to convey (Kurdi, et al., 2018). 
Even if there is an incentive structure for social workers, it is crucial to institutionalize it and 
apply it all stages of service delivery (Sholkamy, 2018). Currently, the Ministry of Planning 
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and Economic Development is working on such a PMS and a human resource management 
system, according to an economist at the same ministry.  
In brief, the MoSS has developed an institutional structure as well as specific roles and 
responsibilities for TKP. Although the ministry has worked with calibers and consultants, 
increased the efficiency of many aspects of the program by outsourcing them, automated 
several of the steps of service delivery, MoSS has to deal with many of the challenges that face 
the Egyptian public sector. These include a shortage in high-caliber staff members in important 
positions, an inadequate division of tasks, a reliance on consultants, a difficulty in 
implementing impactful CD programs as well as the lack of an effective PMS.  
6.2.2.3. Controls and Accountability Mechanism  
For SP programs to be governed effectively, it is crucial to incorporate oversight 
mechanisms that ensure adequate flows of information and financial resources (Bassett, 
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). Such controls and accountability mechanisms can be sub-
divided into supply-side and demand-side measures. Supply-side mechanisms include 
verification, M&E processes, spot checks, database crosschecks as well as a formal grievance 
redress mechanism (GRM). This section starts with an examination of these measures followed 
by the demand-side mechanisms. These include oversight mechanisms by the citizenry. For 
instance, they could take the form of social audits, social accountability committees, public 
hearings, third-party monitoring, among others (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). 
Proper control and accountability mechanisms can lead to the significant reduction of error, 
fraud and corruption.  
Before analyzing the demand-and supply-side mechanisms that ensure proper governance 
of SP, it is crucial to reiterate a challenge that was previously alluded at and that underscores 
the importance of controls and accountability mechanisms. Due to the economic instability, 
persistent poverty levels as well as years of corruption, a large percentage of the Egyptian 
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population believes they can “casually deceive the government”, according to most of the 
interviewees. The citizens do not trust the government, hence they believe it is acceptable to 
defraud the government and provide false information to receive more money from the 
government.  
“Because one of the exclusion criteria of TKP is the ownership of assets like cars, there are 
cases where applicants fake documents selling their cars to acquaintances, then receive a 
document enabling them to drive it. This way, it looks like they do not own any assets and 
they can receive TKP benefits. Other women hire men to look like their husbands to deceive 
the field assistants during the interviews while in fact, their husbands are working abroad 
which would also make them not eligible for TKP.” (Interview, Expert Consultant at an 
international NGO, December, 2019).   
 
Aside from the usual importance of controls and accountability mechanisms, in a culture 
where there is a lack of trust between the citizenry and the government, it is crucial to make 
sure the right benefits reach the right beneficiaries at the right time (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, 
& Ringold, 2012). Thus, by developing rigorous supply-and demand-side mechanisms, MoSS 
can significantly reduce corrupt behavior. 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
With regards to the supply-side mechanisms, MoSS designed and implemented a number 
of M&E tools, especially with the help of the World Bank. Conducted and still to be conducted 
evaluations focus on the targeting accuracy, process improvements as well as the measurement 
of the program’s impact, both on the long-and the short-run (MoSS, 2016; MoSS, 2017; World 
Bank, 2015). To assess the targeting accuracy as well as the program’s impact, MoSS hired 
IFPRI to manage such evaluations. IFPRI conducted both a qualitative as well as a quantitative 
impact assessment (Breisinger, et al., 2018a; ElDidi, et al., 2018). With the help of a local 
survey firm, they included both beneficiaries as well as non-beneficiaries in their sample, 
according to a consultant who was involved in the impact evaluation. In addition, a service 
readiness assessment was undertaken in order to analyze the beneficiaries’ readiness for the 
implementation of conditionality (El-Zanaty and Associates, 2016) as well as to enhance 
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MoSS’ understanding of the beneficiaries’ perception of the program and its processes (World 
Bank, 2015). Nevertheless, it is crucial to highlight the fact that such an impact assessment 
covers solely the sampled population.  
Conditionality  
Another mechanism for auditing conditional cash transfer programs, like Takaful, is the 
implementation of conditionality itself (Bastagli, et al., 2016). According to some of the 
interviewees, conditionality will reveal both supply-side as well as demand-side error, fraud 
and corruption (Interview, Former consultant at MoSS, January, 2020; Interview, Senior 
specialist at an International Organization, January, 2020).  
“For instance, if you have a beneficiary who is living in Cairo but has registered for TKP in 
Assiut since he knows the chances of getting admitted into the program are higher in the 
Southern part of Egypt, we will detect this. As soon as we implement Conditionality, we 
will be able to catch him since his son will not be attending the school he is supposed to be 
registered in in Assiut. This way, the ministry will be able to check whether he really is 
eligible for TKP but given all the right information.” (Interview, Former consultant at 
MoSS, January, 2020) 
 
In addition, conditionality will allow MoSS to track and report mishaps on the supply-side 
of service delivery. Indeed, as soon conditionality is applied, households will be keen on 
receiving the educational and health services needed in order not to be excluded from TKP. 
Through the program’s GRM - which will be elaborated below - they can then report any issues 
they face, according to a senior specialist at an international organization.   
“For instance, they can report having visited the health facility during normal opening hours 
and finding it closed. They could also report if their children are being bullied at school and 
are therefore not attending or if the school is too far away or if there are not any teachers 
available at the schools.” (Interview, Senior specialist at an International Organization, 
January, 2020). 
This way, MoSS can hold those accountable for such errors, sanction them, audit the local 
service providers as well as work on the enhancement of the educational and health facilities 
and the supply-side services. 
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Database Cross-Checks  
Other crucial supply-side evaluation mechanisms are database cross-checks. The 
government is working on a Unified National Registry (UNR) together with the Ministry of 
Planning and Economic Development (Government of Egypt, 2015). The UNR is an integrated 
database of beneficiary information which includes data about a large portion of the citizens 
and is linked to their national identification cards (World Bank, 2015). The database includes 
data from various sources among which the MOSIT, NOSI, MoSS as well as water and 
electricity usage, among others (MoSS, 2016). The main objective of the UNR is to “establish 
a national database platform to support consolidation of SSN programs and facilitate 
coordinated targeting and delivery mechanisms.” (World Bank, 2015). Thus, it should provide 
verifiable administrative information on household characteristics and thus, enhance targeting 
and reduce errors and fraudulent behavior. Although the UNR is still under development, the 
MoSS has been able to use its data in many cases, according to an expert on Social Protection. 
Yet, many interviewees argued that one of the biggest challenges facing evidence-based policy-
making and service delivery in Egypt is the lack of data freedom. 
“Before the development of the UNR, it was very difficult to obtain data from other 
ministries unless there was political support, the minister intervenes or the projects were 
intertwined and hence, it would be plausible to share data. The biggest challenge, however, 
is still the culture and mind-set of the sanctity and the secrecy of the data.” (Interview, 
Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020).  
 
Even after the UNR is fully developed, only few individuals at every ministry will have 
access to the database, according to an economist at the Ministry of Planning.  
Before the development of the UNR, MoSS worked with NOSI in order to determine the 
eligibility or disqualification of TKP applicants. Since the SIS’ minimum pension stands at LE 
900 whilst TKP beneficiaries receive approximately half of this amount, applicants receiving 
social pension are not entitled for TKP transfers, according to an expert consultant at NOSI. 
This is why, while determining the eligibility of TKP applicants, MoSS staff members had 
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access to NOSI’s database. “They were able to cross-check and validate the answers provided 
by the applicants with regards to the receipt of other types of governmental support.” 
(Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020). 
Spot checks  
Another crucial set of control mechanisms are spot checks. Spot checks are usually 
conducted on a periodic basis by a third-party to provide a deeper evaluation and analysis of 
the program effectiveness and efficiency as well as prevent fraud and corruption through 
deterrence (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). TKP spot checks are not conducted by 
a third party and are not regular. IFPRI’s qualitative impact assessment showed that most study 
participants recommended the MoSS should send more regular inspectors to do background 
checks since “otherwise, it’s government’s money lost for nothing” (Study Participant, as cited 
in ElDidi, et al., 2018). According to a consultant at MoSS, there are areas in the country where 
spot checks are effective and efficient.  
“Spot checks are functioning in some governorates better than others since inspectors in 
some governorates are corrupt and provide data of inspections they have not conducted, 
while in others, they are conscious.” (Interview, Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020). 
 
The consultant’s recommendation is to improve automation and MIS and thus, mainstream 
and tighten the system. It is also essential to have measurable and specific key perfomance 
indicators which are evaluated on a regular basis, but which are not available yet.  
Management Information System  
MoSS has developed a rigorous Management Information System that was praised by 
almost all interviewees as being state-of-the-art and well-developed. From registration, to 
back-office registry, payment cycle, case management, GRM, compliance with co-
responsibilities in health and education for Takaful beneficiaries, all steps of the management 
of TKP service delivery are automated and included in the MIS (World Bank, 2015). The MoSS 
is working on a regular basis with the World Bank, E-Finance as well as Ministry of Planning 
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and Economic Development in order to maintain, update and upgrade TKP management 
information system (MoSS, 2016). Additionally, it hired an international consulting firm to 
conduct an MIS gap analysis (MoSS, 2016). Also, an MIS team is working inside the ministry 
to coordinate the efforts and consolidate the data. Because of the strides in digitalization, TKP 
is moving faster than many of the Latin American countries’ experiences with cash transfer 
programs, according to a senior specialist at an international organization.  
“All TKP modules are automated. Running the PMT, enrolling the beneficiaries, rejecting 
the disqualified applicants, the payment process, the GRM, all are IT-based. This is why, 
you can say the program has achieved a paradigm shift both at the ministry as well as in the 
government. In order to design and implement a program which is well-targeted and well-
monitored , you have to create built-in oversight mechanisms. Egypt has started these cash 
transfer programs twenty years after the Latin American experience. In that time, technology 
has achieved huge strides so technology is allowing the program to move fast and be more 
efficient.” (Interview, Senior Specialist at an International Organization, January, 2020). 
 
Although the MIS is relatively advanced, the capacities working on it are not yet well-
acquainted with the system. The system is also not yet tight enough to prevent error, fraud and 
corruption, as argued by a consultant at MoSS. Yet, it has made strides and is being upgraded 
so as to close any loopholes or significant gaps. Therefore, the MIS might be used as an 
efficient tool to reduce fraudulent and corrupt behavior.  
Grievance Redress Mechanism  
A grievance redress mechanism includes a number of systems and procedures aiming at 
resolving complaints, queries and requests (World Bank, 2015, p. 65). Channels to receive 
complaints are both at the local -social units- and the central level (MoSS, 2015). The national 
office is in charge of more complex complaints including targeting and misreporting whilst 
local social units are trained to deal with more simpler day-to-day complaints and case 
management (MoSS, 2015). The resolution rate of grievances takes five to ten working days if 
the issue is concerned with MoSS solely (MoSS, 2017). If it is a complaint related to other 
ministries, resolution rate is slower since it requires coordination with other ministries, 
according to a former consultant at MoSS. This consultant also highlighted that the GRM helps 
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in implementing a softer and more flexible type of conditionality, that gives a voice to the 
beneficiaries.  
“Takaful was rolled out nationally and in a quick manner. Yet, the system will stay fair since 
it is a very flexible system. If the school is further away than 10-15 kilometers - depending 
on the age group, the family can easily file a complaint through the GRM and the sanctions 
[imposed on the lack of school attendance due to the distance of the school] would be lifted. 
[…] We tell the families in general that there is a GRM, however, we do not provide them 
with the details as to the flexibility of the system because we do not want to give them ideas. 
[…] There were cases where the women went to the health facilities for the quarterly check-
ups and found it closed. Naturally, this would cause a sanction to be implemented under the 
system of conditionality. The GRM allows her to tell her story, the grievance officer reports 
the mishap and the sanctions are then lifted.” (Interview, Former consultant at MoSS, 
January, 2020)  
 
Such a GRM which includes the option to complain and appeal can help ensure the cash 
transfers reach the intended population and minimize social tensions and grievances (Bastagli, 
et al., 2016; Overseas Development Institute, 2006). This is because this platform gives a voice 
to the beneficiaries and allows the system to be more equitable and “democratic” (Bastagli, et 
al., 2016).  
According to the biannual TKP assessment conducted by MoSS, a large portion of TKP 
beneficiaries are not aware of the existence of a GRM (MoSS, 2016). The majority of the 
respondent have not filed complaints through the GRM system before. Many of the 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries who are aware of the possibility of filing complaints 
through the GRM refrain from doing it since they do not trust the process (MoSS, 2016). 
According to the report, they believe it will not make a difference. This is why, it is crucial to 
raise the awareness of both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries to their rights and the due 
process to file complaints and grievances.  
Although the system is designed according to international standards, it is still premature to 
judge the GRM system, especially since conditionality has not yet been implemented and many 
of the (non-) beneficiaries are not aware of its existence. As soon as awareness is raised and 
conditionality is implemented, more complaints will be filed since beneficiaries’ actions would 
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have consequences such as the imposition of sanctions. In order to avoid being sanctioned, 
beneficiaries would resort to the GRM. This will represent a true evaluator of the system. 
Nevertheless, the GRM is automated and there is a certain resolution rate that is expected. 
Thus, given the data available, one can say that the GRM is developed according to 
international standards and can lead to more equitable program delivery. 
Community Monitoring and Public Hearings  
As mentioned previously, TKP’s targeting efficiency met its original goal. Nevertheless, the 
program faced some significant inclusion error - including undeserving beneficiaries from 
higher income quintiles - as well as exclusion errors - leaving a large portion of the poor 
uncovered by the program (Breisinger, et al., 2018a). In order for such errors and 
misrepresentations to be detected, the MoSS is starting to establish “co-responsibility” or 
“social accountability” committees to conduct community monitoring. Such committees also 
target an enhancement of the communication channels between MoSS and the beneficiaries, 
one of the recommendations of IFPRI’s impact assessment (Breisinger, et al., 2018b). In 2018, 
the government passed decree number 794/2018 to establish community monitoring 
committees. The main objective of the committees is to ensure “transparency of efficient 
resource management [and] monitoring the quality of social services […]” (Amr, Heikal, & 
Moharram, 2019, p. 10). To date 449 committees were formed in Qena, Assiut, Minia, Beni 
Suef and Sohag involving 3,725 members (MoSS, 2017). Each committee included 13 
members among which the village head, village lead workers, MOHP and Ministry of 
Education representatives, religious representatives, youth representatives, Non-Governmental 
Organizations’ representatives, among others (MoSS, 2017). Selection of these members is 
approved by the village or city head (MoSS, 2017). The committees were trained for 
approximately two days on TKP details as well as critical skills needed for communication and 
awareness building (MoSS, 2017). More than 100 beneficiaries were disqualified from 
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receiving TKP benefits after community monitors discovered them misreporting their earnings 
(Amr, Heikal, & Moharram, 2019). Thus, they were able to reduce inclusion errors.  
Although many committee members’ work out of a sense of religious consciousness, they 
face several challenges. According to an expert consultant at an international NGO some of the 
most dire challenges the are confronted with are the lack of social acceptance in the community, 
as well as the lack of communication with the local social units.  
 “Many of the communities regard community monitors as intruders who spy on them to try 
to disqualify them from the program which creates tensions that can sometimes get 
physical.” (Interview, Expert consultant at an International NGO, December, 2019). 
 
In addition to the poor understanding of the goals of community monitors, communication 
between the monitors and TKP staff members is weak. This is why, many of the community 
monitors do not have a proper understanding of the program, its target beneficiaries as well the 
selection criteria which exacerbates the issue of distrust between committee members and 
program beneficiaries (Amr, Heikal, & Moharram, 2019). Finally, in light of the distrust and 
social tensions community monitors face, it is doubtful whether the committees will stay 
incentivized to raise the awareness of the beneficiaries and report wrong-doings. One possible 
way to incentivize them would have been providing them with a financial return (Bassett, 
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). This proposition was, however, declined by current minister 
of social solidarity Dr. Nevine El-Qabbage at the annual conference of the Public Policy Hub 
held at the American University in Cairo. She argued that they should be working out of a 
sense of nationalism and that these are honorable committees that are not working for the 
financial return. It is also crucial to highlight to the beneficiaries that community monitors not 
only monitor and report wrong-doings on the side of the beneficiaries, but they also monitor 
service delivery on the side of TKP program providers.  
Another successful model of demand-side control mechanism is a public hearing. Care 
International was conducting the pilot of community monitoring in Assiut when its staff 
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members noticed huge discrepancies in the transfers provided to the beneficiaries. Some were 
receiving transfers that were less than the minimum provided by TKP.  
“In order to close this feedback loop, a public hearing was conducted. The head of the post 
office, social unit, among others were all attending. The people then started voicing their 
complaints on the low level of benefits they were receiving. This is when, in front of 
everyone, we started asking them how they were receiving the benefits. We then found out 
that the officer at the post office had collected 1000 cards from mostly illiterate beneficiaries 
and was giving them an amount less than what they were entitled to every month. After 
having detected this roguery and reported it to MoSS, changes to the payment scheme 
through the post office were made in order to ensure that such actions are not repeated in 
any other community.” (Interview, Expert consultant at an International NGO, December, 
2019).  
 
To date, no other public hearings were conducted, according to the above-mentioned 
consultant. Whether through a public hearing or community monitoring it is crucial to ensure 
transparency at every level. It is also necessary to include all different partners, so not only the  
ministry of education and the MOHP, but also the post offices. Although public hearings might 
not always be feasible but they should be conducted in an aggressive manner, especially in 
areas where corruption is persistent, as highlighted by the expert consultant above.  
For a program that is the first targeted cash transfer in Egypt, which was rolled out on a 
national scale in a very expedited manner and reached millions of beneficiaries in less than a 
year (MoSS, 2015), TKP has an advanced set of control mechanisms. Not only is the program 
being constantly evaluated, both in terms of the processes as well as the progress and the 
impacts. But also, the program has automated most parts of service delivery and established a 
rigorous and constantly upgraded MIS. MoSS is also working with other partners as well as 
the UNR in order to do cross-checks on the data provided by its applicants. Conditionality is 
also set to ensure misreporting and inadequate service delivery is detected. This should also be 
guaranteed through the GRM. Finally, social accountability committees are being developed 
across the country to add another layer of demand-side M&E. On the other hand, the program’s 
biannual evaluations are conducted by the Ministry itself which might represent a conflict of 
interest. Spot checks are also not conducted by a third party. The GRM, although well-
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developed and embedded into the MIS, has still not been fully tested since conditionality has 
not been applied yet. Also, the majority of the beneficiaries are not aware of its existence. Even 
though the MIS is supposed to significantly reduce error, fraud and corruption, the capacities 
working with it are still not fully acquainted with automation. This is why, some loopholes are 
still to be closed. Regarding community monitoring, it is crucial to enhance transparency and 
reduce the tension community monitors face by holding such a position. It is also necessary to 
find ways to incentivize them.  
To sum up, just like most SP programs in Egypt, TKP has demonstrated a disconnect 
between design and implementation. The program is designed up to international standards. 
Indeed, the World Bank has provided technical support in building the infrastructure of the 
system. Nevertheless, the program’s implementation is inadequate in many levels which 
highlights the existence of the discrepancy between design and implementation, which is one 
of the most challenging parts in the delivery of SP (Bastagli, et al., 2016; Slater R. , Farrington, 
Holmes, & Harvey, 2008; Robalino, Rawlings, & Walker, 2012; Giannozzi & Khan, 2011; 
Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012) 
6.2.2.4. Sustainability  
Unlike social insurance schemes which are ever-existing in most countries, whether 
developed or developing, cash transfer programs need to include measures to guarantee their 
sustainability (Slater R. , Farrington, Holmes, & Harvey, 2008; Rohregger, 2010). Especially 
in light of the economic instabilities and persistent poverty in Egypt, it was imperative to ensure 
that TKP is both financially as well as politically sustainable, according to a senior specialist 
at an international organization.  
“Since it is the first cash transfer program in the country, the MoSS was keen to 
institutionalize it from the beginning. TKP was established by Prime Minister’s Decision 
Number 540 of 2015. Afterwards, the program was included in the government’s budget. 
The Minister of Social Solidarity at the time, Ghada Waly, was aware that TKP is being 
launched after two revolutions, eight cabinet reshuffles, and a very unstable economy. So 
 128 
the program had to be protected from a legal and financial point of view.” (Interview, Senior 
Specialist at an International Organization, January, 2020) 
 
While at the beginning, the budget that was allocated to the program stood at roughly LE 
2.5 billion, over time when the program’s impact became evident the budget increased to LE 
19 billion (MoSS, 2018). The Ministry of Finance has committed to increase the program’s 
funding in a way that corresponds to the program’s impact. Indeed, budget spending on TKP 
increased from 0.1% of the budget in 2011/2012 to reach 3% in 2017/2018 (Ministry of 
Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform, 2018). Although the cash transfers are 
funded by the government’s budget, the program’s infrastructure was financed by a loan 
provided by the World Bank in the amount of LE 400 billion (World Bank, 2015). The loan 
was renewed this year by the same amount and should be spent over the course of the next four 
years on the advancement of the infrastructure, according to a senior specialist at an 
international organization.   
The program also enjoys political support (World Bank, 2015). It is designed in a way so as 
to become the country’s national SSN, to replace the Solidarity pension and to enhance the 
human capital of the poor and vulnerable in the country (World Bank, 2015). The program is 
also regarded as a model that would aid in the shift from untargeted subsidies to targeted SSN 
(Government of Egypt, 2015).  
Even though TKP is currently backed by political support, it is doubtful whether it will 
continue to do so. First, the implementation of conditionality might reduce the satisfaction with 
the program among its beneficiaries. It has been argued in the literature that conditionality does 
not respect the agency of the poor (von Gliszczynski, 2015). The consultant from MoSS also 
noted that the question of conditionality is a human rights question.  
“Conditionality poses a human rights question; does the government have the right to stop 
giving money to a child because his parents do not obey the orders?” (Interview, Consultant 
at MoSS, January, 2020).  
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Also given the lack of awareness on conditionality, it can be anticipated that the 
beneficiaries would not be prepared for the application of sanctions. Mexico’s Prospera cash 
transfer program was abolished in 2019 (Kidd, 2019). One of the reasons for the 
unsustainability of the program is the lack of satisfaction caused by the implementation of 
conditionality.  
" A further challenge for the Prospera programme – which further enhanced its vulnerability 
to closure – is that it probably didn’t even have the support of the majority of those living 
in poverty. […] Prospera has also been well-known for its use of sanctions, punishing 
families unable to comply with the programme’s conditions by withdrawing the transfer.” 
(Kidd, 2019).  
 
Thus, the implementation of conditionality eroded the support and satisfaction with 
Prospera in Mexico, which was considered an iconic cash transfer program (Barrientos & 
Santibáñez, 2009). 
Another hurdle which might affect the program’s political support in the long-run is the lack 
of societal support, specifically from the middle class. Indeed, political support for a program 
stems from societal satisfaction, buy-in as well as the public support of the program 
(Rohregger, 2010). Cash transfer programs aid the poor and vulnerable who are not vocal and 
do not steer policies (Sen, 2001), while they neglect the missing middle class (Kidd, 2019) who 
pay the taxes and hence, contribute to the government’s budget. The experience of the demise 
of Prospera cash transfer program in Mexico suggests that poverty-targeted programs are 
usually unpopular with the majority of the populace (Kidd, 2019). This is because the middle 
class pays the taxes but is unable to access the benefits. Thus, when the Mexican government 
made the decision to terminate the program, there was not a “powerful constituency” (Kidd, 
2019) in place to object to the decision, which was not implausible since the majority of the 
population was not benefitting from the program but was still paying it through the taxes (Kidd, 
2019). Hence, TKP’s political sustainability is endangered by the fact that its constituency is 
not vocal and powerful as well as the fact that the program’s beneficiaries might not support it 
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when conditionality is applied. This also highlights the importance of focusing on both 
contributory and non-contributory schemes and developing an integrated SP system at the 
meso-level. Solely investing in non-contributory schemes might antagonize the missing middle 
class (von Gliszczynski, 2015), while SSN should not be neglected since they support the poor 
and vulnerable.  
To sum up, although TKP enjoys political and financial support and thus might be regarded 
as sustainable, its impact will only be sustainable if coupled with other SP measures, if the 
level of benefits or number of beneficiaries increase, if its governance challenges are overcome 
and if there is a true graduation mechanism whereby a percentage of those receiving the 
benefits truly graduate poverty. The program’s sustainability is also endangered so long as the 
middle class is not benefitting and is not satisfied with the SP system. Unless these aspects are 
taken into consideration, the program might demise - like Prospera.   
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7. CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter summarizes the main findings of this paper and proposes a number of 
recommendations that concern the effective governance of social protection in Egypt. The 
concluding remarks briefly elaborate on the different components of this research study, first. 
Afterwards, the main findings regarding the conditions and challenges of SP in Egypt are 
compiled and a number of recommendations are suggested to the overcome these 
shortcomings.  
7.1. Concluding Remarks  
This thesis examines the governance of the social protection system in Egypt. By 
looking both at the policy and program level, the analysis explores the main conditions and 
challenges facing the SP system as a whole as well as the contributory and non-contributory 
schemes, specifically. 
In light of the Arab Spring which has revealed the importance of social justice, the 
rising poverty rates as well as the economic and political instability in Egypt, the focus on 
social protection has become even more fundamental for the country. Social protection 
measures are aimed at providing an effective response to poverty and vulnerability. The 
government of Egypt is currently in the process of reforming the social protection system. In 
2014, the government launched a ministerial committee on social justice to demonstrate its 
efforts in reducing poverty and inequality. Strengthening social safety nets has become one of 
the government’s most important policy targets. This is why, the Ministry of Social Solidarity 
launched the country’s first targeted cash transfer program, Takaful and Karama. The 
government also embarked on a number of reform efforts of the Food Subsidy system. 
Regarding the social security system, the government has passed legislative reforms to the 
social and health insurance schemes.  
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Social protection systems need to be adequately designed and implemented so as to 
achieve the desired outcomes. In the context of SP reforms, it has been common for developing 
countries to establish complex systems while failing to respond to a number of common 
governance challenges, such as the lack of coordination between SP programs, the incompetent 
institutional capacity, the lack of transparency, the discrepancy between design and 
implementation, among others. For this reason, it is crucial and timely to assess the governance 
of the social protection system in Egypt. An examination of governance necessitates an analysis 
both at the systems level as well as at the program level. It provides insights as to the loopholes 
and challenges in the design and delivery of SP schemes, but also depicts the facilitators of 
effective social protection which are either present or neglected within the Egyptian context. 
By analyzing the governance of SP in Egypt, this study aims to enhance accountability, 
transparency and legitimacy of the system, as well as base reform efforts on an evidence-based 
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the current SP system in Egypt.   
In accordance with the World Bank’s (2012) typology of SP schemes, social protection 
programs are divided into contributory and non-contributory schemes as well as labor market 
interventions. The most important contributory schemes in Egypt are the social and health 
insurance schemes. Starting from the first of January, 2020, a new law started governing the 
social insurance system in Egypt. It aimed at mitigating many of the challenges of the old legal 
framework among which is the complexity of the old framework, the difficulty in managing 
compliance, the coverage gap as well as the inadequate law enforcement capacity. The health 
insurance system has always been facing a number of challenges regarding the coverage and 
the quality of the services. Currently, the universal health insurance scheme is being piloted in 
Port Said and is set to be rolled out on a national scale by 2030. Regarding non-contributory 
schemes, the Food Subsidy system has undergone a number of reforms which aim at enhancing 
its efficiency and effectiveness, among which is the change from an input- to an output-based 
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system, the provision of a larger portion of produce to choose from and the rationalization of 
bread consumption. In 2015, the government has launched its first targeted cash transfer 
program, Takaful and Karama, which has been designed with the help of the World Bank and 
has been able to reach 20% of those living in the poorest quintile. The program is supposed to 
gradually replace the old Solidarity pension. Active labor market policies face many 
shortcomings, among which is the lack of coordination among the players in the field, the 
provision of supply-driven programs and the focus on financial services.  
It is crucial to place the governance of social protection within the discourse on social 
policy and protection. Governance is a term which has been used in many fields and domains 
and is conceptualized in a variety of ways. The governance of social protection takes an 
operational and structural stance towards SP. Although the relationship between the two 
concepts has not been studied extensively, there are a number of accounts which show the 
necessity of governance in social protection. Indeed, an examination of governance allows for 
an in-depth examination of the “black box” (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012) of 
social protection systems which aims to enhance accountability, improve coordination, 
optimize service design and delivery and reduce error, fraud and corruption. This thesis fills a 
gap in the literature by examining the governance of social protection in a country in the Middle 
East, for the first time. Governance assessments of SP systems have been applied to a number 
of developing countries but not in the MENA region. Moreover, studies in the MENA region 
and in Egypt lack a holistic and comprehensive analytic framework which examines both the 
SP system and the underlying programs.  
The analysis of the governance of social protection in Egypt follows the conceptual 
framework Rules, Roles and Controls by Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop and Ringold (2012). The 
framework is developed in the context of the World Bank’s Social Protection and Labor 
strategy. The working definition of governance used in this study is one which highlights the 
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importance of accountability relationships as well as the interplay between actors, programs, 
rules and regulations, policies as well as outcomes. The framework provides three operational 
entry points for the analysis of the governance of SP; the rules of the game, the roles and 
responsibilities, as well as the controls and accountability mechanisms. These entry points 
which make up the parameters upon which the analysis is built, operate in three spheres; the 
macro- or policy-level, the meso- or sector-level and the micro- or program-level of 
governance. This study, examines the sector and program levels since they are more 
operational, their data are more accessible and are more relevant for the study of governance 
of SP in Egypt. 
This study is guided by a qualitative research design. Qualitative research methods are 
chosen because the study is exploratory, examines a policy arena and probes into complexities, 
relationships and structures. Data collection methods include both in-depth, semi-structured 
elite and expert interviews as well as a content analysis of scholarly work and published and 
unpublished government reports covering the social protection system, Takaful and Karama 
as well as the social insurance system in Egypt. Interviewees included policy-makers at 
different ministries and governmental institutions such as the Ministry of Social Solidarity and 
the National Organization for Social Insurance, expert consultants at different international 
governmental and non-governmental organizations who have worked closely with MoSS as 
well as a number of researchers and consultants at the ministries, among others. These 
interviewees were chosen based on their positions as well as most importantly the organizations 
they represent. Purposeful and snowballing sampling approaches guided the interviewee 
selection process since the interviews consisted of policy makers and experts who are well-
connected and were able to provide useful and helpful contacts in the field.  
Although the data collection process was not influenced by the conceptual framework, 
inductive analytic approach, the framework guided the analysis and the organization of the 
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emergent themes. This is why, the analysis is sub-divided into the meso-or sector-level and the 
micro-level which delves into the governance of contributory schemes, in this case the 
Egyptian social insurance system, as well as the non-contributory, Takaful and Karama 
program. Due to the data availability, both in terms of the data collected through the interviews 
as well as the desk review, and the limited scope of this thesis, the study focused solely on 
these two programs. Nevertheless, the two programs, although not totally representative of 
other SP schemes, provide an insight into the common challenges and conditions of the SP 
system, in Egypt. Moreover, many of the features are common between the two types of 
programs and can therefore, to some extent, be generalized on the Egyptian SP system, as a 
whole. All necessary ethical dimensions were taken into consideration, in this study, most 
importantly the approval of the Institutional Review board, the confidentiality of the study 
participants and their voluntary participation. The limitations of the chosen method are firstly, 
the difficulty in its replication since it would be crucial to gain access to senior officials and 
expert consultants. Another limitation relates to the study participants. Although the 
interviewees represented a spectrum of different agencies, I was not able to gain access to local 
level officials or local NGOs which might have provided a different perspective to the study. 
Finally, the data on TKP are more extensive mainly because the program is in the cornerstone 
of contemporary governmental efforts. 
Table 3 summarizes the main findings of the micro-level analysis in this study. It lists 
the entry points of governance, the parameters that were obtained from the conceptual 
framework, as well as the ones that were added. The table also presents some of the main 
findings regarding the conditions and challenges prevalent in the governance of SP programs 
in Egypt, the social insurance scheme as well as Takaful and Karma.  
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Micro-level Analysis of the Governance of SP Programs  
Entry Points of 
Governance  
Contributory Schemes Non-Contributory Schemes 
Prerequisites Social Insurance Prerequisites Takaful & Karama 




- More than 50% of workers 
under-report their earnings  
- Lack of coverage of casual 
workers  
- New SIS tries to mitigate 
many of the challenges 
related to coverage 
Clear Program 
Rules 
- TKP targeting and eligibility criteria clear 
- Multilayer targeting formula 
- Changes in PMT formula create confusion 
- Criteria for setting benefit level clear  
- Lack of clarity regarding conditionality 
Publicizing 
Program Rules 
- Inadequate awareness and communication campaigns to 
build awareness towards TKP and Conditionality  





- Lack of social insurance 
awareness 
Transparency 
of Rules  
- Lack of communication and transparency between local 
social units and TKP beneficiaries leading to lack of trust 
Consistency 
of Rules  
- Diversity of rules in the old 
SIS led to confusion  
- New System: Unified 




- PMT formula acts like a ‘ruler’  
- Existence of error, fraud and corruption on both sides of 
service delivery leading to many beneficiaries believing the 
targeting of the program is not ‘fair’ 





- Lack of adequately qualified 
personnel  
- Lack of training and 
capacity development  
- Shortage of employees  
Division of 
tasks  
- Clear division of tasks at all levels 
- Challenges of effective decentralization - Governors and 
local capacities  
- Challenges of effective decentralization related to 
conditionality 
Outsourcing 
- Entrepreneurial approach  
- E-Finance, Consultants, IFPRI 
- Reliance on Consultants vs working with them 
- Lack of a Performance 
Management System  
Separation of 
functions 
- Separation of functions between payment and processing as 
well as data collection and decision-making 





- Employees resistance to 
change  
- “Employees should work 





- Training of social workers and field assistants as well as 
health and education units at the local level  







Transfer through: bank transfers, 




- Constant evaluations focusing on the targeting accuracy, 
process improvements and the measurement of the 
program’s impact 
- Conditionality as a verification and audit tool  
Conditionality  - Supply-side as well as demand-side checks and balances 
Database 
crosschecks 
- Unified National Registry 
- Cross-checking with NOSI  
Sanctions  
- Sanctions of the new SIS 
more severe  




- Low number of inspectors 
(exacerbated by division of 
GSIF and PSIF) 
- Lack of incentives for 
proper inspections 
(Corruption)  





- Includes all stages of TKP service delivery 
- State-of-the-art and well-developed  




- High resolution rate  
- Lack of awareness of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of 





- Community monitors face several challenges and tensions 
among which the lack of transparency from social units  
- One successful experience of a public hearing 
Sustainability  
- Old System: Anticipated Cash Deficit in 
2037 + Difficulty initiating changes in the 
system - decision-making  
- New system: automatic adjustments + 
Calculation of contribution rate that would 
not cause an actuarial deficit   
- Program embedded in the government’s budget (Financial sustainability as long 
as it produces positive impact)  
- Political sustainability granted in the short-run since the program cushions from 
the economic instability  
- In the long-run political sustainability doubtful because of the lack of support 
from the missing middle class.  
Source: Author
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While the table categorizes the findings according to the structure of the analysis, in the 
following, I will cluster, group and elaborate the main findings of the meso- and micro-level 
analysis of the governance of SP in Egypt.  
A country’s social protection system is often organizationally complex and includes 
diverse governmental as well as non-governmental actors, systems, processes and programs 
(Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). In order for a country to establish a transformative 
SP system (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2007) which achieves social justice and inclusivity, 
it is crucial to ensure the meso-level is properly governed. In this regard, coordination is 
imperative.  
A. Coordination: The main challenge facing the social protection system in Egypt and in 
many other developing countries, relates to the meso-level of governance. Indeed, the 
inadequate intergovernmental coordination as well as the deficient coordination with other 
relevant actors impedes the development of a comprehensive and transformative social 
protection system.  
This study finds that the social protection system in Egypt is fragmented, lacks a unified 
vision, is neither comprehensive nor coherent and hence, is not effective in delivering a 
bundle of complementary social protection programs which can help the poor out of 
poverty, which promotes the livelihood of the middle class and protects them against 
shocks and risks. Not only is the coordination inadequate between the different SP 
programs, but the different governmental agencies do not coordinate their efforts in the 
development of SP tools and methods and often face difficulties in terms of data sharing. 
The lack of effective coordination impedes the development of an integrated social 
protection system, creates an overlap in the mandates between the different ministries and 
deters effective service delivery at the program level. 
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Indeed, the Ministry of Social Solidarity has been facing challenges in the implementation 
Takaful’s conditionality. This is because the program necessitates the cooperation of line 
ministries such as the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health and Population. 
Due to the lack of the institutionalization of coordination efforts, only the process leading 
up the signing of the protocol between the three partners on the implementation of 
conditionality spanned more than two years.  
Regarding the social insurance system, one of the main shortcomings of the system is the 
evasion of social security contributions. Gaining access to the database of the Tax Authority 
would pave the way for the NOSI to detect under-reporting practices. This would not only 
enhance the fiscal sustainability of the program but it would also increase the coverage and 
make the system more equitable. This has not been possible due to the culture of data 
secrecy which is persistent in Egypt.  
The government has been putting efforts into the improvement of coordination on social 
protection, in Egypt. First, the government tried to institutionalize efforts by establishing a 
Ministerial Committee on Social Justice. Yet, the committee only convened two to three 
times and has therefore, been ineffective.  
With regards to the challenge of knowledge and data sharing, the government has been 
working on a Unified National Registry which consolidates the data collected by the 
different agencies working on SP in Egypt. The consolidation of the data is undertaken by 
the Ministry of Interior with the help of the Ministry of Planning and Economic 
Development. Although it is still premature to judge the registry, all study participants 
highlighted that the data will not be made available for all government employees. 
Moreover, the ministries and agencies providing the data, collect them in different period 
of times which might create a lag that would impede the feasibility of the usage of the 
registry.  
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Turning to the challenges and conditions related to the design and delivery of social 
protection programs, the micro-level of governance, it is essential to highlight that most of 
the challenges center around the disconnect between design and implementation. This 
discrepancy is evident whenever programs are well-designed but do not achieve the targets and 
outcomes they set out to reach. A governance examination is well-suitable for the detection of 
shortcomings in the delivery of programs. Another issue which will be evident in many of the 
presented challenges relates to the behavior, culture and misconceptions of the service 
providers. Finally, most of the challenges that are highlighted below are inter-connected. This 
is why, the challenges are often mutually-aggravating. In the following, these themes will be 
apparent in the discussion of a number of governance prerequisites and constraints.  
B. Laws, Rules and Regulations: At the program level and even at the policy level, the 
challenges of SP rarely relate to the laws, rules and regulations. Especially in the last five 
years, the government of Egypt has been investing in reforming the inherited and deeply 
flawed SP legislative framework. As it has been clear from the analysis, the social insurance 
system has been recently revamped with the issuance of law 148/2019. The law has 
changed several of the outdated provisions of the old legal framework, thus, aiming to 
mitigate many of the challenges of the old SIS. IFPRI’s impact evaluation as well as the 
data provided by the interviewees have also revealed that many of TKP’s rules are clear for 
both the beneficiaries as well as the service providers, among which are the eligibility 
criteria, the calculation of benefit levels, among others.  
Nevertheless, in line with the culture of the secrecy of data, problems persist in the 
communication, awareness and transparency towards the different programs’ rules. 
This obstacle is apparent in both the social insurance scheme and TKP. The SIS faces a 
serious challenge of awareness. Not only is a large portion of the populace unaware of their 
social insurance rights and obligations, they are not aware of the benefits of the system and 
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are not well-informed about the reforms being undertaken. The challenge here relates to 
the resources, both financial resources as well as the know-how to carry out awareness 
campaigns and build the awareness of such a large percentage of the population.  
TKP does not face the same challenge regarding awareness campaigns. Indeed, the MoSS 
has developed the expertise with the help of the World Bank and other partners to conduct 
awareness campaigns. The ministry is also capable of financing such campaigns since the 
loan provided by the World Bank supports these activities. Nevertheless, such campaigns 
have not proven their efficiency and effectiveness. The largest percentage of Takaful’s 
beneficiaries are not aware of the application of conditionality, in spite of the use of 
different types of awareness techniques such as marketing campaigns and door-to-door 
awareness. The next impact evaluation to be conducted within one to two years will reap 
more information on the effectiveness of the conducted campaigns. Moreover, many of the 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are not aware of the existence of a grievance redress 
mechanism. Hence, although the GRM is developed so as to increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the program, to reduce error, fraud and corruption and to enhance 
communication with the beneficiaries, a small portion of the beneficiaries is aware of its 
existence and made use of the system.  
Another challenge relates to the transparency regarding rules and regulations. Both at the 
central and the local levels, often service providers are guided not to disclose information 
regarding the rejection criteria of the program, the details of the implementation of 
conditionality, the existence of community monitoring, among others. On the other hand, 
this cultivates a culture of lack of trust from the side of the citizens. They believe the 
government is disguising information and hence, they expect officials to be acting in a 
corrupt manner, which leads citizens to find it justifiable to provide false information both 
regarding their TKP applications as well as regarding their contributions in the SIS. Egypt 
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has been referred to as the “security state” (Khalaf, 2016) for many years due to the culture 
that portrays hiding information as the safer option, and transparency as the risker variant. 
Even when sharing data, the culture of the country - both the officials and the citizens - is 
to view data as secret and thus, sacred and should not be shared. Hence, the lack of 
transparency leads to an increase in error, fraud and corruption, as well as to the impediment 
of effective accountability on both sides of service delivery.  
C. Quality of services: Another challenge which is reiterated in both programs is the quality 
of service delivery. Regarding the social insurance system, in the old social insurance 
system, the management of compliance was difficult because many of the contributors were 
not incentivized to report their earnings accurately. Since the system was designed in a way 
which, for instance, calculates the pension benefits as the average of the last number of 
years’ earnings, neither employers nor employees were encouraged to report their real 
salaries. Indeed, contributors did not want to deduct a large amount of their monthly income 
and put into a social insurance scheme which would not benefit them on the long-run. 
Nevertheless, the new social insurance system reduced the high contribution rates, the 
calculation formula of pension benefits and made other changes to the system that aim at 
increasing social insurance benefits.  
Regarding Takaful, it has been emphasized that the poor quality of educational and health 
services at the local level were among the main causes why conditionality has not yet been 
applied. The conditionality component of cash transfer programs aims to enhance the 
participants’ quality of life by ensuring beneficiaries send their children to school and 
health care units for regular checks and vaccines. In order for the system to achieve its 
developmental objective, it is crucial for the quality of health and education services to be 
adequate. In reality, there are a number of areas with no proximity to schools, many schools 
have a deficit in teachers, the quality of the curricula can also present a challenge, and often 
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children could be bullied at schools. According to the Egyptian Social Justice Index, the 
Egyptian health and education systems are among the sectors facing the greatest degree of 
social injustice (El Baradei, 2019a). This is not only the case in Egypt, but lower middle 
income countries often have educational systems where public schools do not provide an 
adequate learning environment (Slater R. , Farrington, Holmes, & Harvey, 2008). Health 
care units also lack adequate resources and competent staff. Thus, the supply-side of the 
implementation of conditionality faces dire challenges.  
D. Institutional and Human Resource Capacity: Developing the necessary institutional 
capacity to design and deliver social protection programs is one of the most important 
prerequisites of the effective governance of SP. It is crucial for every program to develop 
an adequate human resource capacity to administer service delivery. Generally speaking, 
there are a number of  shortcomings related to the institutional and human resource 
capacities of social protection programs in Egypt.  
Starting from the end of the 1990s up until now, the government started suspending public 
sector hiring and celebrating understaffing efforts. This has created a gap in the service 
delivery of SP programs. Indeed, there are often crucial positions which require calibers 
who are difficult to hire due to the hiring freeze. These positions are usually filled by 
consultants who are difficult to retain in the public sector due to the inability to provide 
them with suitable financial incentives. Even if there are many consultants who have filled 
important roles, the sustainability of the reliance on consultants cannot be guaranteed. 
Understaffing negatively affects the SIS insofar as the staff members are overloaded and 
need to deal with a wide segment of the society which they are often incapable or unable 
to deal with, properly. Understaffing has also led to the impediment of the existing controls 
and accountability measures since the number of inspectors is so low that it would almost 
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be impossible for the inspectors to reach the whole spectrum of contributors across the 
country.  
MoSS has been able to adapt to the gaps in human resources by outsourcing a portion of 
the program. Not only has the MoSS worked with consultants but it worked with women 
who are doing their civil service for the door-to-door awareness campaigns.  
Labor market regulations in the public sector pose another hurdle. Indeed, most SP 
programs do not have effective performance management systems, incentive structure or 
human resource capacities. This is why the employees themselves often represent a burden 
on the implementation of programs. As previously mentioned, the staff members at NOSI 
refused to implement the planned defined-contributions scheme in law 135/2010, which 
was one of the main reasons why this change was not included in the reformed legal 
framework.  
An efficient human resource management system would include a plan for the capacity 
development of the service providers. Although many of the staff members of both the SIS 
and TKP received a number of training programs, these are often ineffective. One of the 
main reasons for the ineffectiveness of capacity development is the unit of measurement, 
which is often process-based instead of outcome-oriented.  
TKP faces another serious challenge related to decentralization. Indeed, cash transfer 
programs need to shift a part of the discretionary power to lower levels of government. 
Coordination efforts become more difficult in a decentralized context. Theoretically 
speaking, the different functions of TKP are divided between the central and local level. In 
the implementation of conditionality, not only the social units will be imperative but also 
the local health and education units. Although the line ministries have signed a protocol, it 
has been pointed out several times that such coordination efforts are often very difficult.  
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On the other hand, it is also important to highlight the positive conditions that are prevalent 
in terms of the institutional capacity of the programs. Both programs were able to design 
systems where payment and processing are separated. This way, the systems ensured 
the reduction of error, fraud and corruption. Moreover, the separation of functions between 
data collection and data analysis leads to the same positive outcome.  
E. Controls and Accountability Mechanisms: While controls and accountability 
mechanisms are crucial to reduce error, fraud and corruption, they reveal the system’s 
disconnect between design and implementation.  
Regarding the SIS, many of the prerequisites of proper control tools are incorporated into 
the system. Not only are transfers delivered electronically, but the system foresees the 
conduct of random and systematic checks as well as the imposition of sanctions in cases of 
misreporting. The implementation of these conditions is, however, faulty. Indeed, as 
previously elaborated, the number of inspectors is low and many of them are not 
incentivized to conduct regular spot checks. This is why, many contributors get away with 
the evasion of their contributions and do not face the necessary sanctions. As opposed to 
TKP, the SIS has not been subject to regular monitoring and evaluation.  
TKP’s infrastructure is designed according to international standards. The program has 
incorporated different types of regular monitoring and evaluation tools which assess the 
impact, process and targeting efficiency. The system also involves database crosschecks, a 
management information system and automation processes, community monitoring and 
social accountability committees as well as a grievance redress mechanism. While all of 
these tools have been incorporated into the infrastructure of the system, they all face a 
number of implementation challenges. For instance, many of the beneficiaries are not 
aware of the existence of the GRM, while many of the staff members are not trained on the 
use of the MIS. Additionally, community monitors face social tensions due to the lack of 
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transparency and hence, their efficiency and effectiveness is questionable. Therefore, it can 
be argued that the SP programs in Egypt have developed rigorous and advanced sets of 
controls mechanisms, which are not properly implemented due to a number of related 
challenges. Here, it also becomes apparent that the challenges of the SP system are inter-
related.  
F. (Un-) Sustainability: One of the most dire obstacles facing the social protection system in 
Egypt is its (un-) sustainability. While the financial sustainability of the SIS and TKP is 
granted so long as the economy is growing, the more dire challenge emanates from the 
political sustainability of the system. 
Because of the structural adjustment programs and economic instabilities the country was 
facing in the last few years, it was crucial to cushion the poor from extreme deprivation. 
This is why, TKP was rolled out on a national basis in an expedited fashion. Aside from 
TKP, the government of Egypt - similar to other MENA countries - has been fixated on 
social safety nets for decades. By nature, such programs target the ultra-poor and are 
therefore described as “residualist” (von Gliszczynski, 2015). On the one hand, they benefit 
the poor, but they are often financed by the taxes paid by the middle class. Although the 
middle class, rightfully, is not eligible for SSN, it is crucial to design policies addressing 
them and protecting them against economic crises. Otherwise, the middle class, who is the 
more powerful fraction of the society (Kidd, 2019), could revolt. Thus, programs such as 
TKP can only be maintained if the middle class is satisfied with the state of social protection 
in the country. Moreover, sustainability of cash transfer programs can also be reinforced if 
the poor support them. If conditionality is applied in the absence of the necessary supply-
side services, this satisfaction might be difficult to maintain.  
In order to further the discourse on the governance of SP in Egypt, future research should 
incorporate even more programs into the examination. This might require the addition of 
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parameters, I was unable to explore. Moreover, it will be beneficial to include more participants 
in future studies, most importantly local level officials. Scholars with access to more reports 
and data sources from the ministries can also provide more in-depth analyses. Finally, it is 
essential for such a governance assessment to be regularly conducted since reform efforts are 
underway and it is necessary to keep tracing the efforts, their strengths and their weaknesses, 
the big picture as well as the one which is zoomed in. 
7.2. Recommendations  
In this section, I will propose a number of recommendations to mitigate the above-
mentioned challenges. It is crucial to highlight that I am not entering into an in-depth 
examination of every policy option because this is out of the scope of this study. Instead, this 
is an effort to start a discussion on possible resolutions to the above-mentioned shortcomings 
of the SP system. These recommendations are all inter-related, for the SP system is complex 
and multi-sectoral and hence, isolated solutions are not feasible. This section will be guided by 
the structure of the challenges described above.  
A. Coordination: The key word for an enhanced social protection system is coordination. 
Indeed, all social protection efforts should be coherent, consistent and well-coordinated. 
In order for the social protection system to be fulfill these conditions, it is imperative to 
focus on the following measures9.  
i. First, it is necessary to establish an institutional home for social protection. A single 
body or authority should be in charge of the coordination of social protection efforts 
so as to avoid fragmentation, overlap of mandates and competition. This authority 
would be in charge of overseeing the efforts of the different players, facilitating 
coordination and steering the system onto a common agenda, strategy and vision. 
Such an institutional home could be one of the existing ministries or could involve 
 
9 These measures are not chronologically organized.  
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the establishment of an external body. While the establishment of an external body 
might seem regressive and inefficient, the choice of a single ministry might create 
tensions. The choice of a certain ministry might also lead other actors to refuse to 
subjugate themselves to it. Ministries are already overwhelmed with their own 
mandates, so adding such a burden might not seem plausible. Thus, I propose the 
establishment of an external body to oversee, regulate, coordinate and monitor the 
activities of all social protection actors.  
ii. Top-down political support might make it feasible to create the institutional home 
inside a certain ministry. Aside from the institutional home, without a top-down push, 
it is questionable why ministries would agree to start coordinating their efforts and to 
subjugate themselves to additional mandates and tasks.  
iii. Without a common vision, coordination efforts are not attainable. It is essential for 
the body in charge of SP to undertake a thorough assessment of the SP system, upon 
which a detailed common vision is articulated. This vision should divide mandates 
clearly and establish a common goal, towards which all ministries and agents are 
working. In addition to the vision, the institutional home would have to prepare a 
strategy along with all the necessary implementation and action plans.  
iv. It is also necessary to incentivize policy-makers to implement the common vision. 
Since policy-makers are more concerned with short-term rather than long-term 
successes, the vision should articulate key deliverables that can be praised if achieved 
in the short-run.  
v. In order for ministries to work together, it is crucial to unify the methods. Along 
with the vision, the institution in charge of SP should develop a generic social 
protection toolkit, which includes the methods of data collection, targeting, the M&E 
tools, among others.  
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vi. Knowledge and data sharing and consolidation are also imperative. Since the 
government is already establishing the UNR, it might be helpful if the UNR 
developed a system of phased data access. Because it could be risky and implausible 
in a country like Egypt to share the data with all the different staff members involved 
in SP, the UNR could be made available to the agency in charge of SP. This institution 
would in turn grant different levels of access to the different levels of government. 
Most importantly, it is necessary for data collection efforts to be conducted in a 
manner which does not create a time lag between necessary data sources. This would 
facilitate data sharing and enhance the analysis that would be conducted on a regular 
basis by the institutional home of SP.  
vii. It is important to build evidence about the effectiveness of different approaches for 
which there is not enough data. Thus, the body in charge of SP should have a unit in 
charge of the conduct of evidence-based research which is geared towards the 
assessment of best practices and their suitability to the Egyptian context.  
viii. Finally, social protection programs should aim to truly graduate from poverty. Cash 
transfer programs do not suffice. This is why, the linkage to active labor market 
programs is necessary.  
B. Laws, Rules and Regulations: In order to enhance the communication, awareness and 
transparency across SP programs, I propose the following recommendations;  
i. It is necessary to have a system of communication and awareness which differentiates 
between SSN as well as programs targeting the middle class. Awareness campaigns 
of, for instance, TKP should focus on door-to-door awareness since it is very often 
one of the most useful means of communication with beneficiaries who are outside 
of the workforce. On the other hand, awareness towards social insurance can take the 
form of social media, radio and television campaigns. Such campaigns need to 
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highlight the benefits of the enrollment in the social insurance system as well as the 
sanctions applied on those evading their contributions.  
ii. Regarding door-to-door awareness, it is imperative to work on a detailed capacity 
development plan for social workers. Moreover, a system should be established to 
assess their performance and possibly provide them with incentives. For TKP, this 
might take the form of quarterly assessments based on the citizens’ abidance to 
conditionality, for instance.  
iii. The lack of financial resources can be detrimental for such awareness campaigns. 
Even though the investment in such communication tools should increase the 
system’s financial viability on the long-run, very often there is an unwillingness to 
invest in these measures. In this regard, international organizations can be beneficial 
in providing both the expertise as well as the material resources. With regards to the 
technical expertise, outsourcing such campaigns might enhance their effectiveness 
and might therefore, be feasible, if financially attainable.  
iv. Transparency poses a more deeply-rooted challenge since it requires a change in the 
culture and behaviors of the policy-makers, service providers as well as the citizens. 
Such change should be top-down. The government should be made aware of the 
consequences of the lack of transparency and should try to be more transparent about 
issues that do not affect national security. This culture should be transmitted to the 
local level officials for they are the ones who deal with the citizenry and are able to 
create a behavioral shift. However, it first starts with convincing the policy-makers, 
- possibly via quantitative data, of the negative impacts of the lack of trust between 
the citizenry and the government.  
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C. Quality of Services: While the new SIS has reformed many of the obstacles that precluded 
contributors from evading their social insurance contributions, it is still unclear whether 
this will have an impact on the contributors’ reporting practices.  
The quality of service presents a more serious challenge in terms of the application of 
Takaful’s conditionality. On the one hand, Takaful’s conditionality is considered as one of 
its main developmental tenets. Although many scholars argue that it does not respect the 
agency of the poor and poses, in essence, a human rights dilemma, most interviewees 
stressed on the fact that conditionality is imperative for the system. If conditionality is to 
be applied, it is necessary for the services to be of adequate quality. Many interviewees 
believed the application of conditionality would expose the system. Yet, policy-makers are 
aware of the quality of the educational and health services at the local level. Thus, exposing 
the quality of the service delivery is not necessarily what is needed. In the following, a 
number of recommendations are proposed, however, the challenge of the quality of services 
is a more serious challenge which requires interventions on a scale larger than the SP 
system.  
i. One way to incentivize the two line ministries to cooperate is to integrate education 
and health within the government’s social protection strategy. It is crucial to 
incentivize the MOHP and the Ministry of Education to enhance the quality through 
key performance indicators as well as performance incentives. Providing them with 
a sense of ownership, making TKP the success of more than one ministry might pave 
the way for the ministries to focus on enhancing the quality.  
ii. The SP institutional home with its evaluation capacity should make sure the staff 
members at the local level receive adequate capacity development. It should also 
ensure the existence of a sufficient number of staff members at the local health and 
education units.  
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iii. One way to monitor the quality of service provision is through citizen report cards 
and community scorecards. Along with the regular spot checks and inspections, the 
involvement of the citizens would help gain an understanding of the weaknesses and 
deficiencies of service delivery. It would also help create local solutions to local 
problems. Another way to guarantee an improved interface with the citizens, is to 
create communication channels between the local social units and the local service 
providers.  
D. Institutional and human resource Capacity: The recommendations regarding the 
institutional capacity of the SP system are not innovative, but are rather based on generic 
management best practices.  
i. Indeed, the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development has been working on a 
human resource management system to be rolled out at all governmental institutions. 
Thus, this is a crucial first step which has already been initiated.  
ii. Programs should also develop a performance management system as well as an 
incentive structure which does not allow employees to become a burden and to halt 
progress. 
iii. The design of capacity development programs needs to include an impact evaluation 
which is outcome-based instead of process-based. Employees should follow an 
organized system of capacity development along with appraisal and evaluation which 
leads to their reward or punishment.   
iv. Finally, it can be helpful to ring-fence administrative resources in the program’s 
budget. The World Bank’s loan allows for the allocation of a portion of the funds for 
administrative and human resources. This needs to be applied to all SP programs. 
Ensuring the existence of a budget to reward dedicated employees or hire calibers in 
positions where they are needed, can help enhance program administration.  
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E. Controls and Accountability Mechanisms: First, all SP programs need to incorporate an 
infrastructure which includes the same control and accountability mechanisms as TKP; 
M&E tools, database cross-checks, spot checks, management information system, 
grievance redress mechanism as well as demand-side measures. Although TKP has 
designed and incorporated all of the above-mentioned mechanisms, they do not seem to be 
effectively implemented. A governance assessment reveals the implementation challenges 
that arise in the application of all the tools. Thus, programs need to develop the capacity to 
analyze and examine the governance and implementation obstacles which preclude an 
effective program delivery. Afterwards, these challenges need to be reported to the 
responsible authorities who in turn should address them in a timely fashion. The whole 
process would be overseen by the SP oversight body.  
F. (Un-) Sustainability: In order for the social protection system to be politically sustainable, 
it needs to be backed up by all fractions of the society. To achieve this, it is crucial to design 
programs that cater to all different fractions of the society and thus, enhance inclusiveness, 
equality, equity and resilience. This is why, an integrated SP vision and strategy that 
provides every fraction of the citizenry with the necessary programs and conditions is 
necessary. As previously mentioned, the SP vision needs to be evidence-based, constantly 
revised and to explore different types of programming and best practices.  
By and large, the development of a properly governed social protection system which is 
not fragmented necessitates political support, the establishment of an institutional home for SP 
that coordinates the efforts of the different actors involved, the development of a common 
vision, the focus on the advancement of the institutional and human resource capacity as well 
as the unification of the tools and data that are used. It is also imperative to constantly evaluate 
the system, to conduct evidence-based research on best practices and to assess the governance 
of the system so as to understand the details related to the very common obstacle of the 
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disconnect between design and implementation. Finally, institutional capacities need to be 
organized and well-trained, mandates need to be clearly defined at all levels of government 
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